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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to show why inclusive legal positivism is the best theory
that captures what the law in Brazil is. Inclusive legal positivism allows the inclusion of
moral standards in the criteria of legality.1 It essentially asserts that the “legality of norms
can sometimes depend on their substantive merits, not just their pedigree or social source.”2
Brazilian legal norms and practices fit and sample the inclusive legal positivism framework.
3 Calling attention to this fact can provide great contribution for the country’s legal system,
because it throws light upon the system’s upsides, but also makes clear what are the most
relevant downsides. Highlighting these positive and negative features is relevant because
they are not evident and, therefore, are not usually noticed.
The fact is that Brazilian legal theory is in a turmoil stage. Being part of a civil law
family country, Brazilian jurists still have a high regard for written laws. Only laws enacted
by legislative bodies justify coercion according to the text of Brazil’s Federal Constitution
[C.F.].4 Separation of powers, considered to be a nuclear principle of government5 and an
immutable constitutional clause, is reflected in the idea that rules are created by legislative
bodies.6 Legal certainty is seen as inherent to the idea of rule of law7 and is embodied in the
notion of enacted laws as the major source of law.8 These facts may create the impression
that Brazil has a classically positivistic legal system,9 in which (a) only norms identifiable
through historical social facts are legal,10 (b) a top-down11 ideal of precise rules prevails,12

1
See Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in Hart's
postscript, in ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 102 (Oxford, 2001).
2
Id. at 100.
3
See WIL WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (Clarendon Press, 1994).
4
According to item article 5, II, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution [C.F.], “no one shall be obligated to
do or refrain from doing something except by virtue of [enacted] law.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate).
5
As per article 2 of the C.F., “[t]he Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial, independent and harmonious
among themselves, are the powers of the Union.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (Braz.)
(trans. Brazilian Federal Senate).
6
Article 60 § 4, of the C.F. states that “[n]o proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed at
abolishing: [...] III – the separation of the Government Powers.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 60, III (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate).
7
See generally S.T.F., MS No. 22.357, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 27.05.2004, D IÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA
[D.J.], 05.11.2004 (Braz.).
8
See generally S.T.F., HC No. 95.483, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 15.09.2009, DIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO DA
JUSTIÇA [D.J.e.], 29.10.2009 (Braz.).
9
According to Raymond Wacks, classical positivism refers to the comprehension that “all knowledge rests
on logical inference from simple ‘protocol sentence’ grounded in empirical, observable facts.” See RAYMOND
WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE, 69 (Oxford, 4th ed. 2015). This is the concept that I adopt for making
the reference above. Also, the Italian author Norberto Bobbio contends that “legal positivism, also admitting a
plurality of sources of knowledge, claims the existence of one sole source of qualification and identifies this
source with the [enacted] law.” See NORBERTO BOBBIO, O POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO – LIÇÕES DE FILOSOFIA DO
DIREITO 166 (Ícone Editora, 2006). See also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE – IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 120 (Oxford, 2003). The use of the concept “classical legal
positivism” does not have the intention to refer to the positivistic view contended by John Austin, which is
designed as the “command theory.” See WACKS, Id., at 91.
10
DENISE MEYERSON, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE 51 (Routledge, 2007).
11
See Denise Reaume, Of Pigeonholes and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law, 40
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113,144 (2002).
12
As Carlos Santiago Nino asserts, “the expression ‘legal positivism’ is used in many different senses
referring to clearly distinguishable and sometimes mutually incompatible thesis.” The most common statement
that represents the Brazilian way of picturing positivism is the one Nino describes as “(7) The law consists only
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and (c) norms are announced in advance and unequivocally provide the solutions adopted
by Courts in adjudication.13 Indeed, some authors have acknowledged that, for decades, the
most solid legal doctrine in Brazil was legal positivism.14
Brazilian legal texts, however, have commonly been enacted using open textured
language. 15 Legal precepts are generally written in broad terms, often employing moral

of standards explicitly enacted by centralized organs (i.e. statutes).” Carlos Santiago Nino, Dworkin and Legal
Positivism, 89, MIND, NEW SERIES, No. 356, 519 (1980).
13
Wil Waluchow contends that the formalist ideal of precise rules takes place when jurists consider that all
laws are announced in advance and applied without the need of law-creating activity. W IL WALUCHOW, A
COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 205 (Cambridge, 2009).
14
Dimitri Dimoulis states that “[f]or decades, in Brazil, legal positivism was considered the most solid,
plausible, truthful to the legislator’s will and stability, rationality and previsibility warrantor, which are usually
designated by the term ‘legal certainty’.” Dimitri Dimoulis, Introduction to NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART,
XVI (Elsevier, 2010). Translation mine.
15
For definitions of “open texture” and its distinction from “vagueness”, I borrow Friedrich Waismann’s
theory: “[v]agueness should be distinguished from open texture. A word which is actually used in a fluctuating
way (such as 'heap' or 'pink') is said to be vague; a term like 'gold', though its actual use may not be vague, is
non-exhaustive or of an open texture in that we can never fill up all the possible gaps through which a doubt
may seep in. Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness. Vagueness can be remedied by
giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot. An alternative way of stating this would be to say that
definitions of open terms are always corrigible or emendable.
Open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most, though not of all, empirical concepts, and it is
this texture which prevents us from verifying conclusively most of our empirical statements. Take any material
object statement. The terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive; that means that we cannot foresee completely
all possible conditions in which they are to be used; there will always remain a possibility, however faint, that
we have not taken into account something or other that may be relevant to their usage; and that means that we
cannot foresee completely all the possible circumstances in which the statement is true or in which it is false.
There will always remain a margin of uncertainty. Thus, the absence of a conclusive verification is directly due
to the open texture of the terms concerned.
This has an important consequence. Phenomenalists have tried to translate what we mean by a material
object statement into terms of sense experience. Now this a translation would be possible only if the terms of a
material object statement were completely definable. For only then could we describe completely all the
possible evidences which would make the statement true or false. As this condition is not fulfilled, the
programme of phenomenalism falls flat, and in consequence the attempts at analysing chairs and tables into
patterns of sense-data -- which has become something of a national sport in this country -- are doomed to fail.
Similar remarks apply to certain psychological statements such as ‘He is an intelligent person’; here again it is
due to the open texture of a term like ‘intelligent’ that the statement cannot be reduced to a conjunction or
disjunction of statements which specify the way a man would behave in such-and-such circumstances.”
Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in ANTONY FLEW, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (Oxford, 1951),
http://www.ditext.com/waismann/verifiability.html. See also WALUCHOW, supra note 13 at 196. An example
of vagueness is given by the Legal Theory Lexicon Blog: “What does it mean to say that a concept, term, or
phrase is vague? Let's start with some examples and then try for an elucidation of the concept. ‘Tall’ is a good
example of a vague concept. Some humans are definitely not tall--Danny DeVito, for example. Others
definitely are tall--Shaquille O’Neal, for one. But the term ‘tall’ is vague. 5'11 is almost definitely tall for a
woman in the United States, but might be a borderline case for men. ‘Tall’ is not the sort of quality for which
there are definite criteria that sort the world into ‘tall’ things and ‘not tall’ things. In other words, ‘tall’ is vague.
There are lots of terms that are like tall: short, strong, weak, beautiful, ugly, heavy, light, warm, and cool--all
of
these
are
terms
that
seem
to
have
borderline
cases.”
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html.
An example of open texture given by the Oxford Dictionary is given using the term ‘mother’: “[t]he term
‘mother’ is not vague, but its open texture is revealed if through technological advance differences open up
between the mother that produces the ovum, the mother that carries the foetus to term, and the mother that rears
the baby. It will then be fruitless to pursue the question of which is the ‘real’ mother, since the term is not
adapted
to
giving
a
decision
in
the
new
circumstances.”
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100251341
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standards, like morality, efficiency, loyalty, among others.16 It is uncommon to find written
rules that fit the all-or-nothing fashion pattern, at least in a “plain fact” manner.17 The use of
the so-called indeterminate legal concepts is highly encouraged, sometimes even in some
punishment cases.18
Legal principles also take part of the legal debate. Their supplementary character has
evolved into being at the center of the legal system. 19 With few exceptions, 20 there is a
prevalent practice among jurists that principles should interact with rules or other principles
in a balancing process, to assist judges, when adjudicating a case, to reach a solution that
intends to take into account all values in the best possible way. Principles are seen as
“reflexive norms, which enable limiting, construing or reconstruing the rules.” 21 Their
source, nevertheless, may be written norms, not “a sense of appropriateness” developed in
the profession and the public over time.22
The situation gets more controversial because courts have established that the content
of the norms set forth in Brazilian statutes should be found taking into consideration
normative principles written in the constitutional text. 23 The C.F., enacted in 1988, is
understood as having inaugurated a new phase of the history of Brazilian law, since it
textually enunciated fundamental rights and gave them prominent role in the system.
Scholars argue that “constitutionalism, and especially the process of law in Brazil, [has]
incorporate[d] as fundamental a right, a guarantee to access […] a just and fair judicial
order.”24 Neoconstitutionalism is the name of this new perspective and is conventionally

16
Article 37 of the Federal Constitution for example, states that “[t]he governmental entities and entities
owned by the Government in any of the powers of the Union, the states, the Federal District and the
Municipalities shall obey the principles of legality, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency […]”.
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37 (Braz.); Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993. D IÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 6.7.1993 (Braz.). Article 3º. “Public biddings shall be conducted in order to
assure the observance of the constitutional principle of equality, the selection of the most profitable proposal
for the Government, and the promotion of national sustainable development, and will be processed and
adjudicated in strict conformity with basic principles of legality, impersonality, morality, equality, publicity,
administrative probity, observation of bid notice terms, objective judgment, and others that are linked to them.”;
LEI No. 8.429, de 2 de Junho de 1992. DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 3.06.1992 (Braz.). Article 4º.
“Public agents of any level or hierarchy are obliged to ensure that the principles of lawfulness, impersonality,
morality and publicity, and efficiency are strictly enforced in the matters that relates to their positions.”
17
See, generally, Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, 35 U. CHI. L. REV, 14, 25 (1967). “All-or-nothing
fashion” rules are usually present in procedural, securities and some parts of civil, administrative and criminal
laws, such as the precepts that deal with statute of limitations.
18
Maria Sylvia Zanella Di Pietro, for example, talking about disciplinary punishments states that “in
administrative law, vagueness prevails. There are few infractions described by the law, as it happens with
‘public employment abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing
with a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as ‘serious fault’, ‘irregular
proceeding’, ‘service inefficiency’, ‘public disobedience’, or other infractions set forth in an indefinite manner
by the statutory legislation. For this purpose, the severity of the breach and the consequences for the public
service should be taken into account.” MARIA SYLVIA ZANELLA DI PIETRO, DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 515,
(Atlas, 19. ed. 2006). Translation mine. See also subchapter III.3.
19
Article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms sets forth that “when there is a gap in the law,
the judge shall decide the case resorting to analogy, customs and general principles of law.” LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO
ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 4.
Translation mine.
20
See subchapter III.5.6.
21
MARCELO NEVES, ENTRE HIDRA E HÉRCULES 103 (Martins Fontes, 2nd ed. 2014). Translation mine.
22
Dworkin, supra note 17, at 41.
23
See subchapter III.5.7.
24
Paulo Roberto Pereira de Souza, Constitutionalism in Brazil, 16 FLA. J. INT’L. L., 155, 156 (2004).
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accepted by the majority of judges as the best way to interpret the C.F..25 Constitutional
norms have gained the status of enforceable norms. Their compliance has become
imperative, especially in fundamental rights cases, which deal not only with the assurance
of formal equality, but also with accomplishing social (substantive) equality. 26 If not obeyed,
constitutional norms can prompt government coercion. 27 This assertion is also true for
programmatic constitutional norms.28 Judges can largely recognize causes of action directly
from the text. Lawyers file suits and judges decide cases based on readings of the
constitutional principles and on interpretations of the enumerated rights, even if these
readings are not grounded on any historical document or precedent, sometimes based on
their personal readings of the text. Convention and some legal norms demand that judges,
when deciding a case either in criminal, civil or administrative law, among others, should
take into account broad constitutional principles to provide the appropriate [or correct]
outcome: “[i]f it is possible to interpret a statutory provision in more than one way, the
interpretation most congruent with the [C]onstitution is to be preferred.” 29 The canon of
constitutional avoidance30 is widely rejected and decisions are rarely minimalists.31 On the
contrary, the phenomenon of constitutionalization of civil, criminal and administrative law,
25

See Tecla Mazzarese, Towards a Positivist Reading of Neo-constitutionalism, JURA GENTIUM (Nov. 15,
2017, 11:35 AM), http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rights/en/mazzares.htm.
26
As Gustavo Zabrebelsky notes “[t]he constitutions in force in Europe [and the C.F.] contain numerous
provisions that enshrine principles and that do not directly concern individual rights but rather require the latter
to conform to general interests. Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, for example, proclaims and defines two
concepts of equality in a programmatic way. First, legal equality (‘all citizens have equal social dignity and are
equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, of political opinion, of personal and
social conditions’), in the sense adopted by Dworkin; and, second, as the duty of the public powers to provide
equality in the distribution of collective resources (‘it is the task of the Republic to remove obstacles of a social
and economic kind, which, by limiting the freedom and the equality of the citizens, prevent the full development
of the human person and the effective participation of all the workers in the political, economic and social
organization of the Country’). A list of social rights follows these programmatic description, such as the right
to education, to health, to social assistance and security; these social rights constitute both guidelines for
government action and rights enforceable by the courts and ultimately by the Constitutional Court. These social
rights obviously require more than equilibrium among individual rights guaranteed by the courts. They also
require pursuit of public policies, which, while also guaranteed by the courts, are likely to limit individual
rights. The most characteristic examples include the constitutional constraints imposed on corporate law,
which—as a whole—may not be contrary to ‘social usefulness’ and may be directed toward ‘social ends’ (art.
41), and the right of property, which is recognized but may be limited in order to guarantee its ‘social function’
(art. 42), while property rights in land are subject to limit that guarantee ‘equitable social relations’ (art. 44).”
Gustavo Zabrebelsky, Ronald Dworkin’s Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View
Roundtable, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 621, 642-643 (2003).
27
See LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO, O NOVO DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRO, 193 (Editora Fórum, 1st
ed. 2014).
28
See Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 643.
29
Friedrich Muller, Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretization, 31 Rutgers L.J. 325, 331 (19992000).
30
The U.S. Supreme Court [SCOTUS] has stated that “[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either
of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter.” Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
31
According to Cass Sunstein, “[m]any judges are minimalists. They favor rulings that are narrow, in the
sense that they govern only the circumstances of the particular case, and also shallow, in the sense that they do
not accept a deep theory of the legal provision at issue. In law, narrow and shallow decisions have real
advantages insofar as they reduce both decision costs and error costs; make space for democratic engagement
on fundamental questions; and reflect a norm of civic respect.” Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 432, 2008).
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among other areas, is largely recognized.32 Constitutionalization of law and constitutional
avoidance may be inconsistent with one another.
Regarding the application of constitutional norms, scholars also note that they are
different from other legal norms. They assert that these norms, being more political, openended and less complete, need to be concretized and not interpreted. 33 The solution of the
case will not be provided by the text, but by a dialectic process of “creatively determining
results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the Constitution.”34 The judicial branch,
grounded on the application of constitutional norms, has declared important new rights.35
Most of lawyers and the press may appreciate these decisions, but they are also criticized by
few more traditional scholars as being, in some cases, judicial activism.36
Taking all these aspects into account, the prevalent school of jurisprudence, that aims
to describe law in Brazil, is post-positivism. Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, a member of
Brazil’s highest court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal [S.T.F.], argues that “[t]he debate
surrounding [the] characterization [of post-positivism] lies in the convergence of two major
currents of thought offering opposite views of law: natural law and positivism—opposite,
but sometimes uniquely complementary. Society’s competing demands for legal certainty
and objectivity (on the one hand), and for legitimacy and justice (on the other) have expanded
beyond the confines of the ‘pure’ and ‘encompassing models.’” 37 Barroso observes,
however, that this new “broad and diffused set of ideas are still in their systematization
phase.”38 He claims that “[i]n a way, post-positivism is a third path between positivism and
the natural law tradition. Post-positivist thinking does not ignore the importance of the law's
demands for clarity, certainty, and objectivity, but neither does it conceive of the law as
being unconnected to a moral and political philosophy.”39
This new comprehension of Brazilian law description advanced by post-positivist
scholars has made the process of identifying what the law requires more complex, not only
for judges, but for public employees and for the population in general. In fact, the postpositivist approach, which advocates that enacted rules (positivistic side) shall be construed
in conformity with broad constitutional principles (natural law side), often makes the
identification of what the enacted law demands less certain and objective, qualities that
should be pursued by a system of law to offer better guidance. 40 The lack of clarity is
precisely at odds with the goals of a system of written norms and top-down methodology.
While empirical disagreement among judges on identifying legal applicable norms is not
usually a problem, theoretical disagreement about the content of these rules is pervasive. It
32

See generally Luís Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e Constitucionalização do Direito (O Triunfo
tardio do direito constitucional no Brasil) 30-43, http://www.luisrobertobarroso.com.br/wpcontent/themes/LRB/pdf/neoconstitucionalismo_e_constitucionalizacao_do_direito_pt.pdf.
33
Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, School of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks
From a German Point of View, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 395, 398 (1994).
34
Id.
35
Examples of fundamental rights proclaimed by judicial rulings of the S.T.F. are provided in subchapter
IV.8.
36
See William Douglas, STF quis reescrever Constituição, Consultor Jurídico (May 13, 2011, 6:02 AM),
http://www.conjur.com.br/2011-mai-13/stf-quis-reescrever-constituicao-votar-uniao-homoafetiva.
37
Luís Roberto Barroso, The Americanization of Constitutional Law and Its Paradoxes: Constitutional
Theory and Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Contemporary World, 16, ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 579, 585586 (2010).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
The Lei Complementar No. 95/98, which establishes rules for the creation and consolidation of statutes
in Brazil, sets forth that “legal precepts should be written with clarity, precision and logical order.” LEI
COMPLEMENTAR no. 95, de DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 27.2.1998 (Braz.).
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can be hard to identify which practical reasons for action Brazilian law demands, since, even
in the presence of clear rules, judges may consider a citizen’s conduct illegal, if, in their
opinion, the citizen complied with the literal terms of the rule but did not balance it with
some abstract constitutional principle.41
In this sense, one may note that even the traditional concept of legality is in some
sort modified, since most of solutions are not preestablished in the written law.
Unquestionably, there is room for subjective judgment and discretion to decide what is legal
and what is illegal. However, the vast majority of Brazilian judges still do not acknowledge
judicial lawmaking. Although concretization involves the reaching of a result not
determinable by the text, it is still seen as a process of merely attributing sense to posited
norms. All in all, the main goal of this thesis is to point out that the Anglo-American doctrine
of inclusive legal positivism is able to explain and to justify what is the law in Brazil.
The Brazilian concept of law has been expanded to also include rules and principles
whose meaning is not sometimes clearly established by social sources, but which courts must
resort to when deciding cases.42 This view comes close to the notion of the inclusive legal
positivistic approach, being in the core of the Hart-Waluchow soft-positivism idea, whereas
morality can be a condition of validity of norms in a specific legal system.43 Brazilian law,
as described and noted by Justice Barroso, has undoubtedly opened itself to moral reasoning.
One issue to be examined is if this opening is an inherent characteristic of the Brazilian legal
system or is merely contingent.44
The second goal of this thesis is to criticize the basic concepts of post-positivism as
understood by Brazilian scholars, to show that this view is not the appropriate view to
describe what the law is in Brazil. I will argue that post-positivism is mistaken when it adopts
as true some propositions about legal positivism that are not accurate. Indeed, the main flaw
of post-positivism is the merging of two important theories that were correctly separated by
Herbert Hart in his classic book The Concept of Law: the theory of law as a descriptive
enterprise and the theory of adjudication.45 I will advocate that this merger is not a recent
phenomenon and has its roots from the civil law traditions of (i) considering legal only the
norms posited by the legislator; (ii) considering enacted law always binding—a practice
called ideological positivism; (iii) at the same time, recognizing the practical incapacity of
written texts to solve all legal problems, but making decisions that supposedly are merely a
41

The S.T.F. Justice Ricardo Lewandowski, for example, in a court opinion, citing Maria Sylvia Zanella Di
Pietro, one of Brazil’s leading administrative law scholars, stated that “the administrative official conduct, may
be […] in conformity with the literal meaning of ‘the law, but if it is revealed to be offensive to morality, to
good behavior, to the power-duty of probity, to the ideas of justice and equity and to the common sense of
honesty, will be in evident confrontation with the constitutional principle of administrative morality. Indeed, as
the romans affirmed, non omne quod licet honestum est [not all that is permitted is honorable]” S.T.F., R.E.
No. 579.951/RN, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 20.08.2008, D IÁRIO DE JUSTIÇA [D.J], 18.12.2009
(Braz.). Translation mine.
42
Cristóbal Orrego, Natural Law under Other Names: De Nominibus Non est Disputandum, 52 AM J Juris
83 (2007); David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 178, 188 (1984).
43
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford: 2d ed. 1994); WALUCHOW, W.J., supra note 3; see also
Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982).
44
Even in some constitutional law fundamental rights cases, the S.T.F. sometimes adopts approaches that
can be considered formalist. See, for example, S.T.F., R.E. No. 397.762, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio,
03.06.2008, 865, DIÁRIO DE JUSTIÇA [D.J], 11.09.2008, 611 (Braz.). (denying the request of a concubine, which
took part on a stable polygamic relationship, to divide, among her and the legal spouse, pension fund rights
inherited from their “common husband,” due to lack of posited norms on the matter).
45
As Cristóbal Orrego points out, “Herbert Hart proposed a new interpretation of analytical legal positivism.
After him, several authors have accepted this new interpretation: […] David Brink, Jules Coleman, Joseph Raz
and Mathew Kramer. They separate the theory of adjudication from the theory of law as a descriptive
enterprise.” Orrego, see note 42, at 77.
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logical-deduction of what is written [a mechanical approach], even when the existence of
creativity is evident.
I will articulate that Hart’s descriptive-explanatory view, as noted by Benjamin
Zipursky,46 provides veracity, clarity and candor in legal interpretation and helps to show
when judges are incorporating their moral or political goals into law, without being locked
to mechanistic practices. While I believe that Brazilian social conventions, in many
situations, allow judges to decide what the law should become—through the process of
concretization of written principles, for example—I will argue that the descriptiveexplanatory evaluation of the law puts light on important issues such as on “questions as to
whether the law should be respected or reviled, renewed, revised, or rejected.”47
Moreover, a third goal of the thesis will be to acknowledge that neoconstitutionalism
is the dominant normative adjudication theory in Brazil and is the conventionally accepted
way of interpreting/concretizing the constitutional text adopted by most lawyers, scholars
and judges. This view has contributed to the development of the Brazilian constitutional law
by attributing an emancipatory character for the C.F. norms and, hence, has allowed the
discovery of new fundamental rights and a broader control of government actions by the
Judiciary, in the sense there is more checks and balances. There is nothing in this view that
makes it incompatible with our Brazilian inclusive legal positivist system since it merely
reflects legal conventions and source-based rules—rules of adjudication in Hart’s sense48—
that allow the judge to refer to moral principles when adjudicating a case. My recognition of
neoconstitutionalism, therefore, is consistent with my view that one must not confuse what
the law says with what judges effectively do.49
Finally, the fourth goal of this thesis is to describe the main problems of that inclusive
legal positivism in relation to the purpose and efficacy of what can be considered a “better”
legal system, particularly in terms of the trouble in law identification and comprehension. I
will point out that some of Lon Fuller’s eight basic principles of a legal system and of law
should be observed in public law’s adjudication in the country, especially in cases involving
the imposition of sanctions. I will take the position that in many cases judges should take
into account that the determination of what the law demands has become a hard issue in
Brazil, due to the complexities of the identification of the social sources involved. In this
view, I will argue that Brazilian law should evolve to adopt approaches similar to doctrines
of fair notice, rule of lenity and qualified immunity. Regarding the latter, the decisions
rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court [SCOTUS], for example, in City and County of San
Francisco v. Sheehan,50 among other, is an important benchmark. In these cases, the Court,
dealing with public officials’ immunity from suits, reaffirmed the orientation that “[p]ublic
officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 unless they have ‘violated a statutory
or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct”.51
46

Benjamin C. Zipursky. Practical Positivism versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at
Fifty 83, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1170 (2008).
47
Id.
48
According to H.L.A. Hart, “[t]he third supplement to the simple regime of primary rules, intended to
remedy the inefficiency of its diffused social pressure, consists of secondary rules empowering individuals to
make authoritative determinations of the question as to whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has
been broken. The minimal form of adjudication consists in such determinations, and we shall call the secondary
rules which confer the power to make them ‘rules of adjudication’. Besides identifying the individuals who are
to adjudicate, such rules also define the procedure to be followed.” H ART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 43, at
96-97.
49
According to Orrego, David Brink writes that “one must not confuse what the law requires with what the
judges ought to do”. Orrego, see note 42, at 85.
50
City and County of San Francisco, California, et al v. Sheehan, 575 US _ , 2 (2015).
51
Id. at 2.
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The opinion added that “[a]n officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established
right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his]
shoes would have understood that he was violating it, […] meaning that ‘existing precedent’
[…] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”52
The adoption of solutions like the clearly established law, fair notice and rule of
lenity approaches for cases that involve punishment may help to solve problems of injustice
related to uncertainty and retroactivity of adjudication, while, at the same time, allow Courts
to develop the law, concretizing constitutional principles, as sought by the
neoconstitutionalist approach. In this view, Fuller’s ‘inner morality of law’ principles of
generality, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, compliability, constancy, congruence, could
be important benchmarks. I will show how some of these moral principles find shelter in
works of both Hart and Dworkin. I will also point out that the clearly established law
approach, although not largely developed in the Brazilian legal system, find light in some
legal provisions and precedents.53
Therefore, after stating the four goals of this thesis in this Chapter I, it is time to
summarize what will be the next steps of this dissertation.
Chapter II will provide a basic overview of the mainstream view of Brazilian law.
The basic purpose of the chapter is to call into the attention of the reader how moral reasoning
comes into the Brazilian legal discourse. At first, three recent cases that made the news in
the country, all of which dealing with controversial moral questions, will be analyzed. The
fact that Brazilian judges, even though resorting to moral arguments to decide the cases,
justify their conclusions in written rules, will be called into attention. Moreover, the chapter
will demonstrate the tools civil law judges use to deny law creating but, at the same time,
justify their creative and intelligible decisions.
Chapter III will shortly describe the basic Anglo-Saxon theories that analyze the
relationship between legality and morality—inclusive legal positivism, exclusive legal
positivism, modern natural law and interpretivism—and will offer arguments to show why
inclusive legal positivism is able to explain law and why the Brazilian legal system helps to
demonstrate that this assertion is true. Inclusive legal positivism, as noted, “allows that
morality can be a condition of legality.”54 It essentially states that the “legality of norms can
sometimes depend on their substantive (moral) merits, not just their pedigree or social
source.” 55 There may be doubts as to what will be the substantive requisites to achieve
legality, since moral standards are usually controversial. The controversial aspect of some
norms without pedigree may limit their ability to guide society effectively on what are the
legal and illegal actions. But this is a practical problem, not a conceptual or theoretical
matter.56 Problems of coordination of conduct among citizens may exist; the legal system
may not be a very efficient one in this respect, but it would still be a positivist system for the

52

Id. at 11.
See, for example, Artigo 2, Sole Paragraph, XIII, Lei No. 9.784, de 29 de Janeiro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL
DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 01.02.1999 (Braz.). “In administrative proceedings, it should be observed, among others,
the criteria of interpretation of the administrative norm in the manner that best assures the public interest that it
pursued, being prohibited the retroactive application of the new interpretation.” Translation mine. See also
S.T.J., REsp No. 1.244.182/PB, Relator: Min. Benedito Gonçalves, 03.06.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 19.10.2012, (Braz.) (when Government mistakenly interprets a statute, resulting in an
undue payment for the public employee, a false expectation that the received values are legal and definite is
created, and this fact entitles the public employees, who were in good faith, to keep the payment).
54
COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 100.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 102.
53
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proponents of this theory.57 All in all, inclusive legal positivism shows that the Brazilian
legal system is a legal system.
Chapter IV will criticize the Brazilian post-positivistic approach on the ground that
it blunts the process of identifying the current state of the law in some areas, the need for
law development and the process of adjudicating a case, in which judges may, in some
situations due to our social conventions, convert moral principles into legal ones. 58 It will
also argue that neoconstitutionalism creates this convention and, therefore, is a correct form
of constitutional interpretation in Brazil, being grounded in our inclusive positivistic system.
Neoconstitutionalism is simply an “evidence of the existence of a social practice among
judges of resolving [constitutional] disputes in a particular way” in Brazil.59 This particular
way depicts pre-commitments of the Brazilian society, instead of final solutions, reveals a
bottom-up model of case-by-case analysis aiming toward the development of the law, which
Brazilian scholars are not used to due to their civil law tradition.60
Chapter V will concentrate on the problems of guidance that an inclusive positivist
system raises, since, in some situations, due to uncertainty on the source-based criteria,
Brazilian law may be unable to furnish clear practical reasons for citizens to act in many
situations. This aspect may not be a problem for cases in which fundamental rights are being
enforced, but it may be a concern in cases that involve the imposition of punishments, for
example, since creative adjudication is essentially retrospective.61 Of course, “judge-made
changes in the law rarely comes out of a blue sky,”62 but it will relevant to analyze, for
example, doctrines of clearly established law, fair notice and rule of lenity, and try to
demonstrate why they provide important ideas for idealizing solutions for this problem when
legal changes were not rationally foreseeable. It will show that these solutions are in
conformity with Fuller’s basic principles of a legal system, which, although may be a wrong
approach to describe the nature of law, are important to assure a functional and effective
legal system. As Gustavo Zagrebelsky observes, “[t]he concretization of the principles take
place in the course of the work either of the legislator, through a rule that looks to future
events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to past events.”63 Lord Diplock,
asserts that “[t]he rule that a new precedent applies to acts done before it was laid down is
not an essential feature of the judicial process. It is a consequence of a legal fiction that the
Courts merely expound the law as it has always been. The time has come, I suggest, to reflect
whether we should discard this fiction.”64
Finally, Chapter VI will provide conclusions for the ideas expressed in the previous
chapters.
57

Id.
I agree with Tommaso Pavone: “[l]itigants and lawyers may reference the [moral principles] to achieve
their legalization; judges may invoke them as guides when faced with open-textured law; and legislators may
codify them via their inclusion in a civil code or a statute. But until these acts bestow legal status upon them, it
is illusory to speak of the existence of legal principles as opposed to moral principles. Tommaso Pavone, A
Critical Adjudication of the Hart-Dworkin Debate, (Sep. 10, 2014), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/
files/tpavone/files/hart-dworkin_debate_critical_review.pdf.
59
Coleman, supra note 43, at 160.
60
See Reaume, supra note 11 at 144.
61
According to Mario Cappelletti, “the creative adjudication is supposed to be retrospective, for a new
doctrine applies also to situations which had occurred previously. Since it has retroactive effect, creative
adjudication runs counter to the values of certainty and predictability, indeed, it is ‘unfair’, for it catches the
party by surprise.” MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 36 (Belknap
Harvard, 1st ed. 1986).
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Lord Patrick Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 Mod. L. Rev., 1, 16 (1976).
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Gustavo Zagrebelsky, see note 26, at 631. See also article 489 of Lei No. 13.105, de 16 de março de 2015,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.03.2015 (Braz.).
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See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 61, at 37.
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II. THE MAINSTREAM VIEW OF BRAZILIAN LAW
II.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals
In this chapter, I will offer a broad overview of the Brazilian legal system. I intend
to describe and explain the basic answers that are commonly given to three philosophical
questions about Brazilian law: (a) what is considered to be law in Brazil? (b) What is the
role of rules and principles in Brazilian law? And, (c) is there a predominant criterion judges
employ when adjudicating cases in Brazil?
In doing so, I will describe the country’s current legal practices. Although my
purpose if to offer a descriptive-explanatory view, there may be situations in which I will be
normatively providing my own opinions. These opinions may be criticized by readers who
disagree with my understandings. The mere choice of citations and themes may be a point
of divergence. I will try, inasmuch as I can, not to advance these normative views at this
moment. This is the reason why I will use more quotes than usual. I would truly prefer to set
a common ground of practices to better allow a truthful debate. I hope I will accomplish this
task.
As previously noted, one of the goals of this thesis is to prove that inclusive legal
positivism is the most appropriate theory to describe law and that the Brazilian legal system
is an excellent example for this theory contenders. Therefore, throughout the chapter I will
essentially describe cases, methods and techniques that employ moral reasoning. I will,
therefore, anticipate how this moral reasoning enters the Brazilian legal discourse.
As the reader may note, I will show that the Brazilian discourse, being grounded in
the civil law roots, acknowledges the role of enacted law as the main source of laws.
Nevertheless, moral reasoning has always made its way in the country’s legal practices.
At last, even though my conclusions will be regarding the Brazilian legal practices,
I will make reference to several authors that are not Brazilians, mostly from civil law
countries, but whose works I believe meet and well explain the legal practices that are
currently performed there.
II.2. Introductory Notes
I will start this subchapter by providing the description of three controversial disputes
that took place in Brazil in recent times. They all involve situations in which moral reasoning
was employed to decide the outcomes. These cases will be helpful throughout the chapter
because I intend to refer to their conclusions when answering the philosophical questions
above specified.
II.2.1. Nepotism
The S.T.F. ruling of 2008 that held nepotism unconstitutional was very controversial.
To argue the constitutionality of Resolution No. 7, of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça
[C.N.J.], 65 enacted in 2005, which forbade the practice of nepotism—appointment of
relatives to positions of confidence—within the Judiciary, the Associação dos Magistrados
Brasileiros—A.M.B.—filed a declaratory action of constitutionality [A.D.C.], before the

65
The C.N.J. is the country’s top governmental council to regulate administrative affairs within the Judiciary
branch.
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S.T.F. 66 Several entities—including associations of judges 67 —filed amicus curiae briefs
requiring the Court either to uphold or to strike down the regulation.
The Court of Appeals of the State of Rio de Janeiro [T.J.R.J.] was among those who
sustained the unconstitutionality of the C.N.J. resolution and also filed an amicus curiae
brief. 68 This shows that the matter was not apparently all clear; even judges showed
disagreement as to whether nepotism was per se an unconstitutional practice or not within
Brazilian law.69 The simple fact that the S.T.F. agreed to hear an abstract review action,70
whose main purpose was to uphold the constitutionality of a norm, shows the controversy
over the issue, since the existence of divergent decisions from different courts is a
requirement for the admissibility of this action.71
Although neither the C.F. nor any statute had ever expressly outlawed the practice of
nepotism, the S.T.F., in both actions, ruled that the prohibition derived from the republican
principles of morality, impersonality (neutrality), equality and efficiency, which are set forth
in article 37 of the constitutional text.72
There is no doubt that the members of the T.J.R.J. had also read these constitutional
principles, but in their view these principles did not forbid nepotism. For A.M.B. members,
on the other hand, the very same principles supported the prohibition and, hence, Resolution
No. 7 was within C.N.J.’s powers and did not offend article 5, II, of the C.F., which sets
forth that “no one shall be obligated to do or refrain from doing something except by virtue
of law.”73

66
S.T.F, A.D.C. No. 12, Rel. Min. Carlos Britto, 20.08.2008, 1, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.],
17.12.2009, 1 (Braz.). The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality (A.D.C.) “is an instrument directed to
declare constitutional any law or federal norm about which there is controversy or relevant doubt as to the
interpretation
of
the
Constitution.”
In
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idCon
teudo=120647.
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The National Association of State Judges – ANAMAGES filed a brief sustaining the unconstitutionality,
due to procedural violations. The Association of Labor Law Judges – ANAMATRA also petitioned before the
Court but argued for the constitutionality. See A.D.C. 12, case files, p. 363-369.
68
See A.D.C. 12, case files, p. 93-130.
69
The Rio de Janeiro Court of Appeals, among other allegations, sustained that it is ingenuous the view that
the “appointment of relatives for commission offices and trust positions violates the principles of impersonality
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pervaded of strong discriminatory weight. It may be said that it is a result of a simplistic view of the problem
that it purposes to combat.” For the Court, “to consider immoral the appointment of a person to perform a
function for which she is capable, because she fulfills all necessary requirements, specially the trust and
efficiency requirements, solely because such person is a parent of her superior, is a demonstration of all human
discredit, and, in special, on those that presented themselves to occupy relevant posts in the nation. […] It is
the physiologism that must be condemned. The appointments of person that are evidently inapt and of the
famous “ghosts” are the ones that must be object of the Administration’s moralizing action.” See A.D.C. 12,
case files, p. 126-127. Only in the Rio de Janeiro Court of Appeals, 90 relatives of judges had to be dismissed
due to the enactment of Resolution 7 of the CNJ. See TJ do Rio vai exonerar cerca de 90 parentes de juízes
(Oct. 24, 2005, 7:23 PM), http://www.conjur.com.br/2005-out-24/tj_rio_exonerar_cerca_90_parentes_juizes.
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See infra text accompanying note 368.
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See supra note 66.
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CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37 (Braz.).
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CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.). AMB arguments were very strong: (i)
most of Brazilian Courts had declared that they would enforce the Resolution; (ii) the creation of the C.N.J. by
a constitutional amendment had recently been upheld by the Supreme Court and, hence, did not represent an
interference with the Judiciary Branch powers of self-governance; (iii) within the powers given by the C.F. to
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morality are established. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-B (Braz.).
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On the very same day this decision was rendered, the S.T.F. also banned nepotism in
the Executive Branch. Despite the fact that Resolution No. 7 only applied to the Judiciary,
the Court unanimously concluded that no statute banning the practice was required to rule
nepotism illegal, because the prohibition derived directly from the constitutional principles
of morality and impersonality (neutrality). 74
The mayor of Agua Nova, a city in the northeastern State of Rio Grande do Norte,
who had appointed his vice-mayor’s brother to be a municipal driver and, for this reason,
was sued, may have read the same constitutional principles in article 37. He most probably
disagreed with the conclusion that these principles ruled out the appointments of family
members for the city government. His legal counselors may have advised him that the
enactment of a statute law was necessary to ban the practice and this prohibition, in their
understanding, could not be simply inferred from the constitutional principles of morality
and impersonality. He could have been aware that even judges thought the practice was
permitted—since apparently not formally forbidden—and appointed their own relatives for
Court similar positions. In this case, can these claims be considered a plausible or a truthful
reading of the C.F. text, independently of their beliefs or personal desires? If not, should the
Agua Nova mayor be punished for having committed an administrative improbity act
because he made this unconstitutional (immoral) appointment? These questions will be
answered in chapter V.
II.2.2. Cruelty Against Animals
The S.T.F. Justices also disagreed on the meaning of the constitutional text when
they, by 6 to 5, held unconstitutional a statute from the State of Ceara that permitted the
practice of the vaquejada. “The vaquejada is a type of sport typical to the Northeastern
region of Brazil, in which two cowboys ("vaqueiros") on horseback pursue a bull, seeking
to pin it between the two horses and direct it to a goal (often consisting of chalk marks),
where the animal is then knocked over.”75 Article 225, paragraph first, item VII, of the C.F.
establishes that “it is incumbent upon the Government to protect the fauna and the flora, with
prohibition, in the manner set forth by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their
ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.” 76 The
majority concluded that the vaquejada violated this article since it subjects animals to cruelty
and represents “an intolerable human practice.”77
Yet, the five minority Justices reasoned that, although the vaquejada hurts the ox tail
and hooves, and may even hurt its bone marrow, it is a cultural practice and a festive activity,
which is carried out in obedience to regulations and techniques since the 19th Century78 and
cultural practices are protected by the C.F..79 The professional vaqueiros are the only ones
74

S.T.F., R.E. No. 579.951/RN, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 20.08.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA
[D.J], 18.12.2009 (Braz.).
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allowed to practice the vaquejada. The minority mentioned that the vaquejada has brought
social and economic prosperity in the poorest region of Brazil, the Northeast, since it
employs around 720.000 persons, directly and indirectly, and generate revenues of US$ 150
million a year.80
Of course, all Justices are aware of the text of article 225 of the C.F.. Their
disagreement rested on what the provision actually means, since its wording is not
conclusive to say as to whether or not it bans the vaquejada. The C.F., indeed, forbids
practices that subject animals to cruelty. However, article 225 expressly states that a statute
law should regulate the subject. Does that mean that the enacted statute may tolerate cruelty
in some cases? If so, does the Judiciary have to defer to any legislative choice? The Ceara
statute was enacted with this purpose. Also, the Constitution protects the performance of
historical and cultural practices.
Nevertheless, the S.T.F. ruled that the practice was cruel. The Court, in weighing the
cruelty of the vaquejada against the benefits of the cultural practice, decided that the cruelty
against the animals came first and stroke down the statute. This balance test may also have
been done by the State of Ceara legislators when they enacted the statute that authorized the
practice, but they had reached a different conclusion. After this ruling, the National Congress
passed a Constitutional Amendment with the purpose of reversing the S.T.F.’s decision and
allowing the vaquejada.81 Following, the Chief Prosecutor of Brazil filed a new abstract
action before the S.T.F. with the purpose of declaring the constitutional amendment
unconstitutional. The argument is that the constitutional amendment offends the entrenched
clauses that establishes that amendments aimed to abolish individual rights and separation
of powers shall not be considered. 82 The right of an ecological balanced environment is
considered to be a social right in Brazil and the proponents argue that it should also be
understood as an individual right. This new case has not yet been decided.83
II.2.3. Party Loyalty
A third example of a controversial case took place when the Brazilian Social
Democracy Party—P.S.D.B. filed a writ of mandamus before the S.T.F., grounded on an
abstract decision issued by the Superior Electoral Court [T.S.E.]. The electoral court,
construing the principles of democracy, party pluralism and proportional representation, had
asserted the duty of politicians to be loyal to the parties they were affiliated to when elected.
The party also sought to regain the seats that it had lost when former members, elected to
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Congress, switched to different political parties. Other opposition parties—the Partido
Popular Socialista and the Democratas—filed similar actions.
The S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E. decision and confirmed the understanding that a
member of the Local or State legislatives or of the Federal Chamber of Deputies cannot
change her political party affiliation during her term, apart from exceptional situations.84 If
she so proceeds, she shall lose her seat in the house. This opinion, rendered in 2007,
consolidated the rule that, except for the seats and offices earned in majority elections, 85 the
parliamentary seat belongs to the party, not to the elected member.86 At the time, Brazil had
more than 20 political parties and party switching was a very common practice. 87 This
decision represented an overruling in the case law regarding the matter. In a previous case,
decided in 1989, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not impose party loyalty to
Deputies.88
The Court took this step because it understood that the “demand for political loyalty
represents and reflects a constitutional value of high political and juridical meaning, which
compliance […] represents an expression of respect both to voters and to the parties, by
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which they were elected.”89 According to the opinion, “the unloyalty act […] represents a
serious political-ethical deviation, and also an inadmissible violation of the democratic
principle and of the lawful exercise of power, because unexpected switch from/to political
parties […] surprises voters and parties and takes away the party representativeness earned
in the election.”90 The Court also stated that the practice jeopardizes the “full exercise of
political opposition,”91 due to the depletion of the party’s representation in the Chamber of
Deputies.
It is hard to say that all members of Congress—aware of the constitutional text that
establishes that Brazil is a democratic country—share the same understanding of the new
S.T.F.’s ruling regarding political party loyalty. To many of them, switching political parties
was not an illegal practice, as it was not expressly forbidden by the Constitution nor
challenged democracy. They probably agreed with the view stated in the 1989 S.T.F.’s
precedent, and that is why some had switched party affiliation. However, to the S.T.F., the
practice offended the democratic principle entrusted in the Constitution. Switching parties,
therefore, was declared an unconstitutional practice and might result in the loss of the
parliamentary seat. Congress has accepted the decision and did not take any step to reverse
it through constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless, most Chamber of Deputies’ members that had changed party affiliation
before this decision did not lose their seat. The S.T.F. decided to establish that the new
interpretation would only apply to those who had switched after March 27, 2007, because
this was the date that the T.S.E. decided the first case which asserted the need for party
loyalty in disagreement with the previous S.T.F. precedent.92 This basically means that only
representatives that changed their party after the first T.S.E. ruling could lose their seat.
II.3. Notes on the Dominant View about the Brazilian Legal Sources
In this subchapter, I will essentially cover what criteria Brazilians employ to ascertain
that a rule is law or is not law in Brazil and these criteria are adopted—the origins of it. I
will show that the dominant legal discourse generally depicts Brazilian law as being a
product of social facts. Following, I will point out that this comprehension of factual sources
of law is a result of the country’s civil law tradition.
II.3.1. Written Law as the Major Source of Rights and Duties
All cases referred in the previous subchapter are similar in at least two respects. First,
they all dealt with matters that raised disagreement among legal scholars, politicians and
judges regarding the meaning of Brazilian law. Second, the justifications of the decisions,
although not founded in rules that provided unequivocal instructions, were supposedly based
on specific dispositions of Brazilian enacted law. For the S.T.F., nepotism is unconstitutional
due to article 37 of the constitutional text, which states that the Government shall obey the
principles of lawfulness, impersonality (neutrality) and morality. The prohibition of the
vaquejada was grounded on article 225, Item VII, of the C.F., which bans practices that
subject animals to cruelty, in the form defined in a statute. And the democratic principle,
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which is mentioned in article 1 of the C.F., was the main reason for the S.T.F. to disallow
the loose hopping of political parties among Chamber of Deputies members.
Indeed, it is common in Brazil to read passages like the following written by
Alexandre de Moraes, a S.T.F. member: “[o]nly through statutes duly enacted, it is possible
to create obligations to the individual, because they are the expression of the general will.”93
Moraes adds that “[w]ith the rule of [enacted] law, the privilege of the power holder’s
capricious will ceases on behalf of the law, guaranteeing the citizen the possibility to
confront state coercion that is not imposed by legislative due process.” 94
José Afonso da Silva argues that:
“[t]he principle of legality is an essential note of the rule of
law. It is, also, therefore, a basic principle of the Legal
Democratic State, […] because it is of the essence of its
concept to subject the government to the Constitution and
ground it in democratic legality. […] All its activity remains
subject to the law, understood as an expression of the general
will, which only materializes in a regime of powers divided
among branches in which the law is the act created by the
popular representatives, through the legislative process
established in the Constitution. It is in this sense that one may
understand the statement that the government, or the public
power, or the administrators cannot demand any action, nor
impose any abstention, nor also ban any citizens’ conduct,
except due to the virtue of law.”95
Manuel Gonçalves Ferreira Filho lectures that “[the] principle—no one shall be
obliged to do or refrain from doing except by virtue of law—intends to oppose the arbitrary
power and is linked to the concept of law written in the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Only [enacted] law may create an obligation for the
individual because it is the general expression of the general will. Expression of the general
will by its body, the Parliament. Expression of the general will that governs everyone in
democracy.” 96
These comments, as seen, are usually made when explaining the content of article 5,
II, of the C.F., which sets forth that “no one shall be obliged to do or refrain from doing
except by virtue of law.”97 They are also referred to when discussing article 5, XXXIX, of
the C.F., which establishes that “there are no crimes unless defined in prior law, nor are
there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”98 The word “law” in these provisions
should be understood as meaning “enacted law,” since, in the cited authors’ views, state
93
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coercion is only justified by norms approved by the legislative process. For all of those
authors, therefore, solely through the enactment of a written law, which expresses the general
will, the Government can create an obligation for the individual in Brazil.
There are some opinions from the S.T.F. that sustain this comprehension. According
to the Court, “[t]he principle of [enacted] law reservation operates as an expressive
constitutional limitation to the government power, whose regulatory authority, for that
reason, is not sufficiently legally trustworthy to constrain rights or to create obligations. No
regulation may impose obligations or restrict rights, because it would trespass a
constitutional area which is substantially reserved for formal enacted law.”99
In these opinions, the Court explicitly acknowledged the role of statute law as the
only mean of creating law admitted in the country. Regulations are understood to simply
specify obligations which are created by Congress through enacted laws. Agencies have no
lawmaking power, at least formally speaking. Judges supposedly decide cases solely
applying written law commands.
In a case ruled by the State of Sao Paulo Court of Appeals,100 this Court stated that
the “image of the ‘judge makes law’ is incompatible with the tri-division of Powers, because
it results in the practice of arbitrary acts by the Judiciary, with the overstepping into the
legislative sphere, other branch’s attribution […].”101 The decision ends by asking “where
will the certainty of law go to if every judge becomes a legislator?”102
Regarding the C.F., the mainstream view among Brazilian courts and scholars is that,
during the 20th Century, a great change took place in the way we should understand it.
Constitutional norms gained the status of enforceable norms. Their observance became
imperative. If not obeyed, constitutional norms can prompt government coercion. 103 The last
century European model, in which the constitutions were seen as an essentially political
document, a mere invitation to the political powers to act, has been superseded. This new
view argues that there is normative force in the constitutional text.104 All opinions that were
referred to in the introduction of this section conferred meaning to written constitutional
provisions to decide the cases.
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Legality, in this sense, is understood by the mainstream view of the Brazilian legal
system as the necessity of enacted legislation, both constitutional and/or ordinary, to justify
coercion. This traditional view, although questioned nowadays,105 is still prevalent.
II.3.2. Civil Law Roots
This way of describing the basis of Brazilian law is typical of countries that have
their roots in the civil law system. As Joseph Daniow points out, legislation is the main
source or basis of the law in civil law jurisdictions. That is the reason why some have argued
that “the function of a civil law court is to merely apply the written law.”106
Gustavo Zagrebelsky, who served in the Italian Constitutional Court, talking about
his country, states that “the concept of law as a collection of norms of behavior exclusively
proposed by the legislator (both constitutional and ordinary) is still prevalent among legal
academics, judges and lawyers.”107
The French author René David mentions that in his country, “[f]ormally, only loi
[written law] is accredited as a source of French positive law. This emphasis is particularly
strong in criminal law where the adage, ‘[n]ullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’ expresses
the general requirement that only a statute can define crime and penalty. But the spirit of
statutory reference also pervades the entire body of the private law.”108
Nino adds that “the adhesion to legislation as a primary source of law in the exegesis
[school]109 had constituted a rational acceptance, grounded on the coincidence of the new
codes with the formal and axiological ideals of the systems advocated by the juridical
philosophers.”110 A phrase attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte states that “public morals are
natural complements of all laws; they are by themselves an entire code.”111 Nino, however,
adds that “contrariwise, in the current juridical science, [the adhesion to legislation] is a
dogmatic devotion based on the fact that norms have been sanctioned by certain state bodies
endowed with general efficacy, not in the evaluative acceptance of the juridical norms’
content or its logical qualities.”112
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This comprehension of legality in a formal way, as anticipated by Nino, incorporates
the traditional notion that enacted law fulfills general requirements of generality, equality of
application and certainty, and respects the separation of powers.113
Hardly anyone denies the need for the enacted law to be interpreted. But there is still
a widespread notion that interpretation is a “logical operation, of technical character, through
which one investigates the exact meaning of a juridical norm, not always clear or precise.”114
Regarding this notion, Gustavo Zagrebelsky mentions that, in Italy, “[it is still]
dominant […] the idea of adjudication as a logical-deductive operation consisting in the
objective application of the law to a particular case in point, by way of a normative and
legalistic syllogism and without any need to look beyond the four corners of the law.”115 He
also points out that “[t]he practical impossibility of decision making exclusively inferred
from the law does not shake this conviction, though it does induce resentment against the
legislator and criticism of [flaws] in legislation. Rationalist aspiration to mechanistic
jurisprudence stands firmly in place, as the product of a need of certainty.” 116
In Brazil, even well-known judges and scholars that argue for a constructive
interpretation of legal texts—especially of the constitutional text—, such as the S.T.F.
Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, claim that the traditional logical-deductive operation notion is
still important for the resolution of easy cases:
“The traditional constitutional interpretation relies on a model
of rules, applicable by subsumption, in which it is up to the
interpreter to reveal the meaning of the norms and apply them
in the case under analysis. The judgments he makes are of fact,
not of value. For this reason, there is no creativity, but merely
a technical activity. This conventional perspective is still of
great importance for the resolution of a great part of legal
problems, but it is not always sufficient to deal with
constitutional questions, notably in situations of fundamental
rights collisions.”117
However, even for hard cases, in which, pursuant to Barroso’s view, the logicaldeductive operation would not be applied, the grounds for decision are found in
constitutional principles. In his opinion, “these principles have a minimal meaning and
range, an essential core, to which they are similar to rules. From a certain point, nonetheless,
the interpreter enters into a realm of indeterminacy, in which its content definition will be
subject to the interpreter’s ideological or philosophical conception.”118
According to Barroso’s quote, even when the interpreter enters into a realm of
indeterminacy to define the content of the principle, he is still trying to provide the meaning
for a principle which has a social source, a known pedigree: the Brazilian Constitution. He
will not acknowledge law creation, but mere application of the text. 119
113
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Even for the S.T.F. to hear a case, the party generally must specify which particular
constitutional article was not observed. This is a constitutional requirement for extraordinary
appeal cases, in which the Court incidentally reviews a lower court ruling on constitutional
interpretation and an implicit requirement for abstract cases directly heard, in which the
S.T.F. has original jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of federal and state statute
laws. 120 If the party seeking the case review argues that an implied principle has been
violated, she commonly informs which precise constitutional provision gives ground to this
implied principle, at least rhetorically.121
Based on these comments, although I have not yet analyzed the role of principles in
Brazilian law, it is not too soon to state that the Brazilian legal classic discourse, grounded
on the civil law tradition, incorporates a social fact view of the source of rights and
obligations and, therefore, of the law. According to this traditional view, the social fact that
distinguishes law from non-law is the enactment of legislation, either constitutional or
statutory. As per article 5, item II, of the C.F., the citizen may only be coerced by the public
forces to act in a certain way if the government enacts a statute with this determination.
Coercion will always be justified by means of interpreting enacted rules and principles.
Precedents usually have a mere persuasive role, 122 but generally there is no
acknowledgement of law creation. This view basically reflects an idea of legislative

inaugurated in the history of our law. This constitutionalism, and especially the process of law in Brazil,
incorporates as fundamental a right and a guarantee to access, not only to justice, but to a just and fair judicial
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the social, political, and economic reality of the country. The implementation of this new vision of access to
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law, or as Montesquieu said, the judge is ‘the mouth of the law.’” Souza, supra note 24, at 156.
120
For information regarding the types of appeals and actions heard by the Brazilian Supreme Court, see
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idCon
teudo=120199.
121
See, e.g., S.T.F., AgR-R.E. No. 200.844, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, j. 25.06.2002, Diário da Justiça
[D.J.], 16.8.2002, 234 (Braz.).
122
There are exceptions to this affirmation in the Brazilian system. When a case is decided in an abstract
review proceeding, the Constitution expressly states that the decision has binding effect. See CONSTITUIÇÃO
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, par. 2º, VII, (Braz.). “Final decisions on merits, pronounced by the
Supreme Federal Court, in direct actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of constitutionality shall
have force against all, as well as a binding effect, as regards the other bodies of the Judicial Power and the
governmental entities and entities owned by the Federal Government, in the federal, state, and local levels”
(Official Translation from the Brazilian Senate). Also, according to Article 103-A of the C.F., [t]he Federal
Supreme Court may, ex-officio or upon request, upon decision of two thirds of its members, and following
reiterated judicial decisions on constitutional matter, issue a summula (restatement of case law) which, as from
publication in the official press, shall have a binding effect upon the lower bodies of the Judicial Power and the
direct and indirect public administration, in the federal, state, and local levels, and which may also be reviewed
or revoked, as set forth in law.” See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A (Braz.)
(Official Translation from the Brazilian Senate). In addition, with the enactment the new Civil Procedure Code
in 2015, a new rule (Article 926) has been established obliging judges to uniformize their decisions, keeping it
stable, consistent and coherent. Some authors have argued that this new rule confer binding effects to some
precedents. See Lenio Luiz Streck, Jurisdição, fundamentação e dever de coerência e integridade no novo
CPC, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Apr. 23, 2016, 08:00 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-abr-23/observatorioconstitucional-jurisdicao-fundamentacao-dever-coerencia-integridade-cpc.

26

positivism123 to describe the sources of rights and duties in a legal system and of juridical
mechanicism, which presupposes that the law system offers solutions for any conceivable
case.124
II.4. Civil Law Systems: Theory and Reality
In this subchapter, I will cover the problems of the written law criterion for legality
and how it is introduced by judges through practices that allow non-legal reasons, especially
moral reasons, enter into the legal discourse. As one may note, moral reasons always took
part of the civil law, but the manner these values played a role changed considerably. The
subchapter will show that moral arguments have always entered the scene due to the need of
interpreting the more general terms that are commonly employed in civil law statutes,
especially if compared to statutes enacted in common law countries. In addition, the civil
law judge has also accepted some specific dogmatic characteristics in law identification and
application that have allowed him to update and reformulate the law, proposing certainty to
its vague terms, filling its gaps, solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to
determined axiological ideals. These dogmatic properties open the door to moral reasoning.
As seen, the written law, in a general sense, is still the major source of law in civil
law systems. This means that in these countries, when examining a legal question, jurists
consider primarily legislative and regulatory sources, trying to discover, by the application
of different methods of interpretation, the solution which in each case corresponds to the
intention of the legislators.125 In using the written law as their major source, courts in civil
law systems are adhering to their tradition.
When referring to the techniques and policies of precedents in the civil law tradition,
René David observes that courts and jurists of the civil law family are not comfortable unless
they can invoke provisions of enacted law to justify or support the legal solution they chose
to apply.126 “It may sometimes even be necessary to demonstrate that a legislative provision
has been violated for the court to be seized at all or for there to be recourse to a higher
court.”127 David adds that this attitude may pass the impression that the law and the written
texts are still considered to be one and the same in the civil law countries.128
Mauro Cappelletti, when addressing the distinctions between the judicial career in
civil and common law jurisdictions, argues that judges in the civil law world are sworn in
very young, after passing high competitive exams, and generally do it without much practical
experience. Their legal education usually focuses on how to manage the technical tools,
instead of adopting value and policy-oriented solutions. So, civil law judges usually do not
like to bring attention to any law creation. Their decisions tend to appear as a mere technical,
almost mechanical, application of the law.129
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The following paragraph, which is part of a S.T.F. opinion written by Justice Marco
Aurélio Mello may confirm this view of the importance of posited norm to the civil law
judge:
“[…] since the first days of my legal career, I have understood
that the judge, when facing a case, should idealize the fairest
solution to the controversy, using, in this first stage, only his
humanistic background. Following, hence, with great respect
to legal certainty, he examines the legal precepts that are
pertinent to the situation. If he concludes for the harmony
between the fairest result and the posited juridical order, he
applies it, in which case, he will materialize justice in its widest
conception. If he does not find support in the dogmatic, he will
disregard the solution that seems the fairest one to him and will
decide in compliance with the statute’s will.”130
Hence, according to Mello, even if the judge identifies a fairer solution for the case,
according to his intuition or hunch,131 if this solution is not supported by the posited juridical
order, he cannot adjudicate the case in that direction.
But how do judges consider that enacted law is the major source for solving most of
the cases, given the unclarity of the text and the circumstance of profound political
disagreement? Is this rationally possible? This question will be answered in the following
subsections. Firstly, I will examine the civil law legislation style and some problems that
emerge from its drafting practices. Secondly, I will show the techniques that judges employ
to make this convention possible.
II.4.1. Civil Law Legislation Style
The legislation style differs in civil law and in common law countries. William
Burnham notes that “[c]ommon law judges see statutes as containing specific rules of law
that will be applied fairly according to their terms, but not beyond. […] Any judicial effort
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to extend a statute beyond a fair reading of its text would add something to the statute that
the legislative apparently did not wish to be there.”132
Burnham points out that common law statutes are usually much longer and detailed
in comparison to civil law statutes.133 According to him, “[a] quick glance at a federal or
state statute books will disclose that U.S. statutes are longer and infinitely more complex
than the average civil law code or even most ‘special legislation’ that has grown up in civil
law countries outside the codes.”134 He also contends that common law judges do not fill
“[…] any statutory gaps by extending the reach of the statute. Any gaps have already been
filled by the common law. Enacting a statute in a common law system, then, is like placing
a rock in a bucket of water. The rock displaces the water as far as it goes, but the water rushes
in to fill any holes or crack in the rock. Judges deciding a case not covered by the statute
simple resort to the common law. As a result, common law judges faced with gaps in a statute
need not to resort to a highly flexible interpretation of statutory language, such as reasoning
by analogy, or germination of rules from the statutory principles.”135
This view expressed by Burnham would probably be questioned nowadays by
textualism defenders.136 Nevertheless, some early 20th Century Anglo-American scholarship
proves that this view was traditionally adopted. Ernest Bruncken, in an article published in
the Yale Law Journal, in 1929, describing the difference in statutes in common law and civil
law countries, stated that “[i]n the common-law countries, the customary law, defined and
developed by courts, is the foundation on which the legal edifice is reared. All statutes, large
and small, whether called codes or not, are but modifications of the customary law and must
be interpreted with a constant regard to this underlying foundation.”137 He added that this
132
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assertion was true even for jurisdictions like California, in which the codes provided
expressly that they were “not amendments of existing law, but an independent statement of
the law of the state.”138 According to him, “these provisions have for the most part remained
ineffective.”139
In the civil law system, the concept of the legal rule is different. Rene David affirms
that the “legal rule […] is the fundamental basis of codification such as it is conceived in
continental Europe. A code would be no more than a mere compilation, and more or less
successful as such, if one were to see a legal rule in every judicial decision and only at the
level of such decisions. According to the Romano-Germanic notion, a code should not
attempt to provide rules that are immediately applicable to every conceivable concrete case;
but rather an organized system of general rules from which a solution may be easily deduced
by as simple a process as possible.”140
David adds that “[t]he Romano-Germanic legal rule [lies] between the judicial
decision in dispute, which is seen as a concrete application of the rule, and the more general
principle of which the rule itself may be considered the application [of the principle]. In the
Romano-Germanic countries, the art of the jurist consists in finding and formulating the rule
at this point of equilibrium. It must not be too general, for then it would no longer be a
sufficiently certain practical guide; on the other hand, the rule must be general enough to
cover a certain series of types of situations rather than merely apply to some particular
situations as does the judicial decision.”141
This point of balance varies according to the specific area of law; criminal and tax
laws should be more specific and discretion should be limited inasmuch as possible. 142
“Greater generalization, on the contrary, may be preferable in certain other and more fluid
areas where it is intended that the rigor of legal solutions be less strictly imposed.”143
David argues that “the generality of the legal rule explains why the task of lawyers
in these countries is conceived essentially one of interpreting legislative provisions and is
thus unlike that of [c]ommon law countries where the legal technique is characterized by the
process of distinguishing judicial decisions.”144 He explains that “the ‘right’ legal rule itself
is not thought of in the same manner: in [c]ommon law countries the judge is expected to
formulate, as precisely as possible, the rule which provides a solution [for] the dispute; in the
Romano-Germanic countries, on the contrary, because its function is simply to establish the
framework of the law and to furnish the judge with guidelines for decision-making, it is
considered desirable that the legal rule leave him a certain margin of discretion.”145
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Nino asserts that “in countries with our legal tradition it is wrong to consider a code
or a statute as part of the law isolated from theoretical constructions that were developed
around it.”146 For that reason, David is right when he says that in civil law systems, the
generality of the rule is considered a positive property because of the assumption that the
judge or the legislator will never be able to foresee all possible cases in which the rule must
govern.
Taking these ideas into account, one may observe that the sort of social fact required
to satisfy legality in common law or civil law countries is very different. Brazil, following
this tradition of civil law drafting, does not have well-developed theories of fair notice,
vagueness or overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the requisite of legality, it
will not really matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer good guidance to the
citizens. There is a sort of general understanding—or convention—that the terms will be
made clear through a process of interpretation or concretization. The fact that some
applications of the rule will not find support in the legislative history or even in the original
intent of the drafters is not generally a problem. The social fact has taken place, there is
written law on the general issue and what the Judiciary extracts from the text—in a process
that may also take into account constitutional principles, as we will see—is considered within
the legitimate authority of Courts—if it is understood that its action does not contradict the
Constitution.
A good comparison of the way statutes are generally drafted in Brazil and in the U.S.
may be found in the regulation of the crime of passive corruption, which takes place when a
public official receives a bribe. In Brazil, the matter is disciplined by article 317 of the Penal
Code, which states:
“Passive Corruption
Art. 317 – Request or receive, for himself or other, directly or
indirectly, even when not in office or before swearing in, but
because of the official position, undue advantage, or accept a
promise of this advantage:
Sanction – incarceration, from 2 (two) to 12 (twelve) years,
and fine. ”147
In the U.S., for the Federal Government, Chapter 18, Section 201, of the US Code
establishes the crime:
“(a) For the purpose of this section—
[…]
(3) the term “official act” means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought
before any public official, in this official’s official capacity, or
in this official’s place of trust or profit.
[…]
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(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public
official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks,
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of
value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the official duty of such official or person;
[…]
(c) Whoever—
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty—
[…]
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or
indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to
receive or accept anything of value personally for or because
of any official act performed or to be performed by this official
or person;”
It is easy to note a difference in the drafting and style, as well as the purposes of the
statute. There seems to be more concern with clarity and on anticipating possible conflicts of
interpretation in the U.S. Federal Code. Undeniably, the American judge is more constrained
to interpret the statute than the Brazilian judge, who may construe vague terms, like “undue
advantage.” In fact, there is still an ongoing debate as to whether the practice of an “official
act” is necessary for characterize the crime in Brazil and the statute was enacted in 1940.148
148
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A close reading of article 317 of the Penal Code shows that it does not say whether the
practice of an official act is necessary.
Also, since doctrines of vagueness or fair notice are more developed in the U.S.,
American judges are more likely to worry about the possibility that the existence of vague
terms in the statute may result in lack of limits on law enforcement. It is rare to see these
concerns in Brazil, because judges consider that the statute merely needs to be interpreted
and that the limits, if necessary, will be established through adjudication.
In McDonnell v. United States,149 for example, the SCOTUS vacated a conviction of
a former Virginia Governor, Robert McDonnel, and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, on honest
services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges related to their acceptance of $175,000 in
loans, gifts, and other benefits from a Virginia businessman. The SCOTUS basically held
that “the jury instructions on the statute term ‘official act’ were expansive and raised
significant constitutional concerns.”150 The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated that “[t]here [was] no doubt that this case [was] distasteful; it may be worse than that.
But [their] concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead
with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of the
federal bribery statute. A more limited interpretation of the term “official act” leaves ample
room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the statute and the
precedent of this Court.”151
In Germany, there have been criticisms regarding the use of indeterminate legal
concepts to define criminal sanctions, which is constitutionally permitted.152 Giacomolli and
Aflen point out that the article 104, 1, of the Basic Norm establishes that “only through
formal law a sanction of incarceration may be applied.” They complain that “the
generalization of the criminal statutes represents a risk to legal certainty, because it is a result
of the excessive use of general clauses, objectively distinctive, which void the guarantee
function of the criminal law.” 153 They mention that German authors claim that legislators
have been neglecting this legality postulate, by “creating penal norms that, even for experts,
are not the most comprehensible. Rules in which it is hard to distinguish the punishable
conduct to a lawful one.”154
To sustain their point of view, these scholars cite a precedent from the German
Constitutional Court:
“The art. 103, item 2, of the Basic Norm demands the legislator
to circumscribe the punishable elements in a concrete manner,
in the sense the ambit of application and the reach of criminal
rules result from the content of the statute, or, in any case, may
be obtained through interpretation. This does not exclude,
however, the use of concepts that need in a certain way be
interpreted by the judge. Also, in criminal law, the legislator
faces the necessity of taking into account life’s multiform. In
addition, it is due to the criminal rules inevitable generality and
abstraction that, in the concrete case, it is doubted that a
conduct is still prohibited by the criminal law. Nevertheless,
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in all cases, the norm’s recipient shall be able to foresee, from
the legal precept, if a conduct is punishable. In borderline
cases, it must be calculated at least the possibility of
sanction.”155
In light of this precedent, they state that “this […] has contributed, decisively, for the
criminal law be guided by indeterminate legal concepts.” 156 And they conclude that “the
classic postulates of the legality principle, which form the base of criminal law, in practice,
have been considered an unreachable ideal, an ideal that may be forgotten if the citizen falls
within the hands of the criminal law.”157
Indeed, in some civil law countries, this regulation of criminal acts through the use
of principles is still criticized. Zagrebelsky, for example, asserts the following:
“[t]he interesting logical difference, from a practical
standpoint, is that in order for the principle to work in practice,
its ‘concretization’ is required; in other words, it must be
reducible to a formula containing a case in point relevant to a
historical event and the consequence must derive from it. The
concretization of the principle takes place in the course of the
work either of the legislator, through a rule that looks to future
events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to
past events. In certain determined fields, the second option is
expressly excluded. That is predominantly the case in criminal
law, where it is preferable that the legislator establish crimes
and punishment through prospective and predictable rules.
Beyond this exception, however, rules and principles often
operate jointly and in parallel fashion.”158
A final important issue to point out is an argument regarding the length of the C.F.
text. Brazil is said to have a very analytical constitution, as opposed to the U.S. Constitution,
which is qualified as synthetical. This assertion is true, the C.F. has more than 250 articles,
some of which also have many items and paragraphs. It deals with a vast number of subjects
which are not considered traditional constitutional issues, 159 such as tax, family,
environmental and health law. But this fact does not undermine the point made regarding the
style of norms in Brazil. Most of the C.F. precepts are written in a synthetic manner and do
not have the ambition of regulating the whole matter they deal with, leaving great room for
construction. About this issue, Patrícia Perrone, a law clerk and professor in Brazil, states:
“the 1988 constitutional text employs, in its provisions,
undetermined legal concepts, fundamental rights and/or
principles, which meanings, to solve cases, demand the judge’s
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evaluative and, many times, creative attitude. Examples of
undetermined legal concepts included in the Constitution:
“political party plurality”, which is a foundation of the
Brazilian State; the “social function” to be accomplished
through property; “the imminent public danger”, which
authorizes the Government to use a private good; the “threat
of violence” against freedom of locomotion, which is protected
by habeas corpus.”160
Saulo Ramos, former Ministry of Justice, made a similar comment in a book:
“It was not possible, however, to improve the whole congress
bill of the constitutional text. A constitutional assembly always
becomes a pressure cooker, and the Brazilian politicians, when
writing the text of a constitution, have a tendency to create
things that look like recreation center by-laws. They include
details, smallness, artistic, sports and financial directors’
competences, and end up mixing up rules that interlace and are
contradictory among themselves, some ridiculous, others
audacious, but nearly all a product of unreflected fruits of nondigested ideological confrontations. These extravagances
hallucinate ordinary legislators, and also make interpreters and
hermeneuts crazy.”161
Examples to prove this point can be extracted from the cases cited in subchapter II.2.
above. Article 225, paragraph first, item VII, of the C.F. establishes that “it is incumbent
upon the Government to protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in the manner set
forth by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause the
extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.” This provision sets a goal to be pursued,
but, at the same time, leaves ample room for statute regulation and judicial construction.
II.4.2. Civil Law Legislation Dogmas
This view that enacted law is what constitutes the sole source of law for the solution
of most cases in the civil law world is supported due to some specific dogmatic
characteristics in law identification and application. There are certain ideological attitudes
and rational ideals regarding the comprehension of statutes and of the C.F. that judges
articulate when reaching a decision, while still thinking they are simply following the
enacted law.162 That is the reason civil law jurists call legal dogmatic the method that allows
the finding of legal solutions.163
Although Santiago Nino calls the dogmatic predicates a fiction, he observes that they
serve the relevant function of reformulating the law, proposing certainty to its vague terms,
filling its gaps, solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to determined axiological
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ideals. The juridical dogmatic, therefore, is essential to the administration of justice and to
the development of the law, although it presupposes to only be applying what is already
law. 164 It has the important purpose of moving the civil law judge away from a
literalist/mechanicist approach of law.
Nino notes, also, that the singularity of the dogmatic is that the judge’s activity of
reconstruing and developing the law is not done in a clear, candor way, but in a feint manner,
using rhetorically the conceptual apparatus to pass the impression that the original solutions
emerge as if they merely derive from posited law.165 The applied techniques “perform the
important mission to adapt the law to certain rational and axiological ideals [and], at the
same time, provide a feeling of preserving legal certainty by allowing to affirm that the
proposed solutions derive implicitly from posited law and are not modifying it.” 166
I will now go over the most common dogmatic predicates, which are: (a) unity,
coherency, consistency and completeness; (b) adhesion to the legislation; and (c) the rational
legislator.
II.4.2.1. Unity, Coherency, Consistency and Completeness
At first, the enacted law is understood as being a unitary system, totally coherent,
consistent, and complete. 167 The civil law jurist considers that the conjugation of these
attributes is what makes the law a system, something distinct from a group of scattered
norms.168
The legal system is understood as a unitary system because there is a general
convention that all rules are posited—directly by the legislature or indirectly through
administrative regulation—by the same authority. All enacted laws, in this sense, come from
the same source, which is the legitimated power to make the law.169 Hans Kelsen’s basic
norm (grundnorm), which traditionally offers an underlying basis for the legal system and
whose existence is presupposed by the civil law jurist, provides the authority to the
legislator.170
According to the University of Heidelberg Professor Winfried Brugger,
“[c]onsistency or legal coherence entails that all of the law—its purposes, principles, and
rules—should form a bond of unity; of mutual coordination, accommodation, and
clarification.”171 He adds that “laws should avoid contradiction and excessive vagueness,
and judges should do their best to read the law as a ‘rational continuum’ in order to promote
clarity and consonance.”172
Brugger adds that “this [attempt to read the law as a ‘rational continuum’] is more
realistic in modern pluralistic societies, whose legal systems must integrate many different
values, and where the democratic process usually is not compelled by a constitutional
mandate to proceed consistently; furthermore, legislatures often evade their responsibility to

164

NINO, see note 109, at 384.
Id.
166
Id.
167
Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical
Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 Yale J.L. & Human. 149, 163 (2007).
168
BOBBIO, supra note 9, at 198.
169
Id. at 200.
170
Id. at 201.
171
Id.
172
Brugger, see supra note 33, at 411.
165

36

take difficult (read: politically potentially damaging) decisions by intentionally using openended language that leaves the burden of decision-making on the judiciary.”173
Both Hans Kelsen and Norberto Bobbio assert that the dogma of completeness means
that the legal system is capable of providing a solution for all cases. The legal system, in this
sense, has no gaps.174
As Thomas Vesting notes, “either the quaestio juris of a circumstance of life is
already anticipated by the law of the jurists or by the political legislative activity or, if this
is not the case, at least, the adjudicator may solve it through literal, logic, gap-filling or,
eventually, analogic interpretation, in the deductive sense employed. The system always has
the prompt response, at least ideally.”175
The attributes of coherence and completeness, according to Francesco Carnelutti, are
pertinent because the law may have two defects: an excess defect (exuberance), when there
are more rules than there should be and they conflict with each other, and an emptiness defect
(deficiency), in which case there is a gap. When the excess defect takes place, the jurist will
have to expurgate it from the legal system, that is, to eliminate the extra norm; in the second
case, she will integrate the legal system.176 The gap, in this sense, would not be one of the
legal system, but of rules, because the system would always have a solution.177
Brazilian law is written in a way that incorporates the dogmas of coherence and
completeness. Even when facing a gap, the Brazilian judge has to decide the case
(prohibition of non liquet). Article 140 of the Civil Procedure Code sets forth that “the judge
may not exempt himself to decide a case under the argument that there is a gap or an
obscurity in the legal system.”178 Brazilian statute law determines that, in these cases, the
judge shall rule by applying analogy, customs or general principles of law.179 She may not
decide the case applying equity, except when authorized by statute law. 180 Therefore,
Brazilian law acknowledges the existence of normative gaps, but also considers itself
complete in a way that in these cases judges will resort to an inclusive general norm, through
which judges will decide non-regulated cases to the discipline of similar regulated cases.181
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These solutions are different from the ones adopted by the Swiss Civil Code, for
example. Although the Swiss Code also has an inclusive legal norm, it authorizes the judge
to behave as a legislator when facing a gap, which may denote that he is expressly authorized
to go beyond the legal system to find the best solution that suits him. 182 Alfred E. von
Overbeck contends that because of this provision the Swiss Code “deliberately rejects the
idea that it could be complete and give an answer to every conceivable question.”183
Nonetheless, when deciding cases that do not have a solution in the system, grounded
in the closure rule, judges do not seem themselves legislating, because, adopting Kelsen’s
view, they will only be authorized to “create an individual norm, valid for the single, present
case.”184
Coherence and unity are dogmas that allow the presence of contradictory instructions
to exist in the system (exuberance). As observed above, for example, the Brazilian statute
law instructs the judge to decide following the enacted norms and only to apply analogy,
customs or general principles of law when facing gaps in the system. But, at the same time,
Brazilian law tells him to apply the law observing the social ends and the needs of common
well-being.185 Also, as noted before, open-textured constitutional principles also must be
taken into account by judges when adjudicating most statutory law cases, a practice known
as constitutionalization of statute law.186
When defining the range of factual situations covered by broader and open-textured
constitutional provisions, Brazilian legal practice adopts similar notions of system coherency
and unity. Brugger notes that the “[t]he prevailing view holds that the Constitution differs
from statutes in that it is more political, more open-ended, and less complete. From that it
follows, according to this view, that vague constitutional provisions cannot be 'construed'
(ausgelegt) but must be 'actualized' (aktualisiert) or 'concretized' (konkretisiert); the
reasoning (today we would call it an analytic judgment or a tautology), that restricts itself in showing
consequences that are already implied in the furnished premises.
182
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difference being that a strict 'construction' reveals a solution already inherent in the text,
whereas an 'actualization' or 'concretization' entails a dialectic process of creatively
determining results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the Constitution.” 187
Brugger explains that Konrad Hesse, a former member of the German Constitutional
Court and the most influential proponent of this view, lectures that the goal of creating
constitutional law is reached by adhering to five points of reference for constitutional
interpretation, which reflect the dogmas of coherence and unity:
“(1) Each interpretation must support the unity of the
constitution;
(2) In cases of tension or conflict, the principle of practical
concordance (praktische konkordanz) must be employed to
harmonize conflicting provisions;
(3) All governmental organs must respect the functional
differentiation of the Constitution, that is, their respective tasks
and powers in the separation of powers scheme;
(4) Each interpretation must try to create an integrative effect
with regard to both the various parties of a constitutional
dispute as well as to social and political cohesion;
(5) These points together lead to the legitimating function of
the Constitution: [e]ach interpretation shall attempt to
optimize all the aforementioned elements.” 188
To assure practical concordance, civil law jurists understand that the constitutional
provisions must be optimized when in conflict, preserving the constitution’s unity. As
Professor Konrad Hesse stated, “[t]he principle of the constitution’s unity requires the
optimization of [values in conflict]: [b]oth legal values need to be limited so that each can
attain its optimal effect. In each concrete case, therefore, the limitations must satisfy the
principle of proportionality; that is, they may not go any further than necessary to produce a
concordance of both legal values.”189
Therefore, civil law jurists when interpreting constitutional texts use similar dogmas
as to when they interpret statutory law. Although they may acknowledge a different attitude
and a more developed method, the process also considers the dogmas of unity, practical
concordance and integration of posited norms.
An example of the application of the civil law dogmas of the unity, coherence and
consistency regarding the constitutionality of death penalty in the U.S. is offered by
Professor Bernard Schlink:
“For German constitutional understanding, incidentally, it is
not the intentions and expectations of the constitution’s
authors that make the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee—that life
cannot be taken without due process of law—important in
interpreting the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
The fact that a life can only be taken with or without due
process of law if a death penalty exists—that is, where the
187

See Brugger, supra note 33, at 398.
Id.
189
KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, 23,
quoted and translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 68 (Duke University Press, 3rd ed., 2012).
188

39

guarantee that the life cannot be taken without due process of
law assumes the admissibility of the death penalty, and that it
cannot, at the same time, be an inadmissible cruel and unusual
punishment—has to do with a concept of constitution as a
logical whole free of contradictions, in which no provision is
without function and all are functionality coordinated with
each other. This systematic interpretation is, in fact, based not
on the subjectivity of the constitution’s authors, which could
include inconsistencies and contradictions; rather it takes
seriously the constitution’s claim to principles and
objectivity.”190
II.4.2.2. Adhesion to Legislation
(Ideological Positivism)
The second dogma is the attitude of adhesion to the legislation, either statutory or
constitutional. Legislation is seen as the major source of law and any judicial decision that
disregards it openly is repudiated.191 There is, among civil law jurists, a dogmatic acceptance
of positive law’s mandatory force. In the legal discourse, civil law jurists assert that their
mission is to describe the law de lege lata (latin for “existing law”) and not to propose
solutions de lege ferenda (latin for “what the law should be”), which shall explain norms as
they are, regardless of their personal preferences.192
As Santiago Nino points out, this attitude of adhesion to enacted law and of
confidence in its formal qualities was dogmatically adopted by contemporary juridical
science.193 Nino explains that this shows “the apparent incoherence among the natural law
ideals exposed by the dogmatic and their supposedly positivist statements, when they face
the task of proposing legal solutions.” 194 He notes that the dogmatic is intensively
impregnated with the ideology, called by Alfred Ross pseudo-positivism and by Bobbio
ideological positivism. This ideology consists in recognizing compulsory force in all positive
law for the simple fact that law exists or is what it is.195 Despite the positivist label, this
ideology, according to Nino, “reflects a form of conservative jusnaturalism and means that
the positive law shall be obeyed and applied by judges irrespective of any axiological
disagreement, which, in every case, shall be oriented to propose any modification through
legal means.”196
In Brazil, for example, the Binding Statement No. 10, approved by the S.T.F. in 2008,
may be considered an example of This ideology. This statement basically prescribes that a
Court cannot choose not to apply, in whole or in part, a statute or regulation in a given case,
without holding it unconstitutional.
A curious reasoning given by S.T.F. Justice Eros Grau, in his concurring opinion
may reveal this attitude. In Brazil, pursuant to article 100 of the C.F., payments by the state
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treasuries, in any level, shall be made exclusively in chronological order of submission of
court orders.197 In 2006, an ill person requested immediate payment due to her severe health
conditions and to the fact that persons in her situation had extraordinarily been awarded
payments in the past. When this case was decided, in conformity with the C.F., there were
few situations that made possible an early payment and suffering from severe illness was not
one of them.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Grau reasoned that to maintain integrity with what
he had decided in the past, he had to deny the ill person’s claim. The constitutional rule did
not allow the Government to make early payments in that situation. But the facts of this case
did not present what is considered a normal situation, but an exceptional one. Grau then
wrote that “the exceptional situation is a spot of indifference between chaos and regular
situations, a spot captured by the norm. But it is the norm that, suspending its force, gives
place to the exceptional circumstance—only in this way the norm is turned in to a rule,
keeping this status in relation with the exception.” 198 Grau added that the S.T.F., when
necessary, must take into account these exceptional circumstances. Doing so does not depart
from the juridical order because it applies the norm by disapplying it, that is, removing it
from the exception.”199 Therefore, he ruled that the ill person should have precedence over
the general public to receive her indemnization. Shortly thereafter, in 2009, the Brazilian
Congress approved a constitutional amendment and included this right of preference for ill
people as one of the hypothesis that allow preferable payment.200
From this reasoning, it is possible to note that what the S.T.F. did, in the case, was to
depart from the general application of a written rule to achieve justice in an individual case,
under compelling circumstances, finding an exception to the rule. This departure is tolerable
in most rule of law systems.201 The same line of reasoning is used to justify, for example,
the exceptions for upholding legislation that treats people unequally, without considering it
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, when compelling, important or legitimate state interests are proven by the
government.202 However, in these cases, U.S. courts would hardly consider that the Equal
Protection Clause is being applied by being disapplying, even though it does not treat people
equally. On the contrary, Justices will probably reason that there is an exception for the
application of the clause that is justified by some other interest or that equal treatment
depends always on circumstances validating distinctions.
197
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This idea that the law applies, even in exception cases in which the rule does not
apply and an exception is declared, is an example of the strength of the civil law judge
adhesion to the legislation.
II.4.2.3. The Rational Legislator
In addition, in the civil law world, attributing to the legislator certain rationality
qualities is typical. These qualities, in Santiago Nino’s view, are far from being real, but they
enable the practical reformulation of the enacted law. Therefore, this reformulation will
sound as a mere description of latent solutions.203
Santiago Nino points out that civil law jurists refer to the legislator as being a unique
individual who has established all norms that are part of a legal system. 204 He adds that
lawyers and judges “[a]lso mention an imperishable legislator, which through his will
sustains the norms’ validity, including those established a long time ago by men that even
may be dead.”205 “The rational legislator is also always conscious of the statutes that he
enacts.”206 This is true even for statutes approved by Congress by their members simply
raising their hands, without knowing what in fact is written in the bill.207 Omniscience is
another quality of the rational legislator. According to the dogma, he is aware of all the
factual circumstances that are comprised by the enacted statute. 208 The legislator is also
operant, meaning that he will not enact rules that do not have any function.209 This property
is similar to the rule against surplusage, which is commonly used in U.S. statutory
interpretation.210
Jurists, in addition, say that the rational legislator is, generally, fair. In this sense,
they often give him credit for the axiological interpretative solutions that they adopt when
deciding cases.211 Moreover, the legislator is always coherent, meaning that his will cannot
be itself contradictory, and precise, in the sense that his will points in an unambiguous
direction, even when the language he uses is open textured.212
Nino asserts that the adoption of this rational legislator fictional model occurs
because it allows the dogmatic jurists to give the rational legislator the credit for the solutions
they adopt when interpreting axiological standards. In this sense, dogmatic jurists fill gaps,
eliminate contradictions, make clear vague terms, and waive superfluous norms, all without
showing that a modification of the law has taken place. They simply pass off the impression
that they are providing a description of the current law, as if Congress has genuinely thought
of it.213
Nino adds that this technique is not used in a cynical or speculative manner, but in
most cases by obeying traditional theoretical habits, which are soundly adequate to reconcile
legal certainty with standards of rationality and justice.214
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The Polish jurist Slawomira Wronkowska, a current member of the Constitutional
Court of her country, also has a work on the rational legislator. She explains that “a lawyer
considering the problems of lawmaking builds a certain model of the rational legislator by
selecting the assumptions constituting this legislator in a way so that the norms enacted by
this legislator could be used as means for the attainment of objectives set by him.” 215
She adds that “[i]t is a characteristic that a lawyer interpreting a particular text in
order to reconstruct binding legal norms […] adopts assumptions about the legislator as to
reconstruct from the given text not any norms, but the norms, which—assuming that they
will be realized—would be an appropriate means for the attainment of the set objectives.”216
Further, she asserts that “[a] lawyer formulating recommendations how to apply legal
norms derived from interpretation acts in a similar way. He assumes that the legislator wants,
[using] particular norms, to establish an appropriate and desired system of social relations
and on the basis of this assumption he recommends a particular application of legal
norms.”217
Finally, Wronkowska concludes that “the assumptions constituting the rational
legislator are selected in such a way as to make the rational legislator a certain model of
socio-technical abilities; and to make the norms enacted by him sufficiently effective and
economic for the attainment of the set objectives.” 218 Nevertheless, she warns that the
rational legislator is solely a formal model, which varies through different periods of time
and cultures219.
Luis Jiménez de Asúa says that “today, in democracies, the law does not emerge from
an autocrat, from a single person, whose ‘spirit’ and ‘will’ is, in any manner, very hard to
find. The legislator is nowadays an abstraction, or even better, a function.”220
The excerpt below, which summarizes a case decided by the Court of Appeals of Sao
Paulo, shows how these dogmas are generally applied in Brazil. The case involved the
recognition and dissolution of a same sex partnership, a matter not expressly treated by
Brazilian statute law and, for some, banned by the constitutional text. The C.F. has a chapter
that regulates matters of family law. Article 226, paragraph 3, states that “[f]or purposes of
protection by the State, the stable union between a man and a woman is recognized as a
family entity, and the law shall facilitate the conversion of this entity into marriage.”221 Since
the text wording refers to “a man and a woman”, conservative jurists assert that the C.F.
banned the recognition of same-sex unions and gay marriage in the country. Even though
the S.T.F. already decided the issue in 2011 and held that these unions are a right of gay
couples,222 the São Paulo Court, in 2013, relied on dogmas such as legal order completeness
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and rational legislator to justify the conclusion that the law protects the same sex
relationship and did not invoke the S.T.F. precedent on their case summary.223
Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, who wrote the 2011 Supreme Court opinion that upheld
the constitutionality of same sex unions, also made reference to the rational legislator dogma
on that occasion.224
Keith Rosenn, writing about this Brazilian Supreme Court ruling, noted that Justice
Carlos Ayres Britto, “whose opinion was followed by a majority of the [Court], reinterpreted
article 1.723 of the Civil Code in conformity with the Constitution, to make same sex couples
eligible for treatment as a family unit. Three members of the Court reached a similar result
by treating the absence of regulation of same-sex unions as a gap in the law, which they
filled by resorting to analogy.”225
The interesting thing to point out is that Justice Britto considered the reference to the
rational legislator pertinent even taking into account that constitutional history showed that
the reference to the words man and woman on article 226, paragraph 3, was inserted with
the purpose of discriminating gay couples. Justice Lewandowski, who followed Britto’s
opinion, cited some constitutional conventional debates and proved this point.226 Therefore,
223
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the rational legislator is not the ‘actual legislature’ and may be referred to by judges even to
justify a different view from the one adopted by the legislature.
These references to the legislator in judicial opinions basically reflect a form of
communication that the civil law jurist considers to take place between the enacted
legislation—not Congress—and courts. According to Marcelo Neves, the “interpreterapplicator attributes sense to the normative text. This does not mean that this attribution of
sense turns the interpreter into the producer of the norm. The situation points to a limited
desire of structuring a double contingency and determine the content of a communication
(what did the alter mean?). The message of the legislation or Constitution drafters (alter)
carries an informative meaning which needs to be understood by ego (judge), who may make
a mistake.”227
In accordance with Nino, “the juridical dogmatic accomplished […] an extraordinary
relevant social function. Regardless of its written law systematization activity, it provides
their main recipients (judges), much more coherent, complete, precise and adequate, in
axiological terms, systems of juridical solutions in comparison to the materials created by
legislators. In this way, the ideal of division of powers is sustained and courts, when facing
possible gaps, contradictions and ambiguities in legislation are able to justify its sentences
grounding them on allegedly authentic interpretations of this legislation, not on their own
opinion. Courts, then, see their interpretative problems reduced.”228
All in all, it is possible to note the approach described by civil law scholars and courts
regarding the interpretation of texts: the interpreter assumes he is applying the statute in the
better updated way and not creating new law, even if his application attributes senses that
have never been thought or attributed before to the written law, or even if it contradicts the
textual meaning. So, his work is viewed as a form of giving attribution to a social fact source.
II.5. Rules and Principles in Brazilian Law
Justice Luís Roberto Barroso states that “the modern dogmatic approves the
comprehension that the norms in general, and the constitutional norms in particular, can be
framed in two big and diverse categories: principles and rules.”229 This classification seems
to be prevalent among judges and lawyers in Brazil.230 It also seems to be undisputable that
“principles and rules can direct actions and decisions in certain determined circumstances,
but the nature of the direction that comes from them varies.”231 This variation is in the core
of the current debates in Brazil.
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The task of providing a precise definition for the current function of rules and
principles in the Brazilian system may not be an easy one for this and other reasons.232 As
previously noted, recent scholarship acknowledges that the enactment of the C.F. in 1988
represented a substantial change in the role of legal rules and of principles in the country
compared to early scholarly works from the 20th Century. This change is considered the
main reason for the emergence of the post-positivistic theory.233 It is not the purpose of this
work to go deeper than necessary to describe the current role of rules and principles. 234
Therefore, some important facts and some influential opinions will be omitted.
Indeed, the main purpose of this subchapter is to describe the role legal rules and
principles serve in helping to decide cases in Brazil. I will basically describe how rules and
principles orient the actions of judges when they reach a case solution. I will not yet examine
the position of neoconstitutionalism to evaluate if this line of reasoning is right or wrong. I
will do that in chapter IV.
II.5.1. Rules and Principles
When talking about principles, in general, Brazilian scholars will mention Ronald
Dworkin.235 Citations of Dworkin’s works are commonly made to distinguish rules from
principles. This logical distinction is largely incorporated in Brazil’s legal works, and jurists
commonly say that both standards are different species of norms236 and differ in the character
of the direction they give.237
In this sense, rules are commonly understood as being more clearly defined, objective
and applicable to a specific set of facts. If the situation they regulate occurs, rules generally
govern. “They are cogent and one either respects them completely or clearly violates
them.”238 They are mostly described as having an all-or-nothing fashion.239 They are applied
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by subsumption. If the facts they address occur, certain predeterminate consequences usually
follow.240 If rules conflict, one shall prevail. The criteria for choosing the one to apply are
their generality, temporality and hierarchy.241
The distinction among primary and secondary rules, which will be explained in the
subsequent chapter, is present in the country’s legal texts. There are duty-imposing and
power-conferring rules, as in any other organized legal system.242 There are also metarules
that guide how other rules should be interpreted, such as the rules that specify the criteria
used to resolve conflict of rules.243
Principles, on the other hand, are traditionally seen as norms with a higher degree of
abstraction, which do not specify with certainty the action that shall be performed in a wide
range of situations.244 They are described as an initial goal that demands to be realized by
consequentially oriented activities. 245 They are, therefore, “not definitive but only prima
[sometimes], and the difference between them is almost a matter of form alone.” The use of words like
"reasonable," "negligent," "unjust," and "significant" often make rules perform the function of principles. “Each
of these terms makes the application of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon principles or
policies lying beyond the rule, and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle.” Dworkin supra note
17, at 25. Neves even says that these rules should be understood as hybrids. Therefore, Dworkin would probably
respond to Neves that they are not talking about the same thing and that Neves probably misunderstood what
he really meant by principles.
The German scholar Robert Alexy has also criticized Dworkin’s all-or-nothing rule approach. He
argued that rules can only be considered all-or-nothing if all the rule’s exceptions could be enumerated. Since
even Dworkin agrees that the enumeration of all exceptional cases in which the rule would not apply is
impossible, because a new exception which will avoid the application of the rule may always arise, Alexy
contends that the rule will not be ever completely known.
Alexy would probably criticize Dworkin’s explanation for why a rule that is written even with broad
standards cannot be turned into a principle (but merely keep serving the role of a principle). Dworkin argues
that “even the least confining of these terms restricts the kind of other principles and policies on which the rule
depends” and gives an example of how an unreasonable contract could not be enforced if there were a principle
or policy that would impose the enforcement of this contract. In this sense, he concludes that if there was no
rule, but merely a policy against enforcing unreasonable contracts or a principle that unfair contracts ought not
to be enforced, the contracts might be enforced without alteration of the law. Alexy would probably say that
this example only proves his point that it is impossible to settle all cases in which a rule would apply, because
an underlying principle or policy could always add an exception to the rule. As Marcelo Neves observes, for
Alexy, “all rules are only applicable in terms of the ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion at the end of the process of
concretization, when all possible and relevant exceptions for the solution of the case have been excluded.”
ROBERT ALEXY, DIREITO, RAZÃO, DISCURSO – ESTUDOS PARA A FILOSOFIA DO DIREITO 144-145 (Porto Alegre:
Livraria do Advogado, 2nd, 2015).
All in all, despite these jurisprudential debates, which will be better examined ahead, Dworkin’s
logical distinction between rules and principles is usually referred to by Brazilian judges. However, it does not
nearly describe all types of most common uses of principles in the legal system and may mean that Dworkin’s
classification was improperly understood by most Brazilian lawyers and that it is not appropriate to reflect the
common use of these standards in Brazil. See NEVES, supra note 21, at 16-18, 61, 104. See also CÓDIGO PENAL
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facie requirements.”246 They are subject to the logic of the possible and, within this ambit,
they often meet other conflicting principles.247 They need to be harmonized, relativized and
balanced.248 The fact that they are not applied in a case or are applied without full force does
not mean that they are invalid. They have dimensions of weight and are considered
optimization requirements.249
II.5.2. Dworkin’s Principle Source Argument (No Pedigree)
Since Dworkin is a commonly referred source for the definition of principles, it is
important to analyze if his doctrine well explains the Brazilian use of principles.
Dworkin’s well-known attack on positivism focuses primarily on the impossibility
of a social fact model of rules to capture the role that principles play in the law. Dworkin
contends that the legality of principles depends on their content, not on their source. He
claims that the power of principles come from their sense of appropriateness, but not from
some test of pedigree:250
“The origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular
decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of
appropriateness developed in the profession and the public
over time. Their continued power depends upon this sense of
appropriateness being sustained. If it no longer seemed unfair
to allow people to profit by their wrongs, or fair to place
special burdens upon oligopolies that manufacture potentially
dangerous machines, these principles would no longer play
much of a role in new cases, even if they had never been
overruled or repealed. (Indeed, it hardly makes sense to speak
of principles like these as being "overruled" or "repealed."
When they decline they are eroded, not torpedoed).” 251
Of course, Dworkin does not deny that institutional support plays an important role
in asserting the force of principles. He argues that if the judge resorts to prior cases to justify
a principled decision in which that principle was cited or figured in the argument, or if the
judge mentions any statute that seemed to exemplify that principle, or even if the principle
was cited in the preamble of the statute, or in the committee reports or other legislative
documents that accompanied it, all these facts of course could be considered and would give
more weight to the principle.252
But these aspects are not essential for him. As Scott Shapiro points out, “Dworkin’s
argument appears to be this: the legal impact of a principle’s institutional support on its
legality and weight is itself determined by principles, namely, those relating to institutions
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and their authority. […] These institutional principles […] are supported by very broad
principles of political morality.”253
Therefore, as Shapiro observes, “Dworkin believes that no rule could be fashioned
that accurately reflect the verdicts of all these principles, presumably because the
possibilities that would have to be considered and codified are infinite in number. Moreover,
these principles and their weights fluctuate overtime, based on their own degree of
institutional support, and hence any resulting master rule would fail to be stable.” 254 In
Dworkin’s own words:
“Yet we could not devise any formula for testing how much
and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a
principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight at a
particular order of magnitude. We argue for a particular
principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing
and interacting standards (themselves principles rather than
rules)
about
institutional
responsibility,
statutory
interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts of
precedent, the relation of all these to contemporary moral
practices, and hosts of other such standards.”255
Dworkin’s refined view of principles seems to vary substantially from how civil law
jurists traditionally see their legal principles and also differs from the prevalent view in the
Brazilian constitutional law stage. This assertion will be examined in the following
chapter,256 but the main reasons for this conclusion will be detailed in the subchapters below.
II.5.3. The Civil Law Jurist’s view of Principles
This subchapter has the purpose of showing what is the most popular understanding
of the role of principles in Brazilian law, both as to their origins and their functions.
The civil law jurist historically has dealt with principles in law reasoning. The fact
that she has traditionally acknowledged written laws as the major source of law creation
never precluded her from formulating arguments and from deciding cases grounded on this
type of standards. And this is true nowadays in her practice.
In summary, according to the former S.T.F Justice Eros Grau, the system of law is
composed of:
[i] general principles of law, […] as the principle of unjust
enrichment;
[ii] implied principles, which are inferred as a result of the
analysis of one or more constitutional precepts or of one or
multiple statutes; and
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[iii] written principles, which are set forth in the text of the
C.F. or of statutes.257
II.5.3.1. General Principles of Law
Principles had generally a supplementary role in Brazilian law in most of the 20th
Century.258 In fact, this supplementary trait may be perceived in the wording of article 4 of
the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, a statute enacted in 1940 with the purpose of
guiding judges in the application of the law. Pursuant to article 4, “when the [written] law
has a gap, the judge will decide the case by means of analogy, customs and the general
principles of law.”259 A similar provision—article 7—existed in the former Brazilian Civil
Code, which was enacted in 1916 and remained in force until 2003.260 However, there has
been a matter of controversy on which are the general principles of law.
There is a division among scholars as to whether judges, resorting to the general
principles of law, are authorized to apply natural law. This dispute is sustained on the fact
that some civil law countries expressly restrict the content of these principles as being the
one that the positive legal system grants. This is the case, for example, in Italy and Spain.
Both countries adopt a positivistic view of this concept, as opposed to a naturalistic view.261
The article 12 of the Italian Civil Code states that “[i]f a dispute cannot be decided
by a specific provision, consideration shall be given to the provisions governing such cases
or similar matters; if the case remains unsolved, it shall be decided according to the general
principles of the legal state.” 262 The fact that the text makes reference to the general
principles of the legal state is seen as a prohibition of use of ius naturale.
A similar, but no so clear, precept is set forth in the Spanish Civil Code. Article 1,
item 4, establishes that “[g]eneral legal principles shall apply in the absence of applicable
statute or custom, without prejudice to the fact that they contribute to shape the legal
system.”263
Some traditional Brazilian authors have argued this approach in classical law
books.264 However, the author of the bill that resulted in the approval of the first Brazilian
Civil Code by the Brazilian Congress in 1916, Clovis Bevilaqua, was a defender of the
natural law position:
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“The general principles of law, unlike what some contend, do
not refer to the general principles of the national law, but to the
current fundamental elements of the human legal culture; to
the ideas and principles over which the dominant juridical
conception rests; to the inductions and generalizations of the
legal science and of the technique precepts.
Such principles, some criticize, are vague, undetermined. But
they are not that much. Certainly, we shall deeply enter in the
legal philosophy, in the history of civilization, and with the
spirit equipped by a careful legal education, in order to
undertake the investigation of the general principles of law.
[…] Notions of freedom, liberty, equity, morality, sociology
and compared legislation concur to detach from the whole set
of ideas, which are the basis of modern civilization, the general
principles of law.”265
Finally, since the article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, cited above,
does not prohibit the judge to resort to natural law when applying general principles of law,
some judges have done exactly that in recent cases. For example, the quote below is a part
of a case summary decided in 2017 by the Superior Tribunal de Justiça [S.T.J.], the Brazilian
highest court for statutory interpretation:
“[...] in cases such as this one, it is possible to clearly denote
that the demand’s solution does not find grounds in the
positivity of the Bid Invitation Document, being inevitable for
the judge to resort to general principles of law, especially to
values such as equality, reasonableness and proportionality,
among other things, since positive reason does not help her in
writing a fair opinion.”266
For the purposes of this thesis, it is worth emphasizing that the first major opening of
the Brazilian legal system to principles in adjudication took place with the enactment of
article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, Brazil’s closure rule,267 which allows
the judge to turn to general principles of law to decide a case that has no solution on the
posited norms and cannot be appropriately solved by resorting to analogy or customs.
II.5.3.2. Implied Principles
Another manner that principles enter into the legal discourse of the Brazilian system
is similar to what happens in Italy regarding the comprehension of the general principles of
law.
Nino contends that “in addition to the legislation rationality, the dogmatic applies
various argumentative tools to show as compatible their adherence to the written legislation,
avoiding its formal imperfections and adapting the text of the law to the current evaluating
265
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standards.”268 He explains that a relevant technique is the work jurists perform to systematize
the written law, building a body of legal principles, which are more general and allegedly
equal to the enacted law. In this sense, the jurist describes the system in a simple manner, as
a set of few principles, whose logical consequences are easy to determine.269
Joseph Raz, in an article in which he criticizes Dworkin’s definition of principles,
stated that “not everything that looks like a legal principle is a legal principle, at least not in
the sense that Professor Dworkin has in mind.”270 The first example he gives is this dogmatic
judge’s tool pointed out by Nino. Raz asserts that courts and scholars, by invoking principles,
refer summarily to a body of legal rules without specifying their content in detail. But Raz
says that “they are not statements of the contents of laws of a special type, namely legal
principles. They are merely a brief allusion to a number of rules.”271 He calls this method of
reasoning individuation of rules. He gives an example regarding freedom of speech in the
U.S. law:
“Someone may say that in this country the principle of
freedom of speech is recognized by law. When asked what he
means he may say that the only laws setting limits to the liberty
to express opinions are concerned with libel and military
security; that censorship of films, books and the theatre must
be justified by the protection of the infants; that there are
detailed regulations guaranteeing access to the mass media to
people representing all shades of opinions on public matters;
and so on. His statement that in his country freedom of speech
is recognized by law can thus be seen to be a summary
reference to a great number of laws, not a statement of the
content of a single law.”272
This definition, which for Raz differs from the one Dworkin is talking about when
referring to principles,273 is the definition alluded by Nino above.
In the context of civil law, Nino points out that the method of individuation of many
rules in general principles does not imply, for the civil law judge, a modification in the legal
system, if the statements that are made remain in the same reach as the enacted rules.
However, he claims that “it is not rare for dogmatic jurists to overstep this limit, proposing
general principles in substitution to various norms of the system, but which, at the same time,
have a field of reference longer than the whole body of substituted rules and allowing new
principles not included in the original system derive and fulfilling system gaps.”274 Nino
asserts that the new norms are introduced in an almost unnoticed manner, because they seem
as mere logical consequences of the rules that were encompassed in the principle.275
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At last, the Argentinian scholar compares this technique of identifying implied
principles with another similar one, also adopted by the civil law jurist, which he claims to
be a bit more sophisticated. The civil law lawyer also, by grouping statements of written
laws, formulates “theories.”276
The most relevant theory in Brazil nowadays is the theory of fundamental rights
articulated in most constitutional law school books, grounded on the reading of article 5 of
the C.F., which is Brazil’s equivalent document to the Bill of Rights.
II.5.3.3. Written Principles
The Brazilian Constitution and many of its statutes also establish a wide variety of
principles. As an example:
“Art. 34. The Union shall not intervene in the States or in the
Federal District, except to:
[…]
VII. ensure compliance with the following constitutional
principles:
a.
republican form, representative system and democratic
regime;
b.
individual rights;
c.
county autonomy;
d.
rendering of accounts of direct and indirect public
administration;
e.
application of the minimum required by the receipts
resulting from the state taxes, including those stemming from
transfers, for maintenance and development of education and
for public health activities and services.”277
[…]
“Art 37. The direct or indirect public administration of any of
the Branches of the Union, States, Federal District and
Counties, shall obey the principles of legality, impersonality,
morality, publicity and efficiency, as well as the following:
[…] .”278
Following this C.F. tendency of writing down principles—but not only due to this
circumstance—it became common to include principles in the text of statutes. A good
example is article 2 of Lei No. 9.784/1999, which regulates administrative proceedings in
Brazil:
“Art. 2 The public administration shall obey, among others, the
principles of legality, finality, motivation, reasonableness,
proportionality, morality, full defense, contradictory, legal
certainty, public interest and efficiency.”279
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The federal statute that sets forth practices of administrative improbity also has
provisions which spell out principles that shall be obeyed by public authorities and
employees:
“Art. 4. Public agents of any level or hierarchy have an
obligation to strictly follow the principles of legality,
impersonality, morality and publicity in matters that they
handle.”280
This type of norm is also present in legal texts of other civil law countries. In
Colombia, for example, article 209 of the Constitution sets forth that the “administrative
function is at service of general interest and is developed based on the principles of equality,
morality, efficiency, economy, celerity, impartiality and publicity, through the
decentralization, delegation and deconcentrating functions.” 281 The German Constitution
also has several principles in its text. For example, in article 33, item 5, which regulates equal
citizenship in public service, there is a provision that states: “[t]he law governing the public
service shall be regulated and developed with due regard to the traditional principles of the
professional civil service.”282
Therefore, Brazil, as well as some other civil law countries, expressly took the
position to include standards in rulebooks and attribute them the qualification of principles.
The fact that these norms are qualified as principles translates an attitude to judges
and lawyers as to how they view the role of these standards in legal reasoning. Indeed,
traditional logical properties of principles such as not falling into the “all-or-nothing” fashion
and having dimensions of weight are commonly predicated by Brazilian jurists to these
posited standards.283 As Joseph Raz precisely observes, “the word ‘principles’ usually carries
an implication of greater generality and greater importance than the word ‘rules.’”284
The importance of this validity dependence on the case is mostly noted when one
reads the traditional type of written norm that sets forth these principles. Usually, many
principles are listed in the same legal precept and some give contradictory instructions to the
determinations given by others. One that carefully reads article 2 of Lei No. 9.784/1999, cited
above, may note that the application of principles of legality, morality, legal certainty and
efficiency may be contradictory in a specific set of facts. If a public employee has to be
efficient in his task, he may not be able to apply, in a strict sense, some posited norms that
would ordinarily be applied to the case. This departure may be seen as a violation of legality,
especially if the enforcing authorities understand that strict application of norms has more
weight and is more important than achieving efficiency in the situation.
Therefore, defining the content of principles, but particularly the content of posited
principles, may be a difficult task for the interpreter. The meaning of some written principles,
like “county autonomy” or “republican form, representative system and democratic regime”
is, in most of cases, settled in advance in other rules. Their content is most likely to be
construed taking into account express rules concerning these issues in the C.F. text as well
as in other statutes. But the content of other posited principles will have to be settled as the
280
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situations arise. Take the principle of administrative morality, for example. In one of the first
cases in which this principle was interpreted (or concretized) by the S.T.F., the Justices
commented the difficulties that it brings for the interpreter. During oral debates, Justice Néri
da Silveira stated that “the morality principle is currently a constitutional principle and it will
be up to the Supreme Court to define it, in our system.”285 Nevertheless, article 4 of the
administrative improbity statute, which was quoted above, states that public agents of any
level or hierarchy have an obligation to strictly follow the principle of morality in the matters
that they handle.286
Regarding the application of principles, Justice Barroso argues that “as they do not
put in detail the conduct to be followed for its concretization, the activity of the interpreter
will be more complex, because it will be up to her to define the direction to take.”287 He adds
that, “in relation to principles, an additional hardship may be stated: the goal to be reached
or the ideal state to be transformed in reality may not be objectively determined, which will
demand a subjective integration by the interpreter. A principle has a minimal sense and range,
an essential core, in which it is equated to rules. But, from a determined point, nevertheless,
the interpreter walks into an undetermined space, in which the demarcation of its content will
be subjected to the interpreter’s ideological or philosophical conception.”288
This idea of the existence of a core in principles was endorsed by the S.T.F. in the
nepotism cases mentioned in subchapter II.2. It is possible to note from the following
quotation of Justice Ricardo Lewandowski’s opinion that the S.T.F. concluded that the
principle of morality listed in article 37 of the C.F. has a “fixed core,” a “certain zone” and
nepotism lies inside these areas:
“This morality is not an element of the administrative act, […]
but is fulfilled with ethical values culturally shared by the
community, which are part, due to this fact, of the legal order
in force.
The semantic indetermination of the principles of morality and
impersonality cannot be an obstacle to the determination of the
rule of prohibition of nepotism. As Garcia de Enterria well
points out, in the structure of every undetermined concept, it
shall be identified a ‘fixed core’ (Begriffkern) or a ‘certain
zone’ that is composed of previous and safe data, from which
an applicable rule to the case can be extracted. The prohibition
of nepotism is a constitutional rule that is inside the zone of
determination of the principles of morality and impersonality.”
289
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I have cited in that subchapter shows that the concept is still applied,290 it is true that the
concept has lost its importance due to the vast number of principles that have been written
into legal norms, because it is more difficult for a judge to consider a gap in the system:
“The general principles of law are constructions of the
nineteenth century, which have the purpose to solve the
problem represented by the closure of the legal system,
“closed” by article 4 of the French Civil Code. That is, the
general principles of law were introduced as a criterion for
closing the system, aiming to preserve, therefore, the pureness
and integrity of the world of rules. It is no longer possible to
talk about general principles of law in the era of constitutional
principles (if someone talks about it, bad luck – it is outdated;
and even if the S.T.F. uses it, the observation has the same
equal value). Who asks this question (or affirmation) does not
know that there has been a discontinuity between general
principles of law and constitutional principles.291
Although Streck takes this position, it is a fact that in 2010, Congress passed a statute
attributing the name of Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, instead of Introductory Act
to the Civil Code, to Decreto-Lei 4.567, of 1940. Article 4 of such decree-law, as shown in
the beginning of this subchapter, is the one that states that judges may resort to general
principles of law. Streck’s position, therefore, seems to be contradictory to Congress’ intent.
Indeed, he strongly criticized the enactment of the statute that changed the name of this
decree-law, claiming that this norm is incoherent with the contemporaneous
constitutionalism model.292 However, his point is important because the relevance of general
principles of law in legal reasoning has diminished. That is the reason I have stated in the
introductory chapter that the supplementary character of principles has evolved into being at
the center of the legal system.
II.5.4. The Breadth of Principles
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Another relevant distinction is the civil law view of the breadth of principles,
especially the Brazilian one, in comparison to Dworkin’s view. In Hard Cases, Dworkin
asserts that “[a]rguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual goal;
arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal. Principles are
propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that describe goals.”293 Alexy, on
the other hand, remarks that “[p]rinciples can be related both to individual rights and to
collective interests.”294
Dworkin, therefore, claims that principles are linked to individual rights. But by the
reading of posited principles and of the cases cited in subsection II.2, one may conclude that
Dworkin’s view is narrow in comparison to the concept used in Brazil and probably in most
civil law jurisdictions, where this distinction between arguments of policy and arguments of
principle is not clearly drawn. The definition of principles such as democracy in the party
loyalty cases and administrative morality in the nepotism cases were not made to protect
individual rights. On the contrary, by affirming that political seats belong to the parties in
proportional elections, the S.T.F. was mostly advancing a goal of strengthening party fidelity
and, therefore, in the Court’s view, protecting the interests of the whole society, not of one
specific person. The same took place in asserting that appointing public official relatives to
public positions is a violation of the principle of morality. The goal was to avoid personal
privileges in the Public Administration.
Alexy recognizes the importance of the distinction between individual rights and
collective interests. But he adds that “it is neither necessary nor desirable to tie the concept
of a principle to that of an individual right. The common logical characteristics of both types
of principle, which Dworkin alludes to his ‘principles in the generic sense’, and which
become patently obvious when principles compete, make a wider concept of principle appear
more suitable.” 295 He claims that Dworkin’s distinction can be made within that wider
concept if one wishes.
Dworkin, in an article in which he offered a response to overseas commentators of
his work, addressed the difficulties that his distinction between policies and principles pose
for some countries, due to the way these nations’ constitutions are written. When offering
comments to an article authored by Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, he observed that:
“The quality of Chaskalson’s Court and his own role in leading
that Court is evident in his discussions of some of its most
important decisions, and, in particular, its decisions enforcing
what are often called socioeconomic constitutional rights.
People’s moral rights against their government include not
only what are called ‘negative’ freedoms—the right to
important liberties, like freedom of speech, religion, and
conscience, and rights to a fair trial—but also ‘positive’ rights
to support for their basic needs of health, housing, and
education that is consistent with the economic resources of
their community. Traditional constitutions, including the
American Constitution, provide guarantees of certain negative
rights that are enforceable by courts. But they do not make
explicit provisions for positive rights except for making hard
policy decisions about resource application, strategy, timing,
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and these decisions are better made by officials who are
directly responsible to the electorate than by judges.
Following World War II, however, many of the newer
constitutions did include guarantees of positive rights, either
as nonjusticiable, as aspirations or as judicially enforceable
mandates. The framers of the South Africa’s new Constitution
believed, understandably, that they could not deny positive
constitutional assurance to the majority of citizens who had
been deprived of the basic requisites of human dignity for so
long, and so they chose to include carefully drafted and
judicially enforceable positive rights in the form Chaskalson
describes.”296
The Brazilian C.F. has made reference to several social goals and purposes that
ultimately are considered socioeconomic fundamental rights. Some of those rights are
treated as principles in legal reasoning. The content of these principles, in the Brazilian
current legal practice conventions, is seen not as mere aspirations but as judicially
enforceable mandates.297
II.5.5. Interpretation of Rules and Concretization of Principles
In a world dominated by the written law, texts have to be interpreted and the judge’s
task, therefore, has traditionally been to rationally express the content of the words of the
enacted law when adjudicating a case.
The literal meaning of the text initially dominated legal interpretation. The
importance of this method came from ancient times. 298 However, Friedrich Carl Von
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Savigny, in a 1840 treatise on Roman Law, 299 argued for a new “regular method for
interpretation of law.”300 He asserted that there are three techniques for legal interpretation
that shall be considered: (1) textual, verbal or grammatic; (2) systematic, structural or
contextual and (3) historical.301 Further, reacting to the problem of an environment in fast
transformation, Savigny added a fourth technique: (4) purposive or teleological
interpretation.302
Savigny’s work was of decisive importance in Brazil and there is no doubt that any
Brazilian judge or lawyer that interprets a statute, until today, considers Savigny’s four
techniques appropriate and applies them. The four methods were first used to interpret rules
but are also relevant to construe the content of principles.
There is a general notion in the country that these four methods must be combined.
None shall be deemed absolute. Therefore, the literal meaning is not considered the most
important and relevant mode for achieving the right interpretative result. The others are
treated as supplementary to it. On the contrary, some precedents mention that the maximum
in claris cessat interpretatio [“when [law] is clear, it does not need interpretation]303 is no
longer pertinent for the majority, if not all cases.304 Some authors, like the S.T.F. Justice
Gilmar Mendes and Professor Paulo Branco, even contend that “it is correct the result that,
through the successive utilization of all methods of interpretation, transmits the meaning of
the law.” 305 Brugger also makes the same point:
“One should avoid concentrating on any particular one method
or on any school of jurisprudence that focuses solely on the
textual, contextual, historical, or teleological perspective. This
may be seen a trivial criterion, but it is not without
consequences. It leads to the critique of simplistic premises
such as: ‘law is (or should only be) politics’, ‘the law is (or
should only be’ in the books, ‘law is (or should be) restricted
to what historically was willed’, law only reflects (or should
only reflect) economic rationality’, etc. Consequently, my
advice may be stated thus: Let us adhere to some form of
integration theory when applying methods of interpretation
and assessing schools of jurisprudence.”306
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Therefore, in Brazil, due to Savigny’s influence and to the dominance of his mode of
thinking, there is no debate whether it would be acceptable for judges to adopt a purposive
interpretation when interpreting statutes and/or the Constitution. Purposive reasoning shall
be used in the majority, if not all cases since there is no hierarchy among this technique and
the other three. There is not a “fear of purposive interpretation of law and legal institution,”
as observed by Lon Fuller, when he criticized H.L.A. Hart’s positivism. 307
Regarding the different views of common law jurists with respect to the civil law
Savigny’s teleological method, Lord Denning, from the U.K., asserts the following:
“They adopt a method which they call in English by strange
words—at any rate they were strange to me—the "schematic
and teleological" method of interpretation. It is not really so
alarming as it sounds. All it means is that the judges do not go
by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical
structure of the sentence. They go by the design or purpose
which lies behind it. When they come upon a situation which
is to their minds within the spirit—but not the letter—of the
legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and
purpose of the legislature—at the effect which it was sought to
achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the
desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps, quite
unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: What is the
sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect
to the presumed purpose of the legislation? They lay down the
law accordingly. If you study the decisions of the European
Court, you will see that they do it every day. To our eyes—
shortsighted by tradition—it is legislation, pure and simple.
But, to their eyes, it is fulfilling the true role of the Courts.
They are giving effect to what the legislature intended, or may
be presumed to have intended. I see nothing wrong in this.”308
The civil law judge does not behave in the same way as some U.S. judges do
regarding the need to update statutory law or the understanding of the constitutional text, at
least with respect to the textualist views. In the U.S., legal scholars specify two paths that
judges follow when identifying mistakes in legal texts. “One strain, represented by Judge
Foster [in Lon Fuller’s classic book ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explores’ 309 ] […],
emphasizes statutory purposes and sees judges and agencies as helpful partners as well as
normative updaters in the ongoing statutory enterprise.310 The other strain, represented by
Judge Keen [also from Fuller’s book], emphasizes the rule-of-law virtues in following
statutory plain meanings and the greater institutional competence of the legislature to make
and update public policy.”311
Judge Keen’s approach, similar to the argument advocated by Justice Antonin
Scalia’s textualism, which does not take a progressive role in solving statute problems and
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advance public policy, would likely be understood to be wrong in Brazil and would probably
be considered contrary to the judge’s duty set forth in article 5 of the Introductory Act to the
Brazilian Norms, which states that “in the application of the law, the judge shall observe the
social goals to which the law is oriented and the demands of the common good.”312 If the
interpretation goes beyond the application of linguistic laws, through a “corrective
interpretation”, the civil law jurist will probably attribute it to a logical interpretation.313
Civil law jurists consider that the interpreter may be able to better understand a text than the
text drafter understood it.314
Patricia Perrone confirms this view. She takes the position that by grounding an
interpretation on its teleological element, the judge goes along with the evolutive
comprehension of the C.F., “discovering the interpretation of its commands to situations not
originally foreseen and, consequently, changing its content, without modifying its text, in
order to fulfill the ends that justify its norms when facing new realities.”315
This necessity of updating the constitutional and the statutory law was also an issue
identified when the legal dogmatic approach was described in subchapter II.4.2. As said, the
juridical dogmatics has been considered essential to the administration of justice and to the
development of the law. The applied techniques, like the teleological method and the rational
legislator myth, among others, perform the relevant mission of adapting the law to certain
rational and axiological standards.
According to Thomas Vesting, “the environmental pressure fatally burdened the act
of interpretation, giving rise to fresh judgment; the factual reach was transformed in each
new case as the result of selections through systemic stable rules and, in turn, totally
controlled in the system.”316 As noted, “either the quaestio juris of a life circumstance is
already anticipated by the law of the jurists or by the political legislative activity or, if this
is not the case, at least, the adjudicator may solve it through literal, logic, gap-filling or,
eventually, analogic interpretation, in the deductive sense employed. The system always has
a readily response, at least ideally.”317
Some civil law jurists [at least some modern ones] use different words when they
analyze the content of rules and principles. If rules are interpreted, the same cannot be said
of principles. As Zagrebelsky remarks, “it is not interpretation – in the sense this term is used
by jurists – because the wording that expresses legal principles contains very little to be
interpreted.”318
As seen in subchapter II.5.3.3., especially due to the fact that the legislative branches
have expressly included legal principles in the text of statutes and, more significantly, of the
C.F., contemporary constitutional scholars began to take the position that it is not right to
say that these norms must be interpreted but must be concretized. Concretization does not
reveal a solution that is in the text but sets a dialectic process of creatively determining results
in conformity with, but not determined by, the C.F..319 This term is commonly used by many
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well-kwon jurists, like Winfried Brugger, 320 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, 321 Thomas Vesting,322
Karl Larenz,323 Marcelo Neves,324 among others.
The main debate that takes place is whether the act of concretization of principles
reflects creation of new law. Zagrebelsky denies it. He points out that “the case already falls
under the law”325 and adds that “[i]n the presence of a pertinent principle, the judge cannot
invoke the lack of a law to reject a question as lacking legal relevance. He must, on the
contrary, reason constructively about the case, in light of the relevant principle and from this
position give an answer.”326
On the other hand, Thomas Vesting:
“the supporters of the concretization model agree unanimously
that a legal argumentation that locates itself beyond the logical
deductive methods is inescapable, especially, due to the
undetermined character of the major premises. This
supposition seems imperative, in that it would not be necessary
any methodologic theory that reflects over the interpretive
method, if law’s interpretation could take place in a totally
deductive way,if it were not more than imperative
subsumption according to the logic. Today, in any case, the
methodologic theory majorly considers that interpretation
(juridical) itself is creative, that it is, so as to speak, the very
creation of the law; today, few stick to an idea of strict
deduction of the application of the law.”327
In fact, Vesting points out that the very use of a new linguistic expression, such as
concretization instead of interpretation, traces to this comprehension of law creation, instead
of mere deduction of rules: “[f]or expressing the difference in comparison to the juridicalpositivistic model of application and subsumption even linguistically, the term
‘interpretation’ has been since the sixties on ongoing replacement by other terms like
‘obtaining the law,’ ‘legal work,’ ‘legal argumentation’ or even ‘law concretization.’
Sometimes, ‘interpretation’ and ‘law concretization’ may be considered opposites.” 328
Another remark is that Alexy asserts that “principles can be reasons for decisions,
that is, for concrete ought-judgements.”329 He argues that principles are not merely reasons
for rules but may be reasons for actions.330
This assertion is to a great extent adopted by Brazilian judges. As shown in subsection
II.2, although neither the C.F. nor any statute had ever expressly outlawed the practice of
nepotism, the S.T.F. ruled that the prohibition derived from the republican principles of
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morality, impersonality, equality and efficiency, which are set forth in Article 37 of the
constitutional text.331 Hence, posited principles were the main source for the decisions.
Finally, I agree with Joseph Raz’s assertion regarding the five different purposes that
he points out that principles are used in law.332 Principles serve as grounds (a) for interpreting
laws; (b) for changing laws; (c) for finding particular exceptions to laws; (d) for making new
rules; and (e) for justifying action in particular cases. This list, nevertheless, is not complete
and other authors may point other common uses.333
II.5.6. Conflict of Rules and of Principles
The conflict of rules is traditionally solved by declaring one of them invalid or
inapplicable. 334 Normally, these conflicts are solved by applying the following criteria: (1)
hierarchy: the superior rule prevails over the inferior (lex superior derogat legi inferiori); (2)
temporal: the more recent rule prevails over the older one (lex porterior derogat legi priori);
and (3) generality: the special rule prevails over the general rule (lex specialis derogat legi
generali). This is what is established in article 2, §§ 1st and 2nd, of the Introductory Act to
the Brazilian Norms.335
The idea of conflicting principles is a more recent debated issue in Brazilian
jurisprudence. The doctrine most frequently advanced in Brazilian legal books and in court
decisions is Robert Alexy’s balancing theory, exposed in Theory of Constitutional Rights.336
According to the German scholar, when two principles compete, the issue must be
resolved by balancing the conflicting interests served by these principles. The judge must
decide which principle (that have equal status in the abstract) has greater weight in the
concrete situation. 337 The solution will establish a conditional relation of precedence
between the principles in light of the concrete circumstances. Alexy points out that “the
relation of precedence is conditional because in the context of the case conditions are laid
down under which one of the principles takes precedence. Given other conditions, the issue
of precedence might be reversed.”338
Alexy notes that the important point in the theory of condition of precedence is that
“the court is no longer speaking about the precedence of a principle, requirement, interest,
claim, right or any other subject; rather conditions are being identified under which there is
breach of constitutional rights.”339
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An example of balancing was given in the vaquejada case. The S.T.F. weighed the
cruelty of the vaquejada against the benefits of the cultural practice and established that
cruelty against the animals had precedence, striking down the State of Ceara statute.
Balancing became such a dominant technique in adjudication that the new Civil
Procedure Code [C.P.C], enacted in 2016, incorporated it in its text. The C.P.C. states that
“in the case of collision of norms, the judge shall justify the object and the general criterion
of the balancing adopted, stating the reasons that authorize the interference of the displaced
norm and the factual premises that ground the conclusion.”340
Zabrebelsky points out that this relation of precedence is also made by legislatures
when drafting rules.341 In the vaquejada case, the State of Ceara Assembly had supposedly
done it. But, according to Brazilian conventions and to article 102 of the C.F., the S.T.F. has
the power to review the constitutionality of this decision.
Another widely agreed approach to solving conflicts of principles is the application
of the principle of proportionality. According to Alexy, the “nature of principles implies the
principle of proportionality. […] If a constitutional right norm competes with another
principle, then the legal possibilities for realizing that norm depend on competing principles.
To reach a decision, one needs to engage in a balancing exercise as required by the Law of
Competing Principles.”342
Proportionality in judicial practice instructs the judge to consider three subprinciples:
necessity, suitability and proportionality in a narrow sense. Alexy notes that the first two
follow from the nature of principles as optimization requirements relative to what is factually
possible, whereas the last one derives from its relation as to what is legally possible.343
The most controversial case in which the principle of proportionality was applied was
possibly the Habeas Corpus n° 82.424,344 the so-called Ellwanger case, decided in 2003, by
the S.T.F.. This case discussed whether the publication of a Holocaust denial book
configured racism, a non-bailable and imprescriptible crime in Brazil. By a 7 to 3 vote, the
court denied the habeas corpus and allowed the criminal lawsuit to proceed. Two of the
Justices, Gilmar Mendes and Marco Aurélio, applied the principle of proportionality, but
reached contradictory results. Mendes, after reviewing the book, asserted that it had no
historical revisionist purpose and represented a mere attack on the Jewish population.
Therefore, he reasoned that in the collision of freedom of speech and nondiscrimination
principles, both established in the C.F., the latter should prevail. Marco Aurélio, on the other
hand, considered that the content of the book did not cause imminent violence and simply
represented the defendant’s personal opinion. He stated that the case involved a book whose
ideas were intolerant and anti-Semitic but did not incite racist violence. Therefore, in
weighing the same principles, he concluded that the crime of racism had not been
committed.345 Proportionality, then, allows subjectivity in judgment.
Justice Luís Roberto Barroso also points out that the principle of proportionality has
mostly been applied as a criterion for examining the reasonableness of legislative and of
administrative acts. He notes that it allows the judiciary to invalidate legislative or
administrative acts in situations in which:
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“a) [t]here is no adequacy between the end sought and the
means used to achieve that end [(suitability)];
b) [t]he measure is not required or necessary, there being an
alternate means for arriving at the same result with a lesser
burden upon a fundamental right (prohibition of excess)
[(necessity)]; and
c) [t]here is no proportionality in the strict sense of the word,
meaning that what is lost by effecting a given measure is more
important than what is gained [(proportionality in its narrow
sense)].”346
A good example of how this application may take place is provided by electoral cases
in Brazil. In proceedings in which an electoral wrongdoing occurs, electoral judges must
resort to the principles of proportionality and of reasonableness to decide whether the
unlawfulness is serious enough to justify the application of the sanctions of office removal
and disqualification to run for eight years.347 If they find that applying these sanctions in the
case is disproportional, they may choose not to punish the infringer, even though it is
undisputable that the facts are subsumed by the law text occurred. In these cases, judges are
basically deciding what the reach of the statute is, not interpreting, making an intelligible and
rational decision and avoiding a mechanical one. 348
In fact, the principle of proportionality has become an essential tool for civil law
judges and has acquired unprecedented relevance in legal reasoning. As David Beatty, a law
professor at the University of Toronto, correctly observes, “the judiciary has constructed a
working model of judicial review that relies, almost entirely, on the principle of
proportionality to tell […] when the elected representatives of the people and their officials
are acting properly and when they are not.”349 He adds that:
“[i]n all areas of government regulation, no matter the nature
of the right or freedom that is alleged to have been violated,
and regardless of the personal characteristics of those bringing
the case, on what might be called the jurist’s model, the test is
always the same. Laws—indeed any act undertaken in the
name or without the authorization (explicit or tacit) of the
state—must respect a basic principle of proportionality in the
way they deal with the different interests and values they
affect. Whether judges are faced with a claim of religious
freedom, sex discrimination, or for material support from the
assessment as possible of what the disputed state action
actually means to those it affects the most. When it is applied
346
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properly, proportionality requires judges to assess the
legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or ruling is before
them from the perspective of those who reap is greatest and
those who stand the most.”350
Regarding the popularity of the principle, Beatty affirms that “[i]n tracing its roots
beneath the words of the page, judges have found that proportionality runs to all four corners
of every constitutional text. Collectively, their judgements establish the neutrality of its
definition as well. Although […] it often goes by different names, ‘reasonableness’ in India
and Japan, ‘toleration’ in Israel, ‘strict scrutiny’ in the U.S., its meaning never changes.”351
Proportionality has acquired such an importance that many statutes have included
provisions—Humberto Ávila calls them metanorms or normative postulates, which he
considers a distinct species of norm, different from rules and principles 352 —compelling
judges to take the principle into consideration. Some of those statutes were referred in
subchapter II.5.3.3. above. Another legal precept that shall be mentioned is article 8 of the
recent Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 2015, which sets forth that “in applying the legal
order, the judge shall follow social goals and common good demands, sheltering and
promoting human dignity and observing the proportionality, the reasonableness, the legality,
the publicity and the efficiency.”353
II.5.7. Constitutionalizing the Law
Since principles can serve as grounds (a) for interpreting laws; (b) for changing laws;
(c) for figuring out particular exceptions to laws; (d) for making new rules; and (e) for acting
in particular cases, they may conflict with rules. In these situations, principles may weigh in
a case in which a rule unequivocally applies, changing the rule or finding an exception to it
or generating other consequences.
This relationship among rules and principles is more apparent when one examines
the phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law. This phenomenon is well described by Justice
Barroso:
“In countries where democracy arrived later, such as Portugal
(1976), Spain (1978), and Brazil (1988), the
constitutionalization of the law is a more recent—and perhaps
more intense—phenomenon. In Brazil, particularly, due to its
extensive and analytical Constitution, the constitutionalization
of the law has taken on two important dimensions: a) the
inclusion in the Constitution of principles related to multiple
areas of the Law, including civil, administrative, criminal,
procedural, and other areas, and b) the projection of
fundamental constitutional principles, like human dignity, in
the different domains of sub-constitutional law, giving new
meaning and scope to their norms and institutions. 354
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Barroso adds that the constitutionalizing the law phenomenon resulted in an
“extensive and profound process of judicialization of social relations and politically
controversial issues that have sparked debate regarding the role of the judiciary and the
legitimacy of its decisions.”355 “The values, public interests, and behavior contemplated in
the principles and the rules of a constitution now tend to affect the validity and meaning of
all sub-constitutional legal norms.”356
Indeed, the phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law has led Brazilian adjudication
to adopt an opposite practice to the one exercised in the U.S., regarding statutory
interpretation. In Brazil, due to this circumstance, there is no canon of constitutional
avoidance357 or minimalism.358 On the contrary, judges are highly encouraged to take into
account constitutional principles to decide the meaning of statutes, even in cases that
statutory interpretation would be sufficient. Through their constitutional reasoning, they may
sometimes “rewrite” or “improve” statutory provisions, what may be criticized in the U.S..359
An example of that phenomenon took place is a tax case. Although the Brazilian
National Tax Code sets forth that rules granting tax exemptions shall be construed literally,360
courts have constantly been declaring the right of disabled persons who cannot drive to
purchase cars without paying sales tax. 361 This exception, however, according to local
legislation, is only granted to disabled drivers who can drive an automobile. The reason for
this discrimination is that the exemption supposedly shall compensate the costs of vehicle
adaptation. Courts, however, consider this discrimination unreasonable because it does not
furnish all disabled people with the same protection granted by the Federal Constitution.
They say that people who cannot drive cars are probably the ones that mostly need the use
of an automobile. Therefore, courts constantly grant claims for tax exemption, when disabled
persons file lawsuits.362
II.6. Stare Decisis (Doctrine of Precedent)
The Brazilian doctrine of precedent also differs from the prevalent doctrine of
common law countries. The binding force of precedents in Brazil has been more a matter of
rules than of culture.
355
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Winfried Brugger, talking about Germany, states that “[r]espect for judicial precedent
is not a formally binding guideline for judicial interpretation in [his country], because in a
code law system, judicial decisions serve only as gloss on the law which is to be found in the
rules and principles of the governing legal texts.”363
Karl Larenz, also German, affirms that to qualify as “jurisprudence”—the term
continental lawyers use to designate caselaw—as source of law, one shall specify what she
understands as source of law. “If all factors that cooperate with the creation and latter
development of the law qualify, then the jurisprudence, so as the legal science, is a source of
law. However, if one considers only the base for the origin of a legal norm to which one
wishes normative validity, in a binding sense, in this case, [the sources of law] are only the
legislation and the original use in a general conviction (as source of customary law).”364
The Brazilian judge, grounded in the civil law tradition, has a different approach
towards precedents from the common law judge because Brazilian law considers enacted law
to be its major source of law.
Precedents do not have the same force as the enacted law because they commonly
offer only persuasive reasons for judges to decide in the same manner in similar cases. Since
judges are only bound to apply the legislation, they may choose to follow the previous
decision if they consider it to be a right application of the enacted law. Precedents are not
considered mandatory norms or peremptory reasons¸ at least in the majority of cases.365
As Larenz observes, “courts, according to our legal organization, are not bound to
precedents as they are to the [enacted] law. It is not the precedent, for being a precedent, that
binds, but the norm that it contains, if this norm is considered a correct interpretation or
concretization [of the law].” 366 For these reasons, the judge’s behavior is different when
facing the necessity of applying a written norm or a precedent:
“[…] every judge that decides again the same issue can and
shall, in principle, decide independently and shall follow the
precedent’s interpretation, the norm’s concretization or the
judicial development of the law, if he is convinced that the
precedent is right and is grounded on current law. Therefore,
the judge does not have to blindly accept the precedent. He not
only has the power, but is compelled to depart from the
previous decision if he concludes that the precedent’s
interpretation is wrong or if such interpretation represents an
poor development of the law, or even if he concludes that the
question the precedent addresses, although rightly decided in
the past, shall be settled in a different manner today, due to the
change in a normative situation or in the whole legal order.”367
The same view exposed by Brugger and Larenz is shared in the Brazilian law. Since
precedents historically have had only a persuasive effect, they are not considered binding,
unless in exceptional hypotheses, in which the C.F. or the C.P.C. grants this effect. These
circumstances are the following: firstly, when the full bench of the S.T.F issues a final

363

Brugger, supra note 33, at 398.
LARENZ, supra note 323, at 615.
365
See RAZ, supra note 284.
366
Id. at 612.
367
Id.
364

68

decision, on the merits, in an abstract constitutional review action, 368 this decision has
binding effect as regards to the other bodies of the judicial branch and the governmental
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enactment of S.T.F. ruling. In exceptional cases, the S.T.F. may issue an opinion conferring prospective effects
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extraordinary circumstances, in order to protect legal certainty or other compelling interest.
The other form of judicial review is called concrete or incidental review. It may be practiced by all Brazilian
judges in any case. If, in a lawsuit, a judge is confronted with the debate of the constitutionality of a statute or
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adjudicate the case. If the losing party appeals, this decision may be subject to review by a Court of Appeals,
either State or Federal depending on the matter, and, after that, the case may be heard by the S.T.F. if the losing
party files an extraordinary appeal.
This extraordinary appeal is decided by the S.T.F. if it considers that the constitutional question in debate
has general relevance. The vote of four justices is necessary to meet this requirement. If the Court considers the
issue of general repercussion, it has also to review the case, not having discretion to merely dismiss the appeal
without issuing an opinion.
The Article 97 of the Constitution requires that all decisions that hold a statute or a regulation partly or fully
unconstitutional must be decided by the majority of the members of the ruling Court (or at least of the majority
of the highest bench of a Court of Appeals). In the case of the S.T.F., a total vote of 6 Justices is necessary to
proclaim the unconstitutionality of a statute or a regulation since our Highest Court has 11 Justices.
If a statute or a regulation is held unconstitutional in an extraordinary appeal case, technically, since the
proceeding is merely subjective (that is, involves a litigation between two parties, it is not abstract review), the
unconstitutional article is not removed from the legal system. In this case, the S.T.F. notifies the Brazilian
Senate in order for it to suspend the execution of this norm in Brazil (Article 52, X, C.F.).
Finally, state courts also exercise abstract judicial review of state statutes and regulations regarding state
constitutions. These decisions can only be reviewed by the S.T.F. if the state constitution norm that provided
the basis of the court decision is a mere reply of a C.F. norm. Since the S.T.F. is considered, under Article 102
of the C.F., the ultimate guardian of the constitutional text, it hears the appeal in order to check if the state
court’s ruling contradicts
its interpretation
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text.
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entities in all levels, not being mandatory to the legislative branch. This rule is set forth in
article 102, § 2 of the C.F.369
Secondly, the S.T.F may, ex-officio or upon request, by the vote of two thirds of its
members, issue a súmula vinculante (binding statement) of a case result, which will express
the conclusion of reiterated decisions of the Court on a constitutional matter. Such súmula
vinculante (binding statement) shall have binding effect, in conformity with art. 103-A of the
C.F..370 The S.T.F. also may issue sumulas não vinculantes (non-binding statements), which,
although reflect a settled understanding of a legal issue grounded in previous cases
adjudicated by the Court, are not legally considered to be binding and are merely persuasive.
Furthermore, the new Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] of March 2015371 adopted a new
attitude towards precedents, which, for many Brazilian scholars, approximated the Brazilian
system to the common law system.372 It was an attempt to introduce a culture of following
precedents in the country. The article 927 of the C.P.C. says that judges must “unify their
jurisprudence and keep its stability, integrity and coherence.”373 To achieve such purpose, §
4 of article 928 determines that the modification of (a) sumulas (statement of settled law),
(b) settled caselaw or (c) theses adopted in multiple appeals issue 374 shall observe the
necessity of adequate and specific justification, taking into account legal certainty,
protection of trust and equality of treatment.375 If precedents or statements that the Code
considers binding on judges are not followed, the parties may file a claim directly to the court
that issued the decision to uphold its authority.376
The new C.P.C. has also established a rule377 that to depart from previous unbinding
precedents, judges must distinguish the cases or show that the understanding adopted in them
has been overruled. If they do not bear this burden, their decisions will be considered
insufficiently justified and, therefore, will be void. For some authors, such rule changed the
force of precedents in general. If they are not binding, at least there is a general expectation
that they will be followed and, although the law recognizes the judge’s power to deviate from
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them, it also imposes the burden of providing reasons why they are doing so. In this sense,
such authors call them weak binding precedents.378
The need to install a culture of precedent-following has led Brazilian high judges to
draw up different justifications from their American counterparts in unconstitutional
decisions. Both countries adopt the rule that ‘the unconstitutional law is no law at all’ and,
therefore, that ruling has retrospective effects. 379 But, since stare decisis is a rule of
American Law,380 the fact that an unconstitutional law is not formally removed from the
legal books is not considered a major problem, because judges will not apply it, especially
after a SCOTUS ruling.
Indeed, American legal books have several unconstitutional laws that have not been
technically removed from its texts but are considered void and, in practice, inapplicable. A
significant example is the article VI, Section 8, of the North Carolina Constitution, which
disqualifies for office “any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”381 The Texas
Penal Code rule, which provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex” and which was invalidated by
the SCOTUS in Lawrence v. Texas, 382 has never been formally repealed by the Texas
Legislature and, hence, removed from the code.383 Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that a
Texas district attorney, by still trying to enforce such statute, would prosecute someone for
engaging in homosexual activity, even if he disagrees with the Supreme Court decision.
Courts would probably think that he does not know the current law in force. Therefore,
technically, in the U.S., judges “cannot reach into statute books and erase laws.”384
In Brazil, a measure adopted by the S.T.F. that certainly contributed to strengthening
the force of its decisions in relation to future similar cases was to consider the
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unconstitutional law formally removed from the legal world. 385 This effect automatically
takes place every time the S.T.F. reaches a decision in an abstract review case.386 Therefore,
contrariwise to the U.S. view, members of the Judiciary branch have the power to reach into
a statute book and erase the law—in fact, technically, since the law is void, it works as if it
has never been enacted—. The S.T.F. understands that it has such power because its
decisions, in abstract review cases, have binding effect, according to the C.F..387 Congress
does not dispute it and has never reacted to such understanding.
However, for concrete review cases, which may be exercised by any judge in any
type of subjective lawsuit, in order for an unconstitutional decision to have extra parties
effect (not limited to the litigating parties), article 52, X, of the C.F. demands that the Senate
suspends the execution of such unconstitutional law. Only then, by the terms of such precept,
the law will be considered not to have any legal effect and judges will not be able to apply it
anymore if they disagree with the S.T.F. decision. The Senate suspension act will only have
prospective effect, not retroactive effect.388
Despite the clarity of its words, until recently, there was a debate over whether article
52, X, of the C.F. should still be understood as to bring the Senate an action to suspend the
unconstitutional law for it not to be considered in force anymore.389 In a very recent case,
decided on November 29, 2017, whose opinion has not yet been published, the S.T.F.
reviewed its former understanding that a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute in a
concrete review case did not automatically have binding effects. According to the case result
summary,390 the Court granted binding effects to such ruling, which incidentally declared the
unconstitutionality of article 2 of Lei No. 9.055/95, that authorized the use of white asbestos
in Brazil. Therefore, the Court held that the Senate decree would no longer have the force of
suspending the validity of the law, but only to help publicize the S.T.F. decision.391
Nevertheless, the relevant point to note, for the purposes of this work, is that stare
decisis is historically far from being a cultural tradition in Brazilian law and though its
importance has been gaining momentum, many judges still remain faithful to the view
exposed by Karl Larenz, that “it is not the precedent per se that binds, but the norm that it
contains when such norm is considered a correct interpretation or concretization.” 392
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The absence of a stare decisis rule has consequences for the Brazilian legal society.
Lower court judges and prosecutors do not feel compelled to follow non-binding precedents
and upper judges feel freer to depart from their courts’ own prior decisions. This freedom is
one of the causes of the high number of cases that reach upper courts in Brazil and also of
the considerable number of reversals. A recent study from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas
[F.G.V.], for example, showed that 44% of the habeas corpus filed in the S.T.J., the highest
Brazilian court for legal matters, had been filed against opinions from the Court of Appeals
of the State of São Paulo [T.J.S.P.]. Among these proceedings, the S.T.J. reversed the lower
court ruling in 27% of the cases. According to an article published by Bruno Torrano, a law
professor and clerk at the S.T.J., the T.J.S.P. tend to be harder on criminal defendants than
the S.T.J..393
Even though Torrano may be angry about the São Paulo judges’ attitude, following
upper courts’ precedents—technically speaking—is not required because S.T.J. opinions in
habeas corpus cases do not bind them.394 The fact that their decisions may be reversed will
not hinder their careers—they hold a life tenured position and need not to seek reelection like
judges in many U.S. states—and they will not be fired for it, nor that will be held against any
career promotion. They may simply choose to ignore the upper court precedent, because they
see themselves free to apply the law in the way they consider correct.
An example of this assertion is the sentence that convicted former President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva for corruption charges, the crime mentioned in subchapter II.4.1. above.
The sentence, written by the Federal Judge Sergio Moro, asserted that there is an ongoing
debate about whether the performance of an official act is a necessary requirement for the
crime of passive corruption.395 Moro cited a S.T.J. precedent, holding that the practice of an
official act is not necessary.396 He also said that the S.T.F.’s ruling in Ação Penal 470, a
famous case called Mensalão, decided in 2012, in which former officials from the Partido
dos Trabalhadores – PT were convicted for corruption, had not settled the issue.397
393
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However, the reason why the former President Fernando Collor was acquitted by the
S.T.F. for corruption charges, in 1994, was because the Court ruled that he had not performed
any official act in exchange for undue advantage. 398 The S.T.F. acknowledged Collor’s
acceptance of undue advantage but acquitted him of the corruption accusation because he
had not performed an official act in exchange for it.
Clearly, Judge Moro did not feel bound to follow the precedent settled in Collor’s
criminal case, even though he was judging another former president for the same crime. Moro
did not even cite Collor’s case in his reasoning.399 He cited an opinion from the S.T.J. and
three opinions from U.S. Courts of Appeals [one of them reversed after McDonnell400] while
asserting that “in the Brazilian jurisprudence, the issue is still subject to debates, but the most
recent rulings take the position that to be convicted for corruption, one needs not to perform
an official act, but if an act is performed, it is not necessary to precisely individualize it.”401
As he observed, the S.T.F. in the Mensalão trials had not followed its previous ruling in
Collor’s case requiring an official act.402
Consequently, although passive corruption has been a crime in Brazil since 1940, one
of its requirements is still not settled in the case law, nor Congress has acted to clarify the
law—a practice that is not common in the country. Prosecutors, for example, do not need to
prosecute corruption only if they can prove that an official individual act was performed,
such as the one required by the S.T.F. to convict Collor. If they disagree with the S.T.F.
ruling, they may simply initiate an action without proving such fact and hope that the judge
that will hear the case also disagrees with the S.T.F. precedent. If this suit results in an
acquittal, the fact is not considered a down point since they have a professional career and a
lifetime job. Judges, under the current stage of the law, do not need to convict only if they
recognize such requirement in the evidence. They may adopt the S.T.J. precedent cited by
Moro and rule differently from the S.T.F. in Collor’s case. If the case gets appealed, there is
cases in public, not privately as the U.S. Supreme Court, for example. So, after hearing oral arguments, the
Justices debate and vote the case in a public session. Regarding the Mensalão, the case citation is the following:
S.T.F., A.P. No. 470, Relator: Min. Joaquim Barbosa, 17.12.2012, D IÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.],
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no certainty as to whether the ruling will be reversed since even the S.T.F.’s position was
modified or at least weakened in the Mensalão cases. The issue will only be definitely settled
when the S.T.F. decides an abstract review case on the matter or enacts a binding statement
with its final decision on the issue.
Another example was a decision rendered by the S.T.F. in an election matter. The
Court examined if the T.S.E. had acted properly when disqualified a reelected mayor to run
for a new office term in a neighboring city. 403 The issue was whether the one reelection
limitation rule for Executive Office set forth in the C.F. also applied for elections in other
cities or states. The S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E.’s ruling but held that such Court could not have
applied this new understanding for cases heard in the same election, because it had already
ruled differently for other candidates in appeals that had been decided in that same election
year. Article 16 of the C.F. demands that alterations in election law shall not occur in the
year of the election. Indeed, the T.S.E. had changed its reading of § 5 of article 14 of the C.F.
on the third similar case that it heard in that year.404 Therefore, the S.T.F. had to notify the
T.S.E. not to change its prior rulings, at least in cases decided in the same elections, because
that did not guarantee equal treatment of the candidates.
All and all, the absence of a consolidated stare decisis doctrine makes the evolution
of the law more complicated in Brazil. Case law is also seen as the law of the land in common
law countries [having the same force as the statute law], whereas in Brazil it is generally not
seen as having the same force of the enacted law, except when the enacted law says so. This
fact carries significant consequences for the guiding function of law and will be examined in
chapter 5.
II.7. Chapter Conclusions
The main purpose of this chapter was to describe the basic answers that are
commonly given to three philosophical questions about Brazilian law: (a) what is considered
to be law in Brazil? (b) What is the role of rules and principles in Brazilian law? And, (c) is
there a predominant criterion that judges employ when adjudicating cases in Brazil? In
summary, the main answers that I think are accurate to these questions are the following.
Brazilian law considers that a social fact is necessary to take place in order for law to
exist. This social fact is traditionally seen as an act of the legislative branch: the enactment
of legislation. The most important social fact that has taken place in Brazil for the legal
community was the enactment of the C.F. in 1988. Such document established the basic rules
as to what are the necessary steps for Brazilians to identify what is law and what is not law.
It states, in its article 5, II, that “no one shall be obligated to do or refrain from doing
something except by virtue of [enacted] law.”405 The basic comprehension of the term law
in this constitutional provision is enacted law. Therefore, coercion is traditionally deemed
legitimate only when the citizen performs an act that runs against a written legal provision,
which is considered a product of the democratic will of the people. The necessary procedures
for making law are regulated in the constitutional text (either federal, state or municipal level)
and, as said, are basically understood as taking place through the enactment of legislation.
Brazilian judges share this basic view. In the three cases that were cited in subchapter
II.1 and in the others cases referred throughout this chapter, the justifications of the decisions
rendered, although many times founded in rules that clearly did not provide unequivocal
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instructions as to how to decide the case, were attributed to specific provisions of Brazilian
enacted law.
Indeed, Brazilian legal practice adopts Savigny’s four interpretation methods: literal,
historical, contextual and teleological, to identify the content of the law. Only if these
techniques do not provide an answer, should the judge rule by applying analogy, customs or
general principles of law. 406 Even when facing a gap, in accordance with article 140 of the
C.P.C., the Brazilian judge has to decide the case. 407 The country adopts the prohibition of
non liquet rule.
The in claris cessat interpretatio maximum, which is similar to the plain meaning
rule of interpretation, is not usually followed, since Brazilian lawyers share the view that
their legal texts shall not be read in parts, but as a whole. They adopt the legal dogmatic
approach, which is very common in the civil law world, and understand their legal system as
having properties such as unity, consistency, coherence, and completeness. Such properties
have allowed Brazilian judges to update—without formally changing—their statutes, which
are, in general, not so clear and detailed in comparison with the U.S. statutes.
Regarding the C.F., the current mainstream view among Brazilian courts and scholars
is that, after its enactment in 1988, a great change took place in the way we understand the
its function. Constitutional norms gained the status of enforceable norms. Their observance
became imperative. If not obeyed, constitutional norms can prompt government coercion.
They are seen as mandatory norms, even if their text demands complement by statute law.408
They also have started influencing many areas of the law, such as civil, criminal and
administrative law. The phenomenon is called ‘constitutionalizing the law’ and reflects an
opposite view of the American constitutional avoidance doctrine409 or minimalism.410
The interpretation of constitutional norms also uses dogmatic techniques, such as
Savigny’s four methods, but scholars argue for additional approaches. To assure practical
concordance, Brazilian jurists understand that the constitutional provisions—commonly
broader and open textured if compared to statutory provisions—must be optimized when in
conflict to preserve the Constitution’s unity. Works of Konrad Hesse 411 and Robert Alexy
are very popular and are constantly cited in judicial opinions. They basically state that “[t]he
406
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principle of the constitution’s unity requires the optimization of [values in conflict]: [b]oth
legal values need to be limited so that each can attain its optimal effect. In each concrete
case, therefore, the limitations must satisfy the principle of proportionality; that is, they may
not go any further than necessary to produce concordance of both legal values.”412
Stare decisis is not a general rule or principle in Brazilian law. The recent enactment
of some legal provisions shows an effort to disseminate and acculturate it in the country.
However, some Brazilian judges still feel free to disregard upper court precedents when they
disagree with their interpretation of the law. They generally only do not do it with decisions
that the legislation attributes binding effects.
Furthermore, Brazilian judges also resort to legal principles when deciding cases.
Principles, at first, were merely supplemental in legal reasoning and judges commonly used
them to fill gaps in the system. Their content was mostly found in natural law. However,
nowadays, principles are paramount in legal reasoning. They may be written in legal texts,
whereas judges will essentially concretize what they mean once they apply them to a case.
Or they may also be implicit, being extracted as an inference of the content of legal norms
that are posited in the Constitution and in statutes. At last, constitutional principles interact
with legal rules in adjudication, optimizing their content, allowing judges to reach a solution
which they consider in line with the principle’s content.
II.8. Jurisprudential Notes
Brazilian law has unquestionably changed in the last thirty years. The enactment of
the 1988 C.F. was a significant moment in the country’s legal history. Judges today resort to
legal sources that are very differently written in comparison to the legal texts that existed
before 1988. Some of the norms are essentially moral and, for that reason, demand that
officials employ moral reasoning when construing them. Judges adjudicate more complex
cases, many related to the enforcement of social and collective diffuse rights, which involve
arguments of policy. They consider their role to be different from the role of their
predecessors: they must enforce a Constitution that is not only a political document, but a
legal and enforceable rule-book.
In this sense, it was more than reasonable for Brazilian jurisprudential scholars and
judges to engage in a project to evaluate (a) what indeed has changed in Brazilian law; (b)
why it has changed; and (c) if these changes are so deep as to even have modified the
philosophical spine of the system.
As I noted in chapter I, legal positivism was, for decades, the most prominent school
of jurisprudence in Brazil. 413 But, due to the recent changes, some scholars have simply
claimed that positivism is no longer able to explain the Brazilian legal system. They argue
that positivism is tied to surpassed ideas, like the separation of law and morals and
legalism. 414 They contend that the contemporary constitutionalism has opened the legal
system to moral values and, therefore, to natural law. In this way, they try to systematize a
new theory, which they call post-positivism, to better capture the phenomena that currently
dominate the legal system. 415
Nonetheless, post-positivists cannot explain if morality is always present in the law,
or if it is just contingent. They also do not have an answer to convincingly describe why
Brazil’s former constitutional regimes, some of them evil and, therefore, immoral, are
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considered law. In addition, they cannot elucidate why, in some moments, Brazilian law is
still tied to legalist approaches, and sometimes tolerates immoral decisions.
Brazilian post-positivism, chained to the civil law tradition, does not acknowledge
judicial lawmaking. Even though judges concretize constitutional concepts through a
dialectic process of “creatively determining results in conformity with, but not determinable
by, the Constitution,”416 they still consider this to be mere posited law application and their
creative decisions, as a rule, may be applied retroactively417 to the facts of the case.418
Moreover, a German post-positivistic theory, in trying to deny judicial discretion in
hard cases, have adopted a different approach regarding what is considered to be the law.
They argue for the separation of the text and the norm. Therefore, posited law would not be
the law, because the law would only exist once the norm is applied to a concrete situation.
The main contender of this view is the German author Friedrich Muller, who
advanced the structuring legal theory and argues that this “theory developed a new postpositivistic concept of legal theory according to which the legal norms […] have not already
been written into legislation.” 419 This view, nevertheless, has trouble in explaining criminal
legality, for example.
Although the structuring legal theory is not purely adopted in Brazil—except in few
S.T.F. opinions, generally written by former Justice Eros Grau420—this distinction among
text and norm has acquired some support. A strong criticism of positivism in the country is
that it does not “distinguish the text from the norm.”421
In this sense, post-positivism, although is the prevalent jurisprudential theory in
Brazil, is often seen with suspicion and is sometimes associated with judicial activism and
usurpation of legislative power. Professor Jorge Galvão, for example, claims that the notion
of the rule of law has been severely compromised.422
Post-positivism also does not convince old school legalistic423 judges that the current
judicial activity is sensibly different from the pre-1988 period. For these judges,
“rationalistic aspiration to a mechanistic jurisprudence stands firmly in place, as the product
of a need of certainty.” 424 The “idea of adjudication as a logical-deductive operation
consisting in objective application of the law to a particular case at point, by way of
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normative and legalistic syllogism and without any need to look beyond the four corners of
the law,”425 is still dominant for them.
Also, post-positivism is criticized by authors that claim that judicial decisions should
not employ moral arguments and that law simply cannot be filtered by morality. 426 Ingeborg
Maus, from Germany, states that the elevation of the Judiciary branch to a condition of
superior instance of morality represents a regression to pre-democratic social models:
“If the justice elevates, in this sense, to the condition of
society’s superior moral instance, the social mechanism of
control that—in an ideal field—every state apparatus should
be bound to are removed. In the dominance of a Judiciary
branch that exercises a “higher” morally enriched law in
relation to the other branches that occupy themselves only with
ordinary law—and in relation to the rest of the society—it is
notorious the regression to the pre-democratic model of
integration.”427
In the opening paragraph of this thesis, I stated that I intend to demonstrate why
inclusive legal positivism best describes the Brazilian legal system. I will show that the
theory not only explains the issues that Brazilian post-positivism fails to do, but also better
elucidates the country’s current practices, in a clear and technical manner, which helps to
avoid the unfair criticisms that post-positivism suffers today.
Inclusive legal positivism, in this sense, will help to clarify “the distinct nature and
legitimacy of judicial decision making in the absence of clear textual guidance”428 in Brazil.
In this sense, I borrow David Kennedy’s remarks: “[o]nly if it seem[s] possible to see judicial
reasoning as different from and differently legitimate than legislation [can] an engaged
liberal judiciary be defended.”429
After examining inclusive legal positivism and the other dominant Anglo-American
theories that purport to explain what the law is, I will go over the most diffused ideas of postpositivism in Brazil and will explain why I disagree with many of its claims but agree with
others.
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III. LAW AND MORALITY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
III.1. Short Explanation of the Chapter Goals
The relationship between legality and morality is the central focus of the debate about
the nature of law, which is the fundamental question of general jurisprudence. 430 In the
posthumously published Postscript to the second edition of his classic The Concept of Law
(hereinafter referred to as “Postscript to The Concept of Law”), H.L.A. Hart 431
acknowledged that the rule of recognition—his conventional master rule that determines
which of the community’s norms are legal ones432—“may incorporate conformity with moral
principles or substantive values as a criterion of validity.”433 For this reason, he classified
the legal theory he described at the center of The Concept of Law as soft-positivism,434 which,
in his words, “permits the identification of the law to depend on controversial matters of
conformity with moral or other value judgments.”435
Although Hart acknowledged soft-positivism, which is more commonly referred as
inclusive legal positivism, as an accommodation to Ronald Dworkin’s criticism of legal
positivism, 436 his endorsement was not sufficient to convince Dworkin 437 or to promote
consensus among the last century’s most prominent jurisprudence scholars on the legalitymorality relationship.438 In fact, by the end of the 20th Century, at least four different theories
dominated the American academy in respect to the issue of the relationship between legality
and morality. Such theories are inclusive legal positivism, exclusive legal positivism, natural
law theory, and interpretivism.439
In this chapter, I will briefly analyze these four different theoretical perspectives. For
explaining them, I will essentially adopt the views exposed by H.L.A. Hart and Wil
Waluchow for inclusive legal positivism, Joseph Raz for exclusive legal positivism, John
Finnis for the modern natural law theory, and Ronald Dworkin for interpretivism.
430
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While describing each of these theoretical perspectives, I will also offer arguments
to make clear why the basic characteristics of the Brazilian legal system shown in the
previous chapter demonstrate that inclusive legal positivism is appropriate to answer what
the law is and why its basic traits do not permit it to be framed within any of the other three
views in the country.
I believe this analysis will be relevant to describe, theoretically, the jurisprudential
characteristics of the Brazilian legal system. This examination will also allow beginning
pointing out of the practical basic features that I consider to be problematic about the
country’s legal system, which I will go over in detail in chapter 5.
III.2. Inclusive Legal Positivism
To explore the basic properties that best characterize the inclusive legal positivistic
theory, I will essentially resort to H.L.A. Hart’s theory, exposed in the well-known essay
Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals,440 as well as in the seminal book The
Concept of Law441 and in the article Problems of the Philosophy of Law.442 As Dworkin
famously declared in his The Model of Rules I, Hart’s positivist approach is not only clear
and elegant, but also constructive thought in legal philosophy “must start with a consideration
of his views.”443
III.2.1. H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Positivism
In his seminal book The Concept of Law, Hart basically described the law as a
particular social practice through which a society defines its rules.444 According to him, the
key to the science of jurisprudence lies in the investigation of what it is for a social group
and its officials to accept rules.445 Through such analysis, Hart argued for an institutional
view of law.446 Law, in his opinion, is a system of social rules in two senses:447
(a) the social rules generally regulate how human beings shall behave (“the
character of the legal directive imposing the duty is injunctive and normative”);448 and
(b)
the social rules only exist due to human social practices (“the criteria for
what counts as a legal norm are artificial and conventionalist, and not moral”). 449
Legal rules differ from moral or game rules because they commonly impose duties
or obligations in imperative form and are, in general, considered obligatory to citizens.450
440
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Rules, therefore, are usually formulated to guide actions.451 Citizens and officials behave in
a certain manner not because they morally agree with what has been commanded by the
lawgiver—they may or may not—or because they have a habit to do so, but due to the
existence of a social practice that tells them to do so. If someone does not act in the manner
established by the social rule, there should be a critical reflexive attitude that the binding
standard is not being observed. This attitude is the internal aspect of rules, an aspect that
habits, for example, lack.452 Most of the times, a sanction may be imposed for not observing
a rule. “Hart’s approach, with emphasis on the internal aspect of rules and of the law, is
hermeneutic in the sense that it tries to understand a practice in a manner that takes into
account the way the practice is perceived by its participants:”453
“The clear cases are those in which there is general agreement
that they fall within the scope of a rule, and it is tempting to
ascribe such agreements simply to the fact that there are
necessarily such agreements in the use of the shared
conventions of language. But this would be an
oversimplification because it does not allow for the special
conventions of the legal use of words, which may diverge from
their common use, or for the way in which the meanings of
words may be clearly controlled by reference to the purpose of
a statutory enactment which itself may be either explicitly
stated or generally agreed.”454
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For a system of law to exist and to differ itself from a pre-legal regime, a special kind
of rules, that impose no duties or obligations, shall also exist and be accepted by officials.455
These rules are Hart’s secondary rules and are introduced with the purpose of solving
problems of uncertainty, staticity and inefficiency.456 The combination of primary rules—
rules that impose obligations and duties—and secondary rules is, in his view, the real “key
to the science of jurisprudence.” 457
According to Hart, there are three types of secondary rules and each of them has the
goal of remedying each one of the mischiefs above:
(a)
to correct the uncertainty as to define which primary rules of obligation are
legal and which are not, the system must introduce a rule of recognition.458 This rule—which
Zipursky says that it is not really a rule but consists of propositions459— may take a variety
of forms, simple or complex. The rule of recognition has also the purpose 460of implementing
the idea of a legal system, by furnishing a unified set of rules, as opposed to an unconnected
set. 461 Without the existence of a rule of recognition, the “judicial role as such is
inconceivable.”462 Hart contends that “law’s primary role is to guide individuals’ conduct in
day-to-day life, to define what we may expect from fellow citizens, governments,
455
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corporations, among others” and the rule of recognition is the way he imagines the citizen
may be able to grasp these rules.463 As such, they have propositional content and they are
normative in nature;464
(b)
in dealing with the staticity problem of rules—which consists in the fact that
in primitive societies rules can only be altered through a slow process of growth, whereby
courses of conduct once thought optional become first habitual or usual, and then
obligatory—, the system introduces rules of change. Such rules empower "an individual or
a body of persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or
of some class within it, and to eliminate old rules;”465
(c)
to solve the inefficiency problem, which refers to social conflicts that may
take place as to whether the primary rules of obligation have or have not been violated, the
legal system introduces the rules of adjudication. Such rules identify the individuals who are
to adjudicate disputes and the procedure that shall be followed by them. Rules of
adjudication, therefore, introduce concepts of judges, courts, judgments and jurisdiction, and
may be reinforced by further rules imposing duties on judges on how to adjudicate.466
He also states that “if courts are empowered to make authoritative determinations of
the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative
determinations of what the rules are. So, the rule which confers jurisdiction will also be a
rule of recognition, identifying the primary rules through the judgments of courts and these
judgments will be a ‘source’ of law.” 467 At last, he adds that legal systems have also
centralized pressure and commit officials with the task of implementing sanctions.468
As Neil MacCormick notes, Hart has a view that a particular aspect of a government
ruled by laws is that there are institutions and proceedings to elaborate, in a clear and
authoritative manner, which standards of conduct are legal and which are not. The legal order
converts vaguer standards of conduct into rules, which ideally are more precise. 469
MacCormick also asserts that “Hart clearly does not agree that all law is in the relevant sense
‘posited’ by some deliberate legislative decision […]. What he does hold is that legal rules
as social rules have social sources, being entirely rooted in the actual practices (doings,
sayings, and thinkings) of persons in society. Legal rules are neither derive nor include, nor
derive from objectively preexisting and valid natural standards of human conduct.” 470
Furthermore, in the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Hart stated that the practice theory is
not pertinent to enacted legal rules, for these norms “may exist as legal rules from the moment
of their enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.”471
Hart’s theory, then, is focused on the actual behavior, on the words and on the
thoughts employed in the depiction of rules among society, whether in legal texts, decisions,
or other statements that may be considered authoritative by officials, as well as in the official
practices that describe the comprehension of these social facts. 472 Law uses “normative
463

WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 49. See also HART, supra note 43, at 39.
ZIPURSKY, supra note 458, at 232.
465
HART, supra note 43, at 95.
466
Id. at 97.
467
Id.
468
Id. at 98.
469
MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 57.
470
Id. at 195.
471
HART, supra note 43, at 256.
472
WACKS, supra note 9, at 95.
464

84

vocabulary of ought to, entitled to, authorized to. Legal statements are generally practical
[and in] contrast with descriptive statements, their function is to guide and appraise our
conduct.”473 As Benjamin Zipursky contends, for primary rules, “[w]hat matters [for Hart]—
as in language and meaning generally—is that the rule exists within a certain context in which
members of a community regard the expression as properly interpreted and responded to in
a certain manner. The injunctive quality of legal directives is what Hart has in mind when he
calls them ‘duty-imposing rules.’ Their content is such that they purport to direct individuals
to act or not to act in a certain manner.”474
III.2.1.1 Hart’s Battles
Hart’s jurisprudential works targeted many important points: (a) John Austin’s
command theory;475 (b) William Blackstone’s mechanistic view of law; (c) the American
realist movement, led by Oliver Wendell Holmes and by Karl Llewellyn; and (d) the natural
law theories and their view that morality and law are inherently interconnected.
Hart’s attack on Austin’s command theory was made both through the introduction
of the internal aspect of rules and of the notion that all legal rules are not necessarily posited
by a sovereign’s deliberate decision, but exist due to social origins, rooted in social practices
of persons in a society, through acts, statements and thoughts.476 By means of these ideas,
Hart demonstrated that legal rules could not be considered merely commands because rules
differ from acts done under coercion and they did not originate from a sovereign, but from a
practice. Also, commands are more precise to describe duty-imposing rules and cannot
explain Hart’s secondary power-conferring rules.
Additionally, he pointed out that an important distinction of a legal rule from a
command is the fact that the rule, in the administration of justice, may be applied to cover a
situation that was not present or believed to be present in the minds of legislators.477 That
would be true, according to him, for any legal system. Hart argues that Bentham’s utilitarian
description calls this application—which was not thought or believed to be thought by
legislators—judicial legislation, whereas Hart thinks that this qualification may fail to make
justice to this phenomenon, at least in some cases.478 The scholar notes that it is important to
distinguish: [(a)] when applying rules to instances different that legislators considered or
could have considered represents a deliberate choice or fiat of the interpreters from [(b)]
when the inclusion of the new case under the rule is a natural elaboration of the rule, as
something implementing a purpose which seems natural to attribute (in some sense) to the
rule, rather to an intention of the law drafter.479
Hart’s criticism on mechanistic decisions is detailed in his article Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals and in The Concept of Law. Hart takes the position that
opinions rendered in a mechanistic fashion “would scarcely deserve the name of
decisions.” 480 He considers mechanical reasoning an ‘error’, calls mechanistic judges
‘automatic’ or a ‘slot machine’ and says that it would be better to ‘toss a penny in applying
a rule of law.’481 The formalist vice is centered in the excessive use of logic by courts, in
473
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taking “a thing to ‘a dryly logical extreme’, or in making an excessive use of analytical
methods.”482 Hart considers the lack of examination of social values and consequences when
interpreting some general term the main mechanistic error:483
“[…] [L]ogic does not prescribe interpretation of terms; it
dictates neither the stupid nor intelligent interpretation of any
expression. Logic only tells you hypothetically that if you give
a certain term a certain interpretation then a certain conclusion
follows. Logic is silent on how to classify particulars–and this
is the heart of a judicial decision.”484
Hart recognizes that the adoption of rigid modes of interpretation leads to more
situations in which the meaning of rules will be predetermined in a legal system. 485
Nevertheless, he criticizes such method, arguing that “rigid classification and divisions
ignore differences and similarities of social and moral importance.”486 The British scholar
says this adoption “prejudges what is to be done in ranges of different cases whose
composition cannot be exhaustively known beforehand.”487
Next, Hart gives his famous “crossing stolen vehicle across State lines” example,
regarding the problem a judge confronts when someone steals an airplane and take it to
another state. He mentions that the case is not controlled by linguistic conventions and
criticizes the mechanistic judge for deciding based on logic, and for not confessing that he is
not dealing with the standard but is in an area of penumbra. In this penumbral zone, the
general terms of the rule are susceptible to different interpretations and the decision is most
likely to be determined by the judge’s discretionary choice. The result is uncontrolled by
linguistic conventions. 488 As Hart asserts at the end of the essay, “we live among
uncertainties between which we have to choose, and […] the existing law imposes only limits
on our choice and not the choice itself.”489
The lack of identification of a core area of rules is Hart’s main criticism to the realist
movement, whose proponents had a skeptical view of rules. He acknowledges that the realists
“opened men’s eyes to what actually goes on when courts decide cases, and the contrast drew
between the actual facts of judicial decision and the traditional terminology for describing it
as if it were a wholly logical operation.”490 He called senseless the notion articulated by some
extreme realists that rules never control courts’ decisions and insisted in the possibility of
hard core settled meaning in some norms. 491 Also, he criticized the fact that Holmes’
prediction theory 492 could not explain the existence of courts and judges, and why their
decisions are authoritative. 493 As Zipursky observes, Hart attacked mischiefs in legal
interpretation and advocated for judges to be more transparent, frank and truthful, exposing
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the law’s flaws instead of imposing their own views by saying that the law covers what it
does not.494
Nevertheless, Hart did state that in case of “rules with an open texture and at the
points where the texture is open, individuals can only predict how courts will decide and
adjust their behavior accordingly.” 495 In fact, Hart understood the importance of ruleskepticism as a theory of the function of rules in judicial decisions.496 But he claimed that
this approach resulted from a misconception of rules being able to anticipate all possible
situations to which they should apply. When the sceptic discovers the flaws of the rules, he
then moves to deny that there can be any rules:
“Thus the fact that the rules, which judges claim bind them in
deciding a case, have an open texture, or have exceptions not
exhaustively specifiable in advance, and the fact that deviation
from the rules will not draw down on the judge a physical
sanction are often used to establish the sceptic’s case.”497
At last, Hart’s most famous struggle was to sustain, under his concept of law as a
system of rules, the separation of law and morals, a thesis that had been priorly articulated
by Austin and Bentham. While emphasizing that in the penumbral area the system of law
does not have a response to the case, leaving to the judge the responsibility to make a rational
non-formalistic decision, Hart argued that the fact that a choice has to be made does not mean
law and morals are merged. He points out that there can be intelligible decisions in the
penumbral area which do not appeal to moral arguments, but to social aims, policies, among
other types of reasoning. Moral arguments only show one type of criticism and of argument
that may be employed by the judge, under his discretion, when reaching the decision, but are
far from exclusively representing in totality what the word “ought” may mean. Economic,
political, even evil arguments could be referred to by the judge; his decision would not be
considered formalistic, but not necessarily moral:
“The point here is that intelligent decisions which we oppose
to mechanical or formal decisions are not necessarily identical
with decisions defensible on moral grounds. We may say a
decision: ‘Yes, that is right; that is as it ought to be,’ and we
may mean only that some accepted purpose or policy has been
thereby advanced; we may not mean to endorse the moral
propriety of the policy or the decision. So the contrast between
the mechanical decision and the intelligent one can be
reproduced inside a system dedicated to the pursuit of evil
aims.”498
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Nevertheless, Hart concludes that the pursuit of evil aims would not be possible in
systems like the British and the American, which “widely recognize principles of justice and
moral claims of individuals.”499 Such phrase, taken from the essay entitled Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, written in 1958, discloses a position that would be later
better detailed by Hart: his acknowledgement of soft-positivism or inclusive legal positivism.
In his 1965 essay Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, in response to Fuller’s assertion
that his rule of recognition could not be subject to any explicit or implicit provision for
revocation of abuses, Hart argued that:
“There is, for me, no logical restriction on the content of the
rule of recognition: so far as ‘logic’ goes it could provide
explicitly or implicitly that the criteria determining the validity
of subordinate laws should cease to be regarded as such if the
laws identified in accordance with them proved to be morally
objectionable. So a constitution could include in its restrictions
on the legislative power even of its supreme legislature not
only conformity with due process but a completely general
provision that its legal power should lapse if its enactments
ever conflicted with principles of morality and justice.”500
Hart, in that occasion, however, slipped a critical opinion on the adoption of
substantive vague standards of morals and justice in the rule of recognition:
“The objection to this extraordinary arrangement would not be
‘logic’ but the gross indetermination of such criteria of legal
validity. Constitutions do not invite trouble by taking this
form.”501
III.2.1.2. Hart’s Inclusive Legal Positivism Acknowledgement
In the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart clearly took the position that “in some
systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly
incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, and these may
form the content of legal constitutional restraints.”502 Therefore, Hart called this doctrine
soft-positivism, which is also known as inclusive legal positivism.503 The first proponents of
the ideas associated to this doctrine were E. Phillip Soper, in Legal Theory and The
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Obligation of the Judge: The Hard/Dworkin Dispute 504 and Jules Coleman, in the essay
Negative and Positive Positivism, published in 1982.505
A problem of a system that includes substantive restraints in its rule of recognition,
nevertheless, is that there may be situations in which citizens are not able to ascertain, in
advance and with certainty, what the legal rules are. Nevertheless, Hart thinks this is an
overrated problem, at least for most legal systems, and contends that the exclusion of all
uncertainty is impossible:
“It is of course true that an important function of the rule of
recognition is to promote certainty with which the law may be
ascertained. This would fail to do if the tests which it
introduced for law not only raise controversial issues in some
cases but raise them in all or most cases. But the exclusion of
all uncertainty at whatever costs in other values is not a goal
which I have ever envisaged for the rule of recognition. This
is made plain or so I had hoped, both by my explicit statement
[…] that the rule of recognition itself as well as particular rules
of law identified by reference to it may have a debatable
‘penumbra’ of uncertainty. There is also my general argument
that, even if laws could be framed that could settle in advance
all possible questions that could arise about their meaning, to
adopt such laws would often war with other aims which law
should cherish.”506
Therefore, regarding the relationship of law and morals, Hart articulated that it is
possible to have a legal system in which laws do not have to observe any substantive
standards to be valid. This legal system, even though could have valid immoral laws, would
still deserve to be called a legal system. However, the mere fact that the rule of recognition
of a system accepts morality as a criterion for some (or all) of its laws does not shake Hart’s
conviction that it is theoretically possible to distinguish legal standards from moral standards
and, therefore, does not strike the separation thesis.
It is important to stress that Hart’s support for the separation thesis does not turn him
into an apologist of immoral, dishonest or unethical acts. On the contrary, he centered great
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part of his scholarship arguing for a critical morality in many legal areas, such as criminal
law. His main goal with the separation thesis was to avoid the premature conclusion
prevalent in classic natural law theory that “an unjust law is no law at all.”507 For Hart, such
conclusion discourages society from developing a critical position as to whether its laws are
unfair and, for this reason, deserve to be changed. 508
A final remark is that Hart drew a line between two types of morality: positive
morality and critical morality. The term “positive morality” was used by Hart in the book
Law, Liberty and Morality. This is a concept that was first used by John Austin. For Hart,
positive morality is not the individual morality; it is the social morality, the morality of a
social group that is socially integrated. It is the morality that in fact is accepted and shared
by a certain group, which is capable to apprehend it as a matter of fact.509 Positive morality
is opposed to critical morality, which refers to the criterion adopted by lawyers to criticize
the posited norms, seeking their modification.510
III.2.1.3. The Model of Social Facts
Hart’s legal doctrine treats law as a product of social facts. As Zipursky notes, for
Hart, “what makes a statement of law true is that the legal norm that it asserts satisfies the
conditions set out by some rule of recognition.” 511 Zipursky adds that Hart takes the
Austinian idea that a command is law and turns this idea to attribute the quality of law to the
command (and to the secondary rules) that are positioned. “How it is positioned is a matter
of social and historical fact about the position and conduct of the issuer and audience of the
command.”512
The strong criticism against Hart’s social fact view is that “knowing the law in a
useful sense will always mean being able to apply it, and so long as there are open questions
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about how the law is to be interpreted at various junctures, there will be huge gaps in what
is the truth about law.”513 Therefore, simply stating that all laws can be captured by a social
fact alone may reveal to be an impossible task, because to understand how the law is
comprehended by the officials that shall apply it, one may have to understand the rules of
interpretation these officials put to use. This idea is clearly argued by Zipursky:
“The apparatus to articulate this problem was in front of Hart
in The Concept of Law, but he made little use of it, at least
explicitly. So long as there are secondary legal rules that have
the status of social rules and are conventionally accepted by
legal officials, it is plausible that norms of interpretation are
social rules too.”514
Zipursky adds that it is a possibility that Hart would have understood that norms of
interpretation are implicit in the rule of recognition, or are a form of rule of adjudication, or
even a special form of secondary rule. But he concludes that such comprehension does not
matter, because even if understood as such type of rules, uncertainty would not be eliminated
and Hart was aware of that:515
“Hart of course believed there was uncertainty and would have
no reason to wish a theoretical device that would suppress that
truth. It would, rather, help us to articulate the possibility of
law existing with respect to a matter that was prima facie
ambiguous (on language alone), but that competent legal
officials would all regard as having the same meaning. To the
extent that there are accepted rules of interpretation, those
rules also determine what the underlying legal rules mean in
the legal system. Hence, there could also be truth about the
correct interpretation of a legal rule.”516
Zipursky, therefore, argues for an extension of Hart’s social facts thesis, one that
would accommodate much of the problem of the “open texture of the law.” Under this
expanded version, which he labels the model of social facts or the penumbra-extending
version, “we would still have answers to legal questions that were true by virtue of social
facts determining secondary legal rules as extant, and by virtue of the application of those
secondary rules.”517
Hart did mention a few words about law adjudication—what in one occasion he
called “justice in the administration of the law”518 —and criticized the utilitarians for calling
every decision in the penumbral area judicial legislation, a qualification that fails to
distinguish when rule application is a deliberate choice of judges for situations which are
beyond any possibility of the legislator’s consideration to when the application is a natural
elaboration of the rule—which merely implements the a purpose natural to the law in some
sense.519 Nonetheless, he conceded, in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, that he “said
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far too little […] about adjudication and legal reasoning and, in particular, about arguments
that his critics call principles.”520
To correct his omission, Hart criticized Dworkin for making a sharp contrast between
rules and principles, as described in subchapter II.5.1. above. He called the latter nonconclusive norms and made the following observations:
“I see no reason to accept either this sharp contrast between
legal principles and legal rules, or the view that if a valid rule
is applicable to a given case it must, unlike a principle, always
determine the outcome of the case. There is no reason why a
legal system should not recognize that a valid rule determines
a result in cases to which it is applicable, except where another
rule, judged to be more important, is also applicable to the
same case. So a rule which is defeated in competition with a
more important rule in a given case may, like a principle,
survive to determine the outcome in other cases where it is
judged to be more important than another competing rule.”521
Therefore, in conformity with Hart’s words on adjudication, one may notice that he
does make a clear distinction between what the law is and its institutional forces. As
Waluchow precisely points out, Hart evidently takes the position that “a judge must
sometimes decline to apply valid law”:522
“It is a common mistake to think that Hart’s theory of law does
imply that valid laws must be applied in all cases in which their
core of settled meaning would seem to make them clearly
applicable. But this is far from true. Nowhere does Hart
suggest this theory of adjudication, nor is there anything in his
theory of law which commits him to that position. This is clear
if one examines Hart’s writings carefully with an eye towards
the distinction between law and its institutional forces.
Whether a valid rule must be followed in a core case will
crucially depend, in part, on the institutional rules of
adjudication accepted within the legal system. These, together
with rules of recognition, help define the varying institutional
forces valid laws have for judges.”523
Indeed, Waluchow is right about pointing out that Hart’s theory does not determine
an unsophisticated binding application of laws by judges whenever they are valid. Hart spent
a lot of energy in trying to demonstrate the impossibility of law to predict all situations.
Moreover, his struggle against mechanical application of laws reveals his opposition to
unintelligible decisions. Attributing to Hart a literalist conception does not seem to be fair
with one of his most important scholarship goals. Hart’s theory, as MacCormick observes, is
considered to be hermeneutical due to his purpose of comprehending the law as how their
participants understand and apply it (or not):524
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“When Hart ascribes to sociologists the job of external
description of legal orders, he is presumably referring to
Weber’s view that the sociologist is not directly concerned
with a normative interpretation of law, but with the probability
that people in society will respond in certain ways to their own
normative interpretation of law.”525
In fact, in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart criticized Dworkin’s all-ornothing rule’s conception and admitted that even areas that demand near-conclusive rules
prohibiting or requiring the same specific actions admit exceptions in the application of the
rule in “rare cases.”526
An example of application of this assertion is the British law’s golden rule, which is
basically “designed to ensure that in interpreting words literally, no absurdity or
inconsistency results.”527 When such rule is applied, of course the literal meaning of the text
is not observed and one may argue that the rule has not been followed. However, such
criterion for deciding cases is largely adopted by British judges and there is no doubt that the
golden rule is a rule in the United Kingdom.528 The golden rule, which leads to the departure
of the literal application of a rule, is Hart’s “rare case” in which the judge may not apply a
rule.
A similar approach exists in the civil law world. According to Nino, civil law judges
may identify axiological gaps in the legal system. This situation takes place when judges
consider that the legislator would not have established the solution that he adopted in the
statute if he had noticed a particularity that he did not pay attention to. Therefore, judges
conclude that the stipulated solution shall not be applied to the case, because they consider
it illogical or unfair and that there is a gap in the system that may be integrated in
adjudication.529 The rationale is similar to the golden rule approach.
For John Finnis, the application of the golden rule clearly takes part in a process of
identifying “a moral standard as one which anyone adjudicating a given case has the duty to
apply even though it has not (yet) been posited by the social facts of custom, enactment, or
prior adjudication.”530
An example from American Law comes from the issue cited in the subchapter
II.4.2.2. concerning the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This clause prohibits states from denying any person
within its territory the equal protection of the laws. However, U.S. Courts have some
525

MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 43.
HART, supra note 43, at 263.
527
PHIL HARRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 212 (Cambridge, 7th, 2007).
528
See Becke, Assignee of Wm. Ashton, an Insolvent Debtor v. Smith (1836) 150 Eng. Rep 724 (KB). See
also Grey v. Pearson, 6 ER 60 (1857) (asserting that “[i]n construing statutes, the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words is to be adhere to … [but if there is] some absurdity or some repugnancy or inconsistency
with the rest [of the statute] … the grammatical and ordinary sense of words may be modified so as to avoid
that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.”) Cited by NEIL BOYD, CANADIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
77 (Nelson Education, 2006).
529
NINO, supra note 109, at 340. KELSEN, supra note 174, at 275.
530
Finnis adds that “[t]his specific moral standard will usually be a specification of some very general
principle such as fairness, of rejecting favourable or unfavorable treatment which is arbitrary when measured
by the principle (the Golden Rule) that like cases are to be treated alike, unlike cases differently, and one should
do for others what one would have them do for oneself or for those one already favours…” John Finnis, Natural
Law: The Classical Tradition in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 10
(Oxford, 2002).
526

93

precedents in which they stated that statutes that treat people unequally can be held
constitutional and, for this reason, this constitutional clause will not be offended, if states are
able to prove compelling, important or legitimate interests for treating people unequally. 531
Nevertheless, it seems true that, for Hart, in the vast majority of cases, it is likely that
judges will follow the law, even if they morally disagree with it. The use of the word “rare”
denotes his position that law departure in adjudication shall be exceptional. Hart,
nonetheless, rejects ideological positivism.532
The important point to bear in mind is that it is wrong to say that Hart’s positivistic
view asserts that judges are always bound to apply the law and that Hart was aware that some
uncertainty would always exist in the system, and that, in these cases, judges are likely to
adopt a form of accommodation of the problem of “relative indeterminacy” of the law.
Zipursky “penumbra covering rules” may vary in a legal system and may take different
forms, as we will see in the following subchapters. The system may adopt several criteria
that judges should follow to make the decisions, such as golden rule, axiological gaps,
balancing, attributing certain dogmatic properties to the system or even act as a legislator—
as set forth in the Swiss Civil Code.533
III.2.1.4. Coherentism
One last remark on Hart’s theory is concerned with what he called truth in law
adjudication. As Zipursky described in the essay Practical Positivism versus Practical
Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, when advocating the separation thesis,
Hart’s goal was not primarily to point out a conceptual distinction among law and morality,
but to draw a line between what the law is from what the law ought to be.534
Even though Hart did not think that judges should always decide cases following the
text of rules, he did believe that judges should be clear about this fact, when they decided not
to follow it.535 Therefore, for an opinion to be rightly written, the judge should inform the
applicable law and should describe the reasons why it should or should not be applied in the
particular case. If the case was in a penumbral zone, the judge should expose this fact. When
talking about the Grudge Informer case in Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals,
Hart asserted that merely sustaining that Nazi Law was not law at all—as Gustav Radbruch
and Lon Fuller contended—did not correctly address the question as to whether a woman
that committed an outrageously immoral act, not forbidden under the Nazi regime, should be
punished. Hart observed that one should not conceal that, in some occasions, life forces us
to choose between the lesser of two evils and the person that has the authority to make the
decision must be conscious that “they are what they are.”536 In the Grudge Informer case,
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the two evils were (a) punishing someone based on an ex post facto law or (b) letting a person
who committed an atrocious act go free.537
Hart believed that there ought to be clarity, candor, an excellence in accurate legal
interpretation. Zipursky individuates these values advocated by Hart as veracity, a term not
used by the British author, but which accurately captures Hart’s thought. This quality is
practical, not conceptual, because veracity allows one to accept the truth in law in practical
cases. This is good for instrumental reasons, because “[w]e cannot know whether to obey,
disobey, revise, reject, celebrate, or overturn the law unless we know what it actually
says.”538
Based on these excerpts, one might conclude that Hart believed in a conception of
truth in law adjudication. The qualification of something as true in law, however, according
to Benjamin Zipursky, cannot come from the fact that (a) there is a correspondence of the
legal proposition to the world—a theory called the correspondence theory of truth; (b)
statements of law are empirically verifiable—the reductionist verificationism in the theory
of meaning; or (c) statements of law can be justified by some other self-justified beliefs—the
foundationalism theory.539 All these qualities argued by these theories, if demanded, would
probably not authorize to affirm that there is truth in law adjudication.
Instead, Zipursky argues for a coherentist approach, which adopts a thinner account
of legal truth, one that would be possible by attributing the quality of truthfulness or falseness
to “a domain of assertions that purport to be about a range of practices, goods, actions, and
entities connected with our everyday world, and spoken about and argued coherently,”540
and not by being in accordance with empirical evidence, justification for believing in it or
correspondence of the proposition to the world. Moral arguments, in this sense, are mostly
construed, not found.541
Therefore, with regards to legal positivism, Zipursky strives that, even though law in
the penumbral area could not be captured by a social fact, it is possible to talk about truth in
relation to decisions made to solve these penumbral cases, if we admit that these decisions
follow accepted practices of interpretation that correspond to secondary rules:
“Another way to describe this practice is […] [through] a
practice of truth-seeking. The practice seems to be
accompanied by a presumption that there is some answer to
which adjudicators ought to converge, a presumption that
justificatory forms of argument that can be analyzed as truthpreserving will lead us to the argument, an idea that the right
answer is independent of the will of the answer-seeker, and
conviction that the answer will be a sound basis for action. The
suggestion is that a critical question in jurisprudence is the
legitimacy and appropriateness of what might be called truthseeking […] practices and attitudes in adjudication.”542
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Zipursky adds that this truth-seeking practice, in the positivist case, should not be
focused as a “locus of legitimacy,” but as a form of assessment of the laws and the methods
of argumentation:
“This approach does not focus on the truth-seeking practice as
a locus of legitimacy. Instead, it says that we should pour our
energy into the assessment of laws and the methods of
argumentation. We must also question the proper scope and
occasions of the exercise of adjudicative power, on the other,
given that the adjudicative practices work as they do, and given
that the law and its methods are what they are. Both these
approaches are consistent with saying that legal statements are
about the law; there is nothing problematic with saying that
legal statements are true; that no extra-legal discourse is
needed to describe the subject matter of law; and that
coherence among our legal statements is the measure of
whether to accept legal statements.”543
Hart’s positivistic conception of truth in law adjudication, of course, differs from
Dworkin’s, as we will see in the following subchapters. Zipursky observes that “Dworkin is
ultimately a legal coherentist with a twist. The twist is to give a sufficiently rich and attractive
account of the detailed nature of the truth-seeking practices in adjudication that the
institutions of the law, and communities governed through those institutions, turn out to
possess a certain sort of social virtue; in Dworkin’s case, it is the virtue of integrity.” 544
As a conclusion, it is important to point out that, under the coherentist approach, it is
possible to speak about the veracity of statements of law if one considers that the truth of
these statements is not claimed because it is compatible with empirical evidence, justification
for believing in it or correspondence of the sentence to the world, but because it follows
forms of argumentation conventionally adopted in the legal community and are argued
coherently in the everyday world.
This approach is largely adopted by Brazilian judges, whenever they talk about truth
in law, because truth will be considered to be found if forms of argumentation conventionally
adopted through rules of adjudication are argued, like balancing or proportionality, among
others.
III.2.2. Brazil: A Hartian Legal System
This subchapter intends to show that Hart’s theory of law, which purports to
demonstrate how law is generally understood, in his soft-positivistic view, captures how
Brazilians understand their legal system. At first, the subchapter outlines some propositions
that give an account of part of the country’s current rule of recognition and show how
substantial constraints compose it. Following, it will elucidate how Hart’s concept of norms
and his approach regarding the separation of law and morals takes part in the country’s legal
practice. At last, it will show why Zipursky’s model of social facts and coherentism theories
are appropriate for depicting Brazilian law because they also explain that a legal theory can
adopt a criterion orienting judges on how to decide cases.
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III.2.2.1. Brazil’s Rule of Recognition
In this and in the next subchapter, I will formulate propositions to show what is the
current rule of recognition in Brazil in respect to law identification and adjudication. I do
not intend to exhaust Brazil’s rule of recognition propositions. This task would deserve an
entire article focused on it. My goal is to demonstrate how substantive criteria are
incorporated within the rule.545
Brazilians, as Hart, do see their legal system as very institutionalized, being the result
of a specific set of social facts, which are created by human institutions to regulate how they
shall behave.
Pursuant to the description provided in subchapter II.3, the enactment of a written
law is the major source of rights and duties in Brazil, therefore, is the social fact that
generally needs to take place for a norm of conduct to become legal in the country. The
quotes from José Afonso da Silva, Manuel Gonçalves Ferreira Filho, and the S.T.F. Justice
Alexandre de Moraes, in subchapter II.3.1, expose a comprehension that legality is fulfilled
with the enactment of written legal norm by the Legislative Branches. Institutional support
through law enactment, therefore, is generally required for norms to enter into the legal word.
The cited rulings both from the S.T.F. and from the State of São Paulo Court of Appeals
confirm this view. These scholars and officials, when technically justifying this claim,
usually refer to the text of article 5, II, of the C.F., said to reflect the content of the legality
principle. This constitutional provision sets forth that “no one shall be obligated to do or
refrain from doing something except by virtue of [enacted] law.”546
A depiction of the Brazilian rule of recognition, for this reason, shall contain a
proposition like the following:
- The judicial duty is to apply as valid law every statute passed
and not further repealed by the majority of the Legislative
Branch, either in the Federal, State, Federal District or
Municipality level, if the statutes observe the formal and
substantial limits set out in the Federal Constitution, and, if
applicable, in State Constitutions and in the Federal District
and Municipalities organizational laws.547
The role of the constitutional text, as depicted in subchapter II.3.1, cannot be left
behind in a description of the Brazilian rule of recognition. After the enactment of the 1988
C.F., officials no longer see the C.F. merely as an essential political and organizational
document, but as a text with normative force that allows judges to recognize causes of actions
without the need of statutes concretizing its provisions. The prevalent official practice
considers constitutional norms to be self-enforceable, being able, in most of cases, to prompt
government coercion even if no statute is enacted to regulate the obligations established in
the text.
Therefore, if one were to imagine a rule of recognition proposition applied by
Brazilian officials with respect to the C.F., one could say that this rule would run as follows:
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- The judicial duty is to apply as valid law the provisions
inserted in the Constitutional text ratified in 1988, recognizing
causes of actions for protecting the rights established in the
text, save for the provisions that have been validly repealed by
procedures set forth in article 60 of the Constitution, but
including every provision validly added by way of
constitutional amendment under article 60.548
Subchapter II.4.1. demonstrated that Brazilian statutes are generally not as detailed
as their U.S. counterparts. Also, the C.F., although much longer and analytic than the U.S.
Constitution, does not generally go into specificities in the wide range of issues that it deals
with. On the contrary, the 1988 Framers expressly introduced a large number of rules and
principles in the C.F., some of them reflecting social goals, others fundamental rights. These
value-laden text includes, for example, as foundations of the Republic, human dignity and
the social value of labor,549 and as fundamental goals of the nation the eradication of poverty
and marginalization, the reduction of social and regional inequality and the promotion of
the good of all.550 Other examples of open-textured words established in the C.F. that were
mentioned in cases cited throughout this work were animal cruelty, administrative morality,
democracy and administrative probity. A quotation from Professor Patrícia Perrone, cited in
subchapter II.4.1, helps to paint the current picture.551
These principles, social goals, fundamental rights and foundations written in the C.F.,
according to Hart’s theory, are all part of Brazilian law, because they are so identified as
valid legal rules in accordance to the criteria provided by the rule of recognition. 552 The fact
that they establish the obligation of statutes and official action to conform with the moral
criteria they impose is not a problem for asserting their legal status, at least for an inclusive
legal positivist adept. As Hart observed, there is “no logical restriction on the content of the
rule of recognition: so far as ‘logic’ goes it could provide explicitly or implicitly that the
criteria determining the validity of subordinate laws should cease to be regarded as such if
the laws identified in accordance with them proved to be morally objectionable.” 553 Indeed,
one of Hart’s example of moral standards in the rule of recognition is the Nineteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which establishes substantive constraints on the
content of legislation regarding abridgments of the right to vote.554 Waluchow, talking about
Canada’s rule of recognition, takes a similar position in respect to section 1 of the Canadian
Charter. This provision declares that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society:”555
“So what is required by section 1 of the Canadian Charter is
not the kind of reasoning which strives to be neutral with
respect to, or totally detached from, concerns of political
548
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morality. The issues are not purely factual in nature, nor are
they purely technical legal matters. What is required by section
1 is some measure of normative, moral judgment which tackles
the tricky issues involved whenever one is called upon to strike
a reasonable balance between competing moral and political
interests. Section 1, then, requires a significant measure of
moral reasoning. In determining the constitutional status of
laws in Canada, courts must often consider their ‘moral
merits’. For good or ill, in Canada the existence of law is not
one thing, its merit or demerit another thing entirely. The two
have been joined by Canada’s rule of recognition and the
charter validates it.”556
Brazilian jurists, as stated in subchapters II.5.4 and II.5.5, very commonly decide
cases based on the interpretation/concretization of moral standards embedded in these
principles. They accept these standards; consider that they may provide direct causes of
action and use them as guide for their decisions. An external observer, in reading judicial
opinions, would easily conclude that in Brazilian legal practices these standards are part of
law. A statement about this issue could, then, be written in the following way:
- The judicial duty is to enforce as valid law the principles,
social goals, fundamental rights and foundations inserted in the
Constitutional text ratified in 1988, save for the provisions that
have been validly repealed by procedures set forth in article 60
of the Constitution, and including every provision validly
added by way of constitutional amendment under article 60.557
Furthermore, the existence of the Judiciary branch and its role in solving disputes is
laid out in the C.F., satisfying the criteria of legal validity. 558 Therefore, the criterion of
legality assures, through secondary rules, the power of courts and makes their decisions
binding on the parties. As Raymond Wacks observes, “judges are empowered by […] rule[s]
of adjudication.”559
III.2.2.2. Brazil’s Rules of Adjudication
The mere fact that someone depicts that Brazilians see their constitution as a binding
document does not tells us how judges interpret it. In the U.S., originalists and living
constitutionalist jurists 560 also see the U.S. Constitution as a binding document and yet
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disagree on how the document should be interpreted. It is, however, possible to try to capture,
as a social fact, what is the prevalent practice adopted by officials in interpreting texts that
meet the legal criterion.561 This social fact will have to take into consideration the way most
Brazilian judges behave in construing the interpretation of the country’s enacted rules and
other primary rules they consider binding. This, pursuant to Hart’s classification of rules,
will be a form of rule of adjudication.
Since the C.F. expressly states that the S.T.F. is responsible “for safeguarding the
Constitution,”562 it is important to pay attention to the methods of interpretation that this
Court employs to define the meaning of the provisions of the C.F. The identification of the
behavior of judges towards the text is relevant because, as previously described, it has
changed throughout the years in comparison to practices adopted by the S.T.F. with respect
to Brazil’s previous constitutions. But even in this new constitutional regime, the practices
of the S.T.F. Justices towards constitutional interpretation have varied. Patrícia Perrone
points out this behavioral modification:
“There are two important marks in relation to the S.T.F.
judicial behavior after the enactment of the 1988 Constitution.
The first is the recognition of the efficacy of the constitutional
norms. Up to the enactment of the 1988 C.F., the Brazilian
Constitutions were not seen as authentic legal norms and were
systematically disrespected. After the 1988 C.F., jurists started
to hold the position that the Constitution is a legal norm, which
must be applied directly to regulate reality, without the need of
statutes to give efficacy to it. The power to apply the text was
given to judges, in resemblance to what already took place
with statutory law. […]
The second mark of the S.T.F. judicial behavior, in a
hermeneutical point of view, is the assimilation of the theory
of principles, which took place in the mid-1990s. This new
phase was distinguished for the recognition of the status of
norms of constitutional principles, for the appeal to the
principles of reasonableness and proportionality, for the
affirmation of balancing of values technique as the leading
interpretative approach in this new context, of a wider
openness and fluid legal hermeneutic.”563
This reference substantiates Hart’s approach that some of the rules of adjudication—
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II.5.6.)—may be considered legal rules due to judicial practice. The rules of adjudication in
Brazil are generally not set forth in any legal text,564 but are usually described by scholars
through observation of the judicial practice. Judges may simply accept the practice and
conform to it, especially in Brazil, in which, pursuant to subchapter II.4.4., in a general
manner, there is no stare decisis.
As stated in subchapter 4.3, principles have been written in Brazilian legal texts.
These principles are considered prima facie norms; they, along with implied principles, are
commonly employed by judges to decide cases in which there is no clear solutions in the
posited norms. According to Robert Alexy’s theory, the most prominent in the country, when
two principles compete, the issue must be resolved by balancing the conflicting interests
served by these principles. The judge must decide which principle (that have equal status in
abstract) has greater weight in the concrete situation.565
Patricia Perrone noted a modification of the attitude of judges after the enactment of
the 1988 Constitution. Judges no longer saw the document as a mere political but began
treating it as an enforceable legal norm. So, the general comprehension of constitutional law
changed due to judge’s practices. There was no reaction from Congress to challenge this
change of behavior and to stop the growth of judicial power. No rules or constitutional
amendments were passed to bind a certain behavior as to how interpret the C.F. or statutes.
On the contrary, many statutes that were drafted in the period have incorporated these
conventional practices within, particularly the ideas of constitutionalizing the law, 566 which
were described in subchapter II.5.7.567 Also, many political parties have initiated abstract
actions before the S.T.F. to enforce fundamental rights.568
Based on these reasons and on the current judicial practice adopted by the majority
of judges in Brazil in relation to written and implied principles, one may argue that one of
the propositions of the rule of recognition, related to a secondary rule of adjudication, may
run like this:
- The judicial duty is to enforce the goals, foundations,
principles and fundamental rights established in the provisions
of the Constitutional text currently in force. If these goals,
foundations and principles conflict, the judge shall solve this
conflict through the application of a balancing test and/or
through the application of the principles of proportionality and
reasonableness.
In addition, even before the 1988 C.F., Brazilian officials shared a discourse that
valid laws were only the ones enacted by the Legislative branch, but, at the same time,
employed several techniques that allowed updating legal texts, such as the four traditional
564
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methods of interpretation—literal, systematic, teleological and historical—and also the
fictions of the juridical dogmatic—unity, coherence, consistency and completeness and the
rational legislator myth. Despite the fact that the range of these techniques was substantially
shorter if compared to the current judicial practices, they served and still serve the relevant
function of reformulating the law, proposing certainty to its vague terms, filling its gaps,
solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to determined axiological ideals.569 These
techniques are all part of Brazilian law and may be perceived as a social fact. They are rules
of adjudication and it is possible to make the subsequent propositions to describe their role
in the official practice:
- The judicial duty is to interpret legal texts through the
application of the literal, systematic, teleological and historical
methods of interpretation.
- The judicial duty is to generally apply the legal system as a
whole, with unity, coherence and consistency, and not by the
reading of insulated texts.570
The balancing technique, the methods of interpretation and the juridical dogmatic,
along with Brazil’s closure rule,571 all serve as Zipursky’s penumbra covering arguments.572
They have the purpose of accommodating the problem of the open texture of the law. This
problem is intentional when a system chooses to use principles, which are prima facie nonconclusive norms and need to be concretized in adjudication.
III.2.2.3. The Separation of Law and Morals in the Brazilian Legal System
Hart’s most famous endeavor was to sustain the possibility of the separation of law
and morals. He considered that the incorporation of moral standards is contingent, not
inherent to a legal system. That is why he acknowledged inclusive legal positivism. He
notoriously believed that there could be evil regimes and those would still count as law. The
goal of this subchapter is to analyze how this issue is treated by Brazilian officials; whether
Brazilians would consider that law exists in a system that pursues evil aims.
III.2.2.3.1. Evil Regimes
In fact, Brazil is a good example for confirming Hart’s point that a legal system
would still exist even though it could pursue evil aims. The country’s journey as an
independent nation has experienced many tyrannical moments. The task is to evaluate, as a
569
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social fact, how Brazilians perceive the status of the norms that were in force in these
totalitarian times.
Brazil became an independent country in 1822. However, the country did not
immediately adopt a democratic regime. D. Pedro I, son of King John VI of Portugal, was
proclaimed Emperor and ruled until 1831. His son, D. Pedro II, after a transitory period, was
crowned and stayed in power until 1889, when the Republic was proclaimed.
During this monarchist regime, the country was ruled by a Constitution, enacted in
1824, which established four branches of government: the Executive, the Legislative, the
Judiciary and the Moderator (the Emperor). The Moderator Power, which looked over the
well-functioning of the other three, 573 was, in reality, the manner the Emperor had to
interfere in the functioning of the other three branches. The Supremo Tribunal de Justiça,
the highest court on the land, acted as a mere “office of the Imperial Government.”574
Throughout Brazil’s Imperialist regime, elections were carried, but under selective
suffrages. Voting rights were awarded on the basis of employment and minimum property
and were denied to women.575 Slavery was permitted during most of the regime—Brazil is
the country that received the greatest number of African slaves on Earth576—and was only
abolished in 1888.577
Nevertheless, some parts of the Imperialist Commercial Code, 578 enacted in 1850,
are still enforced by judges in Brazil today and are considered to have been taken in by the
1988 C.F., a document that started a new era of comprehension of law, with the purpose of
assuring democracy, equal treatment and guaranteeing a just and fair order.579 These goals
are the opposite of those of the imperialist regime—whose legal order was insensible to
popular suffering580—but there is no debate as to whether laws from that period that do not
confront with the substantial limits of the C.F., and have not been formally revoked, are still
binding.
The same is said of the laws that were approved in other totalitarian moments. The
country’s current Criminal Code was enacted in 1940,581 during Getúlio Vargas government
(1930-1945). Vargas promulgated a Constitution in 1937, revoking the former document
that had been approved three years before. He justified that this new Constitution was
necessary because there was “a state of apprehension raised in Brazil due to the communist
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infiltration, which, because of its extension and deepness, demanded radical and permanent
remedies.”582
Under the 1937 Constitution, the efficacy of judicial review was seriously
compromised, because any unconstitutionality ruling could lose its effects by a decision of
Congress. But Congress was closed during the regime, therefore, this provision meant that
the President could reverse any S.T.F. decision. 583 Article 180 of the 1937 Constitution
declared that “while Parliament does not meet, the Republic President will have the power
to issue decree-laws on all the legislative matters that are under the Federal Government
powers.”584
Vargas also issued a state of emergency decree that allowed deportations,
censorships and the suspension of individual liberties. Pursuant to the terms of the decree,
those acts could not be reviewed by the Judiciary.585 The case of Olga Benario Prestes, a
German Jew, married to Luis Carlos Prestes, the then leader of the communist party, one of
Vargas’ main opposers, is emblematic. In 1936, she was arrested and, while pregnant, was
deported to Germany. She died in a concentration camp in Bernburg. The Olga Benario case
is an evidence of the close ties that Vargas had to the Nazi regime—Brazil only joined the
war on the allies’ side due to significant American pressure and in exchange for economic
compensations; Brazil’s exports to Germany during the Vargas regime were as financially
relevant as the exports to the U.S..586
During Vargas’ dictatorial government, Brazil’s Criminal Code, still in force, was
enacted through an exclusive act of the President. The fact that the Criminal Code was never
approved by a democratic Congress and was enacted during a dictatorship period is no
barrier for being enforced today. Indeed, the S.T.F. has ruled that pre-constitutional norms
that substantially conform with the 1988 C.F. are considered taken in by it even if their
approval process did not follow the C.F.’s procedural requirements for similar legislation.587
The Criminal Code is considered received because judges regard its provisions substantially
compatible with the 1988 C.F.. Judges, hence, consider that this legal norm, passed as a
decree-law,588 has the current status of an ordinary statute and can only be amended by laws
of identical or higher hierarchy. The same is the status of the Criminal Procedure Code.589
A third evil period of Brazilian history was the military dictatorship regime that
lasted from 1964 until 1985. During that time, Congress was closed for a couple of years;
elections were manipulated by the sitting government; around 333 federal parliamentary
seats were revoked in 1969;590 five seats were added to the Supreme Court;591 three Supreme
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Court Justices were forced to retire;592 the right to habeas corpus was denied for crimes of
opinion; there was press and speech censorship; and around 434 persons were killed or
disappeared because they were against the regime and many more were tortured.593 Keith
Rosenn, a Professor at the University of Miami, described the regime in the following way:
“The period preceding the promulgation of the 1969
Constitution was one of constant crisis resulting from
widespread opposition to the military government. The
government responded by issuing a series of 12 Institutional
Acts that continuously modified the 1967 Constitution in
accordance with the military command’s assessment of the
needs of the moment. A constitution that can be modified by
the government’s unilateral declaration that it has decided to
utilize a self-proclaimed ambulatory constituent power is, like
the Emperor’s new clothes, only a transparent disguise for
naked power. In 1972, Professor Riordan Roett concluded,
with considerable justification, that the military’s commitment
to constitutionalism was basic cosmetic.”594
The fact that Brazilians suffered under such a brutal regime has not been sufficient
to state that the country did not live under a rule of law system. In fact, it is common to draw
a line between what Brazilians called a state of law (estado de direito) and a democratic
state of law (estado democrático de direito).595 The first concept is commonly associated to
the 1964-1985 dictatorship period, while the second concept is used to describe the current
constitutional regime, installed after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. This expression is
mentioned in the text of article 1 the C.F. The state of law, although a legal system, is not
considered to be the current legal system, because of the substantial choices made with the
enactment of the 1988 C.F. text. But this does not mean that Brazilians do not consider it to
have been a system of law, neither indicates that every legal norm that was passed in this
period is void.
Indeed, many legal norms and acts that were enacted and performed during the
military dictatorship were received by the current constitutional regime and are applied by
judges. For example, S.T.F. appointments made during those years were honored by the
1988 C.F. and the Justices served until retirement. Only with the retirement of Justice Sydney
Sanches, in 2003, the Court no longer had members appointed by military presidents.596
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These justices served honorably their positions and many of them are still regarded among
the country’s best judges in history.597
Many laws passed in that period are still valid, even if they could not be approved
today. A curious case is the amnesty law,598 enacted in 1979, which pardoned all crimes
committed by the armed forces and by civilians during the tyrannical regime. That law
undoubtedly conflicts with the country’s current substantial values that are engraved in the
1988 C.F.. However, in 2010, the S.T.F. ruled that the amnesty law is compatible with the
current Constitution and remains valid.599 The Court took into account the historical context
in which the law was approved and the conciliatory spirit that prevailed in the debates that
allowed the peace talks to start the process of returning to a democratic regime. The Justice
who wrote the majority opinion, Eros Grau, a left-wing lawyer appointed to the S.T.F. by
former President Lula, was arrested during the dictatorship years. He stated that deciding not
to hold the amnesty law incompatible with the 1988 C.F. did not mean denying the need to
repudiate all the torture that had been carried. But he voted that the amnesty law should be
declared received by the new constitutional order.
Those examples show that Brazil’s account to law is very Hartian in the sense of the
possibility of separation of law and morals. Even during immoral regimes in its history,
Brazil regards that a rule of law regime existed in the country, although part of the laws that
those regimes enacted were, even then, considered immoral. Nonetheless, they were valid
law.600 The other part of the laws, which were not immoral then and that are not immoral
nowadays, are considered to be valid and are still applied if in accordance with other
requirements of the criteria of validity.
A distinction among Nazi law and Nazi-era law adopts a similar approach.601 It is
true that Lon Fuller, in his famous essay Positivism and Fidelity to Law, acknowledged that
under the Nazi regime there was no comparable deterioration in the ordinary branches of
private law, if contrasted to laws of race or criminal law, for example. 602 Therefore, the
examples provided in this subchapter regarding Brazilian law would probably not be
sufficient to convince Fuller that law and morality may not overlap and that those systems
still were legal ones. Fuller focused on the capacity of the system to subsist as an enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. These Brazilian authoritarian
regimes did not endure.
But since the main goal of this subchapter was to analyze how Brazilians perceive
the evil regimes—whether they are able to produce valid laws or if they are not legal systems
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at all—the examples prove that Hart’s institutional view is correct to describe the country’s
practices: law may exist even in evil times.603
Of course, nowadays, after the enactment of the 1988 C.F., it is certain that Hart’s
conclusion that the pursuit of evil aims would not generally be possible in countries like
Britain and the U.S.—because they “widely recognize principles of justice and moral claims
of individuals,”604—is applicable to Brazil.
III.2.2.3.2. Reasoning in Cases that Deal with Unsettled Legal Issues
In Positivism and Separation of Law and Morals, while emphasizing that in the
penumbral area the system of law does not have a response to a case, leaving to the judge
the responsibility to make a rational non-mechanical choice, Hart argued that the fact that a
choice has to be made does not mean law and morals are merged. This is at the center of
Hart’s discretion argument, probably the most controversial and contested of his views.605
Hart pointed out that judges, when deciding a case attributing sense to open-textured
standards, which do not have settled meaning, can make intelligible decisions that do not
necessarily appeal to moral arguments, but to social aims, policies, among other types of
reasoning. Moral reasoning is solely one type of argument that may be employed by the
judge but is far from exclusively representing in totality what the word “ought” may mean—
Hart believes that judges are likely to create a rule in the case, since there is no solution in
the law, but natural applications of the settled law to similar situations may also occur.
Economic and political arguments could be referred to by the judge; if so, his decision would
not be considered mechanical, but not necessarily moral.606
Later in his life, in Problems of the Philosophy of Law, Hart contended that when
rules do not control the outcome of the case, judges have discretion to make this decision.
603

Hart, nevertheless, acknowledged that systems that advance an evil agenda suffer from instability:
“[h]ence a society with law contains those who look upon its rules from the internal point of view as accepted
standards of behaviour, and not merely as reliable predictions of what will befall them, at the hands of officials,
if they disobey. But it also comprises those upon whom, either because they are malefactors or mere helpless
victims of the system, these legal standards have to be imposed by the force or threat of force; they are
concerned with the rules merely as a source of possible punishment. The balance between these two
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latent threat of upheaval. Between these two extremes various combinations of these attitudes to law are to be
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some call legislative. Neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges confined to the alternatives of
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the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for it is folly to believe that where the meaning of
the law is in doubt, morality always has a clear answer to offer.” HART, supra note 43 at 204.
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Hart, in this occasion, revealed that he never intended to endorse discretion because he
romantically thought of it as the best option. He was not taking the position of what is best
for the legal system but looking for a term that allows capturing what in fact happens and
confessed that ‘discretion’ may not accurately describe what takes place: “[i]t may well be
that terms like ‘choice’, ‘discretion’, and ‘judicial legislation’ fail to do justice to the
phenomenology.”607
Hart’s discretionary argument, in a sense, reveals a lot of his unromantic view of law
and his unwillingness to accept illusory descriptions of what effectively takes place. He
considers Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin and Karl Llewelyn [and probably Hans Kelsen]
noble dreamers.608
Discretion, nevertheless, for him, does not mean arbitrary or non-justified
decisions:609
“Judges do not generally, when legal rules fail to determine a
unique result, intrude their personal preferences or blindly
choose among alternatives; and when words like ‘choice’ and
‘discretion’ or phrases such as ‘creative activity’ and
‘interstitial legislation’ are used to describe decisions, these do
not mean that courts do decide arbitrarily without elaborating
reasons for their decisions—and still less that any legal system
authorizes decisions of this kind.”610
The argument he made was that “a wide variety of individual and social interests,
social and political aims, and standards of morality and justice [come into play]; and they
may be formulated in general terms as principles, policies and standards.”611
I have cited that Brazilian judges, such as Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, correctly
assert that some of the cases covered by principles cannot be objectively determined; these
standards are commonly understood to have a certain minimum range, but there are areas of
indeterminacy, in which subjective judgments are necessary and in which choices shall be
made. 612 As an illustration, Barroso cites an argument based on the principle of human
dignity:
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HART, Supra note 442, at 106.
See HART, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 442, at 123-145. Hart, of course, knew Llewelyn was
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then it does not make good sense to say that a judge is under a duty to reach one result rather than another; as
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Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75, Columbia Law Review, 359, 378
(1975).
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Id.
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“In relation to principles, an additional hardship may take place: the goal to be achieved or the ideal state
to be transformed in reality cannot be objectively determined. There is a need for subjective integration of the
interpreter. A principle has a sense, a minimal meaning and range, an essential core, to which it is similar to
rules. From a certain point, nonetheless, the interpreter enters into a realm of indeterminacy, in which its content
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“An example is the principle of human dignity. Other than not
stating the necessary behaviors to comply with human
dignity—this is the first difficulty: discover the behaviors—
there may be controversy as to what dignity means from a
determined essential content, according to the point of view of
the interpreter.”613
Barroso’s acknowledgement is clearly an evolution from the old civil law tradition of
considering the system of law complete and, therefore, able to provide a solution for all
cases.614
The purpose of this subchapter is to examine if Brazilian judges think like Hart or if
they consider that their decisions in interpreting and construing principles on unsettled legal
issues should be grounded solely on moral reasoning—we will see that Dworkin contends
that these decisions shall be made according to the political morality, at least in individual
rights cases.
The answer to this question was somewhat given in subchapter II.5.4, in which I
described the breadth of principles in Brazil. Due to the fact that principles in Brazil do not
cover solely individual rights cases, but also several social goals and purposes that are
considered to be socioeconomic fundamental rights, courts generally do not only resort to
moral arguments to solve these type of cases, but to economics, politics, even legalists,
among others.
In reality, it is very hard to know when judges will resort to moral principles as the
main institutional force to solve a penumbral case, or if they will resort to social and political
aims, even in individual rights cases. In this sense, the point of view of the interpreter, as
Barroso notes, can be decisive.
In fact, in Brazil, cases involving conflict of principles commonly happen when an
individual fundamental right conflicts with socials goal. Courts generally decide these cases
balancing rights and interests, as well as applying the principle of proportionality. Individual
moral rights, under the proportionality scheme, cannot be totally suppressed, but can be
limited. Brazil’s approach is similar to the one adopted by article 1 of the Canadian Chart of
Rights and Freedoms:
“1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.” 615
Due to the adoption of this line of reasoning, the S.T.F has an understanding that
“there are no absolute rights, even the fundamental rights set forth in art. 5, of the C.F., or in
treaties or in human rights international conventions. The criteria and methods of
reasonableness and proportionality are fundamental in this context because they disallow the

note 27, at 151. Translation mine. Barroso admits the existence of discretion. See text referred to by note 288.
Id. at 154.
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Id. at 151.
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See BOBBIO, supra note 174, at 119 (Editora Unb, 8th ed., 2006). Translation mine. See also KELSEN,
supra note 174, at 273-274.
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, c 1 (Can.).
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prevalence of one determined right or interest over the other of same or higher juridicalevaluative stature.”616
The Civil Procedure Code of 2016 [C.P.C.], which, as seen, posited balancing as a
technique for reasoning under art. 489, § 2, does not specify the kind of arguments that may
be used by the judge in the balancing process.617
There are many cases decided by the S.T.F. in which one could argue that moral
principles did not win the argument. One may cite, for example, a case concerning the social
right of housing, decided in 2006.618 The Court, by a 7 to 3 count, upheld a statutory provision
that establishes that the realty in which a guarantor of a lease agreement resides can be
judicially sold to pay debts of the tenant, if this real state was purposely included as collateral
for rental payments in the lease agreement, even if the guarantor does not have any other
realty to reside.619
The question was controversial because, in Brazil, there is a statute that sets forth that
the family residence real estate cannot be sold to pay personal debts. The lease agreement
collateral situation is a statutory exception to the general rule and the appellant party argued
that this exception provision was unconstitutional, because article 6 of the C.F establishes
housing as a social right.620 The majority reasoned that the social right of housing does not
mean that every person has a right to own a house. The Court noted that the fiduciary
guarantee is the cheapest form of collateral and asserted that declaring the unconstitutionality
of the statutory provision would raise the costs of access to lease agreements for low-income
persons, since lessors would be unwilling to take it due to its lack of strength.
In the reasoning, Justice Cezar Peluso argued that a balance between the right of
housing of an ample class— formed by persons interested in renting a realty—has to prevail
even if it harms a smaller group—formed by the guarantors who own only one real estate, its
family dwelling—as they are not compelled to offer it as a collateral in a lease agreement.
He stated that the economics of the market should not be modified by the Court. Therefore,
economic arguments were weighed to justify the majority opinion. The three dissent votes
focused on moral arguments to hold the statutory provision unconstitutional.
Another case in which moral reasons were not decisive was the ruling adopted in six
abstract actions that attacked a Resolution, issued by the T.S.E., that redistributed the
Chamber of Deputies seats among the Brazilian states, to match the populational growth
modification. The S.T.F. concluded that this seat assignment should have been made by
Congress and not by the T.S.E.. 621 But Congress has not taken any measure since the
616
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[CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 489, § 2 (Braz.).
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enactment of the 1988 C.F., because the majority of states would lose seats and just few
would gain.622 The necessary criterion to calculate the proportion of seats among the states
has never been set in a statute.
It is easy to see that the Court chose a legalist approach, maintaining a situation of
unequal treatment among the states, since the seat representation at the Chamber of Deputies
has not been updated and does not reflect the current population distribution in Brazil. This
lawsuit involved the right of a minority of states, which has been violated by the majority
inertia. It is a typical case in which courts traditionally should employ moral reasoning, like
equal treatment and equal protection, but that was not the S.T.F.’s path.
In the U.S., in contrast, to assure the efficacy of the “one man one vote” principle,
the SCOTUS has ruled unconstitutional several district maps that abusively drew voting
districts. 623 Non-legalistic decisions seem common when constitutional courts interpret
moral constitutional provisions to assure equal treatment.624
A third case that can be cited involved the possibility of division of a retirement
pension among the wife and the husband’s concubine, after his death.625 According to the
facts, the man had concomitantly formed two families and had several children with both of
them.626 He financially supported both his wife and his concubine, who pacifically accepted
that bigamous situation. Nevertheless, when he died, the married wife refused to share the
pension with the concubine. The latter filed a lawsuit and the Court of Appeals of the State
of Bahia awarded her half of the pension. The state appealed. The S.T.F. reversed the holding
on the grounds that her relationship was unlawful since legal unions [similar to common law
marriages] can only be recognized if both the companions are not married. The case approach
was legalist, because the factual situation, in which all three involved parties had for many
years consented, was not taken into account. The Court stated that Brazilian posited law only
gives effect to legal unions if none of the parties is legally married. This legalist approach
ended up treating the concubine unfairly, depriving her of her means of subsistence.627
There are even easier cases that are worth mentioning. For example, if a judge denies
a claim on an unequivocal legal issue covered by a statute, and the lawyer files the losing
party appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case. The fact that
the sentence adopted an unconstitutional, illegal, unfair or immoral reasoning, will not
matter. They will apply the literal rule of the C.P.C. that states that appeals should be filed
law enacted to regulate this article is the Lei Complementar No. 78, of December 30, 1993. This law established
the maximum number of 513 members at the Federal Chamber of Deputies and, in sole paragraph of article 1,
awarded the T.S.E. the power to allocate the seats. The S.T.F., in this case, ruled this sole paragraph
unconstitutional, because it violated art. 45, § 1°, of the C.F., which requires a complementary law to regulate
the matter. S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.947, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 1.7.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 30.10.2014 (Braz.).
622
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Paraíba and Piauí (2 seats), Pernambuco, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Alagoas and Rio Grande do
Sul (1 seat).
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According to the case record, the lower court opinion registered that: “In reality, this situation described
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described, the deceased accomplished to administer his wedding’s subsistence with a serious and longstanding
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families, administer and provided for both of them, financially supporting them.” Id. Translation mine.
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within 15 days of the sentence’s publication in the official court report. The S.T.F. would
rule in the exact same way if an extraordinary appeal filed after the 15-day term.628
Adopting a similar outcome, the S.T.F. also rejected the possibility that courts, in
judging rescissory actions, rescind final judicial decisions that applied the holding of
precedents that were later overruled by the S.T.F..629 The Court sustained that the rescissory
actions are only admissible, under the C.P.C., in restricted cases and that this action does not
have the function of uniformizing case law. Therefore, persons that were denied rights under
old precedents may not have the possibility of having this right acknowledged now, in
conformity with the more recent understanding of the law, because their cases were
adjudicated and the decisions are final. Therefore, even if you have moral laws, there is no
guarantee that you will have a moral outcome, because many variables may play a role to
avoid the moral result, such as procedural issues.
Nevertheless, the citations and examples above should not pass the impression that
moral reasoning never comes into play. On the contrary, especially in the activity of
concretization of principles, the most common feature is to adopt moral approaches and the
cases cited in subchapter II.2 are good examples. Precedents that declared the right of samesex couples to legal unions630 and the right to perform an abortion in the first trimester of the
pregnancy631 are other good examples. The phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law is
evidently dominated by moral reasoning, because the language and comprehension of
constitutional principles is essentially moral (e.g. administrative morality). 632 Human
dignity, as stated, is posited as one of the Republic founding principles and has enormous
relevance in adjudicating cases.633 Nonetheless, it is not treated as an absolute principle that
trumps all other conflicting considerations.634
Even the rules that incorporate the balancing and proportionality techniques of
solving conflict of norms, such as art. 489, § 2, of the C.P.C., do not impose moral reasoning
as the mean for defining content of indeterminate legal concepts. They do demand that judges
justify the positions they adopt, but do not establish the type of argument that judges shall
employ.
In summary, when deciding a case attributing sense to unsettled legal issues,
Brazilian judges may make intelligible decisions that do not necessarily appeal to moral
arguments, but to social aims, policies, economic and political, among other types of
reasoning.
III.2.2.4. Commands and Sanctions
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By attacking Austin’s command theory, Hart demonstrated that legal rules could not
be considered only commands because they differ from acts done under coercion. He also
drew a line between duty-imposing rules and power-conferring rules, a distinction that Brazil
widely accepts—as stated in subchapter II.5.1—and showed that the latter have the nature
of rules, even though they do not prescribe sanctions. Hart also attacked Kelsen’s conception
that all rules are backed by sanctions and are drafted for instructing officials as how to behave
when certain conditions are satisfied.635 He showed that legal norms are normative in the
sense that try to orient general behavior, not only official. The purpose of this subchapter is
to briefly show that Brazil does not accept the idea that all rules are followed by a sanction
and that even duty-imposing rules may not be backed by a threat and are still considered
rules.
There are several duty-imposing rules that are not backed by threats in Brazilian
codes and still are considered rules. For example, in Civil Procedure, there are many
provisions that establish deadlines for judicial acts, what Brazilian scholars call improper
time limits. Article 226, III, of the C.P.C. states that judges shall issue sentences within 30
days after the fact-finding phase of the proceeding ends.636 But the judge will not be punished
if the does not perform the act within that term. In fact, there is no stipulated sanction for the
breach of that rule in the statute.
More recently, the S.T.F. held that even a crime not backed by a sanction [in a
criminal sense] can be, nonetheless, considered a crime. This understanding took place when
the Court decided whether possessing drugs for personal use was still a crime. Due to a
modification of the criminal statute, that crime is not punished by time in prison or restriction
of rights. If a drug user is caught, he shall be notified of the consequences of this habit and
can be ordered to provide services to the community. This comprehension led the S.T.F. to
conclude that drug possession is no longer penalized but is still a crime.637
These examples show that a judge who does not follow a statute deadline or the drug
possessor, as a matter of the internal point of view, may know that they are disobeying the
law, but their disobedience will not cause them any punishments [or at least incarceration in
the drug user’s case]. It will not be the fear of punishment that will move them, but the
psychological notion of legal duty.
In addition, returning to Hart’s attack, he understood that there is a difference
between “making a law” and “making a face-to-face order”. Commands are authoritative
and, even general ones, give the idea that a specific order has been demanded and that the
ordered person understood it. Making a law may not fit this frame:
“In this respect making laws differs from ordering people to
do things, and we must allow for this difference in using this
simple idea as a model for law. It may indeed be desirable that
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laws should as soon as may be after they are made, be brought
to attention of those to whom they apply. The legislator’s
purpose in making laws would be defeated unless this were
generally done, and legal systems often provide, by special
rules concerning promulgation, that this shall be done. But
laws may be complete as laws before this is done, and even if
it is not done at all. In the absence of special rules to the
contrary, laws are validly made even if those affected are left
to find out for themselves what laws have been made and who
are affected thereby.”638
As an example, a case decided by the S.T.F.: there is a constitutional provision that
states that governments may enforce tax raises in the subsequent year of the one in which
the statute that raised the tax is published.639 This rule, known to establish the principle of
tax anteriority, exists to give fair notice to taxpayers of tax raises, so that they may reorganize
their budget to pay the new or incremented tax. Removal of tax benefits also shall obey this
principle.640 Nevertheless, in a case in which the law that affected the taxpayer was published
on December 31, 1994, a Saturday, in an extraordinary edition of the official gazette, the
S.T.F. concluded that the principle of tax anteriority was not offended.641
It is hard to consider that taxpayers had notice of this statutory modification before
the beginning of the new year. Yet, the mere fictitious notice was considered enough by the
S.T.F.
Therefore, if Hart’s example for striking down the command theory was that, under
this doctrine, laws make face-to-face orders to citizens so that they clearly know what has
been demanded, the example above helps to illustrate his point, because actual publicity of
laws is hardly an issue in Brazil—the official requirement is publication in the official
gazette, which lawgivers are unlikely to read, especially on extra editions, published on
weekends, as depicted in the facts of the cited case.
Also, Hart’s arguments to defeat the command theory demonstrate his assertion that
positivism is not strictly committed with unequivocal clarity, what drives him away from
exclusive legal positivism, as will be shown below.
These brief considerations, of course, do not exhaust Hart’s criticism on Austin,642
but seem to be the most controversial ones and show why the Brazilian system would side
with Hart on these matters.
III.3. Exclusive Legal Positivism
It is now time to explain why exclusive legal positivism does not capture what
Brazilians consider to be law. In examining this issue, I will keep justifying why inclusive
legal positivism is a more powerful doctrine at least for Brazil’s reality.
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Exclusive legal positivism is a respectable doctrine, whose most prominent
supporters are Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro. This work will focus on Raz's view of it because
he was the first proponent of the theory and his is the most debated version in the AngloAmerican academy.
Raz essentially argues for a source thesis of law. The word source is used by him in
a technical sense and means that “[a] law has a source if its contents and existence can be
determined without using moral arguments.”643 For Raz, “the law on a question is settled
when legally binding sources provide its solution. In these cases, judges are typically said to
apply the law, and since it is source-based, its application involves technical, legal skills in
reasoning from those sources and does not call for moral [discernment].”644 He thinks that
there are two reasons for accepting the sources thesis. The first one is because this thesis
“reflects and explicates” our conception of the law. The second one is because it provides
reasons for adhering to that conception.645 For saying that the source thesis provides the
correct description of the legal practice, Raz draws a line between law application and law
development. He asserts that judges perform two functions: either they apply the law or they
develop the law. In some cases, it is hard to disentangle these two operations. But, the point
he intends to make is that while applying the law judges use legal skills and while developing
the law judges use moral arguments.646
Raz also makes a distinction between settled law and unsettled law. On the one hand,
he claims that “[i]t is primarily deciding cases regarding which the law is unsettled (as well
as distinguishing and reversing settled law) that judges are thought to develop the law using
moral, social, and other non-legal arguments.”647 On the other hand, “[i]t is when deciding
cases where the law is settled that judges are thought of as using their legal skills in applying
the law.”648 For Raz, the phenomenon of law only takes place when there is settled law,
because only then “the private view of member of the society, or of influential sections or
powerful groups in it, ceases to be their private view and becomes (i.e. lays a claim to be) a
view binding on all members notwithstanding their disagreement about it.”649
The reason for stating that the law is only settled law is mainly that, by claiming
authority over citizens, law has to be able to make a practical difference in orienting their
conduct. Law should preempt all other conflicting considerations. If law is unsettled, it does
not serve this orienting function and, therefore, should not be considered law, because people
643
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will not be sure on how to behave in order to follow it, neither judges will be reasoning
according to the law. As Raz asserts, “it is of the very essence of the alleged authority that it
issues rulings which are binding regardless of any other justification, it follows that it must
be possible to identify those rulings without engaging in a justificatory argument.”650
In summary, Raz points out that the underlying function of law is “to provide publicly
ascertainable standards by which members of the society are held to be bound so that they
cannot excuse non-conformity by challenging the justification of the standard.” 651 Raz’s
sources doctrine is called exclusive positivism because no legal rule may condition legality
on morality.652
Based on the considerations noted in the previous subchapters, it is clear that
exclusive legal positivism explains law differently than Brazilians do. For the proponents of
this theory, many open textured provisions of legal texts that Brazilians consider part of the
law—because they were enacted by Congress—would not be law because the instructions
they provide are not unequivocally certain.
It is true that the Brazilian legal system has, as a goal, the intention of furnishing the
country’s citizens with ascertainable standards of conduct. This is a statutory requirement set
forth in a statute that regulates how statutes shall be written in Brazil. 653 Brazilians are also
very concerned with legal certainty. As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the
concept is seen as inherent to the idea of rule of law. 654 Nonetheless, as described in
subchapter II.4.1., in the civil law tradition, the generality of the rule is considered a positive
property of the legal norm because of the premise that the judge or the legislator will never
be able to foresee all possible cases in which the rule must govern. On the contrary, for
assuring the continuum adaptation of the legal rules to the new cases, civil law countries draft
broader statutes if compared to common law countries and adopt Friedrich Carl Von
Savigny’s four techniques of legal interpretation—textual, systematic, historical and
teleological.655 The adoption of the juridical dogmatic also allows judges to develop and
update the law, presupposing to only be applying what was already law.656
Moreover, after the enactment of the 1988 C.F., the tendency of Brazilian law has
been to employ moral standards in legal texts, such as morality, efficiency, loyalty, among
others. These concepts are sometimes qualified as indeterminate legal concepts. The fact that
jurists currently employ the verb concretizing, instead of interpreting legal principles, show
that their meaning in particular cases is construed “in a process of creatively determining
results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the [C.F.].”657
In addition, Brazil does not have well-developed theories of fair notice, vagueness or
overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the requisite of legality, it will not really
matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer good guidance to the citizens. There is
a sort of general understanding—or practice—that the terms will be made clear through a
process of interpretation or concretization. The fact that some court applications of the rule
will not find support in the legislative history or even in the original intent of the drafters is
not generally a problem. The social fact has taken place, there is written law on the general
issue and what the Judiciary extracts from the text, in a process that may also take into
650

Id.
Id. at 92.
652
Id. at 8.
653
See art. 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95, de 26 de fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 27.2.1998.
654
See generally S.T.F., MS No. 22.357, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 27.05.2004, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA
[D.J.], 05.11.2004 (Braz.).
655
VESTING, supra note 131, at 217-219.
656
NINO, supra note 109, at 384.
657
Brugger, supra note 33, at 398.
651

116

account constitutional principles, as we will see, is considered within the legitimate authority
of courts.
In light of these considerations, it is clear that Brazilians do not consider, as a social
fact, that the legal phenomenon only takes place when the law is settled. Defining the content
of vague laws is deemed to be a task of courts, although judges do not acknowledge law
creation, only law application, even when they are developing the law. These decisions
generally apply retrospectively to past facts because they are seen as an expression of what
the law has always been.
Take the nepotism case for example (subchapter II.2.2.). The S.T.F. Justices reasoned
that the prohibition of the practice already existed in the law. The existant law is the
administrative morality and impersonality principles. Nonetheless, even the then lawyer Luís
Roberto Barroso, who filed the actions before the S.T.F., stated that “the case was morally
good, but faced juridical hardships.” 658 The issue was controversial and provoked
disagreement. In ruling the case, the Court did not acknowledge that it was creating law but
concluded that the prohibition lied in the core of the referred principles. If one examines the
case in light of Raz’s thesis, it will be hard to affirm that the principle of administrative
morality offers such an ascertainable guidance that he claims law needs to provide. It is more
likely that Raz would contend that the law was developed in these cases and that the
prohibition was created in that occasion, since even judges disagreed as to whether the
prohibition could be extracted from these principles. 659
Another example is Brazil’s approach towards disciplinary punishments. Maria
Sylvia Zanella Di Pietro states that “in administrative law, vagueness prevails. There are few
infractions clearly described by the law, as it happens with ‘public employment
abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing with
a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as a serious fault,
irregular proceeding, service inefficiency, public disobedience, or other infractions set forth
in an undetermined manner by the statutory legislation.” 660 In order for punishments to be
applied, will the law need to be settled in each case? Only in a second equal case will the law
be applied? That is not the Brazilian current practice. This example resembles Waluchow’s
point that “[w]ithin [some] societies, some degree of ‘unsettledness’ is wisely accepted as a
reasonable price to pay for the sake of other values considered to be of at least comparable
importance.”661
Finally, going back to the analysis of the crime of corruption in Brazil (subchapter
II.4.1), even though it is still controversial the question as to whether the commitment of an
official act is a necessary requirement for configuring corruption—as Judge Moro noted in
the former President Lula case—judges do not dispute if the requirements of article 5,
XXXIV, of the C.F., have been observed. This legal provision states that “there are no crimes
unless defined in prior law, nor are there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”662
Lula was convicted despite the fact that the law could be uncertain— I am not saying that it
is uncertain, I am just calling attention to the fact that the sentencing judge pointed out that
there was uncertainty as to what the settled law was and Moro claimed that Lula performed
an official act, although not a specific one.663
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Hart, by endorsing inclusive legal positivism and an institutionalist view of law,
unequivocally disagrees with Raz. Hart acknowledges some flexibility in law application,
especially because he recognizes ‘the relative indeterminacy of rules and precedents.’ His
view is unequivocally more precise to describe Brazilian law than Raz’s view, as a matter of
social fact:
“This indeterminacy springs from the fact that it is impossible
in framing general rules to anticipate and provide for every
possible combination of circumstances which the future may
bring. For any rule, however precisely formulated, there will
always be some factual situations in which the question
whether the situations fall within the scope of the general
classificatory terms of the rule cannot be settled by appeal to
linguistic rules or conventions or to canons of statutory
interpretation, or even by reference to the manifest or assumed
purposes of the legislature. In such cases the rules may be
found either vague or ambiguous. A similar indeterminacy
may arise when two rules are expressly framed in such specific
terms as ‘reasonable’ or ‘material’. Such cases can be resolved
only by methods whose rationality cannot lie in logical
relations of conclusions to premises. Similarly, because
precedents can logically be subsumed under an indefinite
number of general rules, the identification of the rule for which
a precedent is an authority cannot be settled by an appeal to
logic.” 664
If Hart considers judicial decisions to be authoritative, although acknowledging the
relative indeterminacy of the law, it is likely that he does not see authority as only being
legitimate if citizens are able to priorly identify law without relying on other substantive
reasons. The understanding for the Brazilian legal system by its judges and officials is much
closer to this picture.
Nevertheless, Raz’s view of positivism is a more sophisticated theory if compared to
the mechanistic view of law, in which all laws are supposedly announced in advance and
applied without the need of law-creating activity. Raz does not think that enacted rules
always furnish the reasons to act. On the contrary, he claims that only when the interpretation
of the rule is settled and reasons are furnished, there will be law. He asserts that moral
reasoning comes into play in the process of construing those clear reasons, that make
authority legitimate. The task of judges, for that reason, is not only to apply, but also to
develop the law. His only wrong point, at least in accordance with the Brazilian prevalent
point of view, is to consider that when the judge concretizes moral standards incorporated
into law by the legal criteria—including the C.F.—he is acting outside the legal system and,
hence, no law exists until the issue is settled.
The argument that laws, to offer guidance, should be settled in advance is a powerful
one and cannot be neglected. As we saw, Brazil has a statute conveying this obligation to
legislators. Indeed, as Kristen Rundle argues, Raz’s position may reveal “a commitment to
understand law as a phenomenon that is fundamentally linked to respect to the legal subject
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as an agent.”665 Raz asserts that by entailing treating humans as persons capable of planning
and plotting their future, the rule of law respects human dignity.666 However, due to Brazil’s
institutional view of law, Brazilians do not consider that a legal norm only exists when
unequivocal guidance is provided. This would mean to confuse the concept of law with the
concept of rule of law. Yet, most of the country’s scholars would concur on the need of legal
certainty because this concept has been adopted as a C.F. principle and is embedded in the
idea of democratic state of law.667 I intend to examine how to deal with this issue in chapter
V.
III.4. Modern Natural Law Theory
“Natural law theory has been remarkably influential since it made its first appearance
2,500 years ago in ancient Greece. Its origins lie in the idea that there is a rational order
which exists in nature and which is discoverable by human reason.”668 There is a wide variety
of writings on the topic,669 from Aristotle670 to Thomas Aquinas.671 Nevertheless, natural law
has long been “surrounded in mystery and generality.”672 John Finnis’ neo-Thomism theory,
developed in the book Natural Law and Natural Rights, 673 is seen as a restatement of
classical natural law theory. His influence in the Anglo-American jurisprudence is
unquestionable. That is the reason why I will focus on his work.
The first point to stress is that, according to Finnis, “[a] theory of natural law need
not be undertaken primarily for the purpose of thus providing a justified conceptual
framework for descriptive social science.”674 Therefore, as Hart observes, Finnis “flexible
interpretation of natural law is in many respects complementary to rather than a rival of
positivist legal theory.”675 Finnis does not deny the separation of law as it is and law as it
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ought to be.676 In this sense, he disagrees with the conclusion prevalent in classic natural
theory that “an unjust law is no law at all,”677 at least when referring to posited law. His
theory seeks to “assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges,
or as statemen, or as citizens.”678 Finnis wants them to understand “what morality has to say
about law.”679
Although Finnis, therefore, does not deny neither the need, nor the independence of
posited law, it is important to emphasize the differences between soft positivism and natural
law at the level of theory: “inclusive legal positivists advocate a morally neutral conception
or conceptual analysis of law, while natural law theorists argue that law is best understood
teleologically, within the context of a larger moral analysis.”680
In light of these considerations, what Finnis argued is that a “theory of natural law
claims to be able to identify conditions and principles of practical right-mindedness, of good
and proper among persons, and in individual conduct,”681 and not really explain what it takes
to be the law of a system. In this sense, it is clear that his theory does not fit the purpose of
this thesis because it will not help describing the Brazilian legal system in a descriptiveexplanatory fashion.
Nonetheless, Finnis’ theory can offer important insights to law development in
Brazil, as to how the moral principles that have been incorporated to the country’s posited
law—through written principles—shall be concretized. This point has been constantly
addressed throughout this thesis. The S.T.F. has asserted the importance of natural law in
construing broad constitutional principles, such as administrative morality, for example:
“[…] morality, as a principle of Public Administration (art. 37)
and as a requirement of validity of administrative acts (art. 5,
LXXIII), has the system of law par excellence as its source,
especially the constitutional legal order. It is certain that
human values inspire and underlie the order are, in many cases,
the normative concretization of values removed from the
guideline of natural rights, or from the ethical and moral
heritage established by society’s common sense.” 682
Another example is the natural right to pursue happiness. The S.T.F. has also
acknowledged that this right, mentioned in the U.S. Declaration of Independence,683 is an
important hermeneutical guide to develop the fundamental rights set forth in the Brazilian
Constitution. This right was referred by Justice Celso de Mello as grounds for recognizing
the right of same sex unions and the right for transgenders to change their names to match
their gender preference.684
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Also, in the course of this work I have pointed out some cases in which the Brazilian
system of law allows reasoning based on moral (natural law) arguments. I have mentioned
that, for John Finnis, the application of the golden rule clearly takes part in a process of
identifying “a moral standard as one which anyone adjudicating a given case has the duty to
apply even though it has not (yet) been posited by the social facts of custom, enactment, or
prior adjudication.”685
Let us turn now to Finnis’ theory. He asserts that there is a differentiation among
focal conception of the law and actual law. The former is the ideal law and the latter is merely
an approximation.686 The law is used in its focal (core) meaning when it secures the common
good of society.687 This common good, “in the case of a political community, […] [is] the
securing of a whole ensemble of material and other conditions that tend to favour the
realization, by each individual in the community, of his or her personal development.” 688
However, the personal development shall be trumped if it does not meet the common good
of the political community in a wide sense.
There is an idea in Finnis that the individual considerations that should be respected
are those in which there is individual collaboration with others. Finnis asserts that “there is a
common good of the political community, and it is definite enough to exclude a considerable
number of types of political arrangements, laws, etc.”689 He cites seven basic forms of human
goods that fit this common collaboration with each other: life (self-preservation), knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, friendship (sociability, acting in the interests of others), religion
and freedom in practical reasonableness (employing one’s intelligence to solve general
problems of life).690 The author states, nevertheless, that “[t]he principles that express the
general ends of human life do not acquire what would nowadays be called a ‘moral’ force
until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project, disposition, or action, or upon
particular projects, dispositions or actions. How they are thus to be brought to bear is the
problem for practical reasonableness.”691
There are nine intermediate practical reasonableness principles “to guide the
transition from judgments about human goods to judgments about the right thing to do here
and now.” 692 These principles are the acts of (a) recognizing the good of practical
reasonableness, which allows one to choose commitments, projects and actions; (b)
establishing a coherent plan of life; (c) setting no arbitrary preference amongst values; (d)
setting no arbitrary preference amongst persons; (e) having certain detachment from all the
specific and limited projects which one undertakes, but also committed to them; (f)
performing efficiency with reason: one must not waste one’s opportunity by using inefficient
methods; (g) respecting every basic value in every act, refraining from doing acts that does
nothing but damage or impede realization of the basic forms of human goods; (h) favoring
and fostering the common good of one’s communities; and (i) acting in accordance with
one’s conscience.693
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Wacks points out that these, in Finnis view, constitute the universal and immutable
principles of natural law. He adds that:
“Finnis argues that this approach accords with the general
conception of natural law espoused by Thomas Aquinas. It
does not, he claims, fall foul of the non-cognitivist strictures
of Hume […] for these objective goods are self-evident; they
are not deduced from a description of human nature. So, for
example, ‘knowledge’ is self-evidently preferable to
ignorance.”694
Since Finnis’ theory does not intend to provide a justified conceptual framework for
descriptive social science, as mentioned above, I will not make further comments on it.
Nevertheless, a final point to be made regarding natural law is that there has been an
attempt to drawing a hierarchy among Brazilian C.F. norms, ranking them up in accordance
to their compatibility to natural law.
This attempt was made through the filing of ADI 815. In the case, the Governor of
the State of Rio Grande do Sul demanded the S.T.F. to hold unconstitutional parts of two
provisions of the original text of the C.F. that set forth the minimum number of the Chamber
of Deputies’ members per state. In Brazil, the C.F.695 guarantees at least eight representatives
per state and four per territory. Therefore, there is overinclusion of representatives for some
states and underinclusion for others. According to numbers of the 2010 census, a Deputy
from São Paulo represents 432,000 citizens, whereas a Deputy from Roraima represents
33,000.696
However, the S.T.F. dismissed the case because it understood that the proponent, the
Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, had failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The Court held that this unequal treatment amongst states was established by the
Framers of the 1988 C.F. and the Court could not judge this choice. This judgment would
have to be made attributing a higher status to some constitutional norms—because they
supposedly conformed with suprapositive norms—in comparison to others, which did not
conform with this criterion. The Court held that, even if it admitted that suprapositive law
exists, it lacked authority to exercise this control.697
III.5. Interpretivism
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Interpretivism is attributed to Ronald Dworkin. It is basically known for the idea that
in hard cases698 propositions of law do not control the outcome of the cases, since there is
theoretical disagreement among judges on what is the correct content of these propositions
under the law.
For Dworkin, positivism, which has the main purpose of guiding conduct, fails in
trying to be a mere descriptive theory of law, because in hard cases it offers no guidance.
Any attempt to merely describe the law through social facts, as positivism aims, would not
be successful in explaining what law really is, because law is essentially interpretive. The
author argues that “propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history in a
straightforward way, nor they are simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history.
They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and
evaluation but is different from both.” 699 He, therefore, stresses for a constructive
interpretation of the law, which positivism, by linking laws to social facts, cannot offer.
Dworkin compares judicial interpretation to writing a novel, and states that when
judges interpret the law, they are writing a new chapter of the story, which must be consistent
to the material that has been construed so far—fit requirement—, but also creative to develop
the story.700 Their creativity, however, has to respect a coherent conception of justice and
fairness that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.701
Therefore, judges are not really stepping outside the law for arguments, but just discovering
solutions that are latent in the law.
Dworkin also disagrees with the ideas that propositions of law are either (a) “intended
to be expressions of what the speaker wants the law to be;”702 or (b) “attempt to describe
some pure objective natural law, which exists in virtue of objective moral truth rather than
historical decision.”703 In this sense, he criticizes natural law, for assuming that moral claims
can be true because they are in accordance with universal reason or God’s rules. Dworkin
thinks that moral claims can be true independently of belief and desire; but correspond to
more abstract substantive moral claims that are not linked to any sort of higher order. 704
Morality plays a role in Dworkin’s theory because he points out that judges, when
solving an unsettled controversial issue—as writing the new chapter of the novel—, may
decide in a way which is consistent with the community’s moral principles that best justify
the previous cases. “What is law depends on moral judgments as to which principles best
justify past political decisions, and legal standards are whatever body of standards provides
the best moral justification for a society’s established legal rules and institutions.”705
Although Dworkin denies the possibility of engaging in a descriptive-evaluation of a
legal system, such as the one Hart proposed to do in The Concept of Law, some commentators
see that Dworkin’s attempt to prove Hart wrong did not work, because what Dworkin
developed is not a theory of what the law is, but a theory of the judicial decision. Therefore,
they claim Hart won the debate.706 I do not intend to examine the Hart-Dworkin debate,
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because it is not the purpose of this work. What I do intend to do is to show that Dworkin’s
interpretative view of describing the law is not accurate to explain the Brazilian current
practices.
In subchapters II.5.1, II.5.2 and II.5.4., I went over some differences between the
current views adopted in Brazil and Dworkin’s conceptions regarding the breadth of
principles and the distinction among principles and rules. Therefore, I will not go deep in
these issues again. Also, when explaining why I think inclusive legal positivism offers the
most accurate explanations for Brazilian legal practices, I have, at least indirectly, refuted
some of Dworkin’s theses. I think we can talk about a “Brazilian rule of recognition” to
formulate statements of what is legal and what is not legal. Brazilians do not have a problem
in writing moral principles into law and they still consider that these pedigreed principles
serve the role of principles, not merely standards. They also do not think the role of their
judges is confined into settling issues of principle and not of policy.
My goal for this chapter is to focus on four of Dworkin’s main points and to examine
if they are pertinent to capture the Brazilian legal practice: (a) if his assertions as to why
inclusive legal positivism fails compromise the framing of the theory in Brazil; (b) if the
chain novel metaphor captures Brazil’s application of laws; (c) if his “rights as trumps”
doctrine describes the practices that dominate Brazilian adjudication in similar cases; and (d)
if his views as to how principles enter into judicial reasoning are appropriate to frame
Brazilian practices.
It is important going over these points because Dworkin is certainly among the most
cited—and probably misread—American jurisprudential authors in Brazil, and many of the
jurists that cite his work refer to these points to explain Brazilian law.707
Finally, it is relevant to state that this thesis does not have the purpose of criticizing
interpretivism as an accurate manner for capturing the American legal system and its
practices. The fact that interpretivism may be a pertinent theory for explaining American law
does not automatically make it a precise theory for depicting Brazilian law and the focus of
this work is restricted to Brazil.
III.5.1. Dworkin’s Attack on Inclusive Legal Positivism
Inclusive legal positivism is traditionally seen as an accommodation of Ronald
Dworkin’s criticism of Hart’s version of legal positivism because Hart had failed to address
the role of principles in law.708 But, as noted, this compromise did not settle the debate.
Dworkin also criticized inclusive legal positivism and denied the possibility of including
value-laden principles in the rule of recognition, because social facts would not be able to
grasp as a whole what these values mean. Therefore, positivism would not serve its major
role, that is, guiding conduct and solving the uncertainty of law, which, for Dworkin, was
the main problem targeted by Hart.709
In reading many provisions of Brazilian legal texts that were cited throughout this
work, one may note that Brazilian legislators do not seem to worry about writing these broad
and general provisions. The principles of morality, impersonality, equality and efficiency are
set forth in article 37 of the C.F.. Do they provide clear reasons for deciding whether
nepotism is unconstitutional, as the S.T.F. did in the cases mentioned in subchapter II.2.2?
707
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Indeed, Dworkin may be right. This article may offer poor guidance in some cases
both for judges and for citizens. This will depend as to whether the factual situations to which
judges apply it are considered hermeneutically controversial. If a public agent issues an
administrative order in exchange for a bribe, that act will certainly be considered illegal and
immoral. However, if he prints his daughter’s ten-page school assignment in the government
department’s printer, the issue as to whether this act is immoral, illegal or if the principle of
impersonality has been violated can be controversial. In the nepotism case, the S.T.F. said
that banning the practice was in the core of the principles of morality and impersonality.
Chapter V will examine whether this should be considered proper guidance.
If Brazilian legislators chose to insert broad words that do not provide clear
instructions on how public agents and citizens shall behave, they are certainly not intending
to furnish all the guidance that Dworkin argues positivism intends to supply. 710 Indeed, as
shown in subchapter II.4.1, the style of the civil legislation in general is less detailed than the
U.S. style. Brazilian codes and laws do not attempt to “provide rules that are immediately
applicable to every conceivable concrete case.”711
Zagrebelsky notes that the choice of principles over rules improves flexibility and
adaptation:
“In relation to rules, the legally relevant elements in a case are
established in a more or less determined way. In contrast,
principles, as already suggested, yield no such determined
path, with the result that the relevant elements of the law are
determined on a case-by-case basis. This characteristic renders
principle-based jurisprudence particularly plastic and
adaptable, whereas jurisprudence by rules aims at a greater
rigidity and fixity.”712
In this sense, Brazilian legislators seem simply to share Hart’s view that “even when
verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required
by them may break out in particular concrete cases.”713
Indeed, Jules Coleman may have a point when he states that “legal rules can be
understood in terms of the role they play in justifying decisions, not in causing or guiding
action.”714 This assertion is certainly more accurate to express the type of guidance legal
principles offer.
In addition, as Waluchow points out, Dworkin’s argument from the function of law
“fails to adequately distinguish between what might thought to be desirable in a legal system
and what might be thought essential to its very existence.”715 A system of general rules and
principles, which obey the criterion of its rule of recognition, may be a bad system in offering
guidance, but may still be law in accordance with the institutional tradition. As I stated
before, Brazil, following this tradition of civil law drafting, does not have well-developed
theories of fair notice, vagueness or overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the
requisite of legality, it will not really matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer
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good guidance to the citizens. There is a sort of general understanding that the terms will be
made clear through a process of interpretation or concretization.716
Therefore, although Dworkin may be precise in pointing out that a system that
includes value-laden principles in its rule of recognition and in rules in general may not offer
good guidance, this fact does not undermine the Brazilian institutional view of law, since the
criterion of validity has been met. On the contrary, this circumstance is considered essential
for providing the necessary flexibility established by the 1988 C.F. to guarantee “a just and
fair judicial order”717 that the document sets as a general goal.
III.5.2. Are Brazilian Judges Writing a Chain Novel?
The question to be answered in this subchapter is whether Dworkin’s famous chain
novel metaphor is compatible with the practices of a country, like Brazil, that (in general)
does not have stare decisis as a rule.
In subchapter II.6, I cited an excerpt from Karl Larenz in which he stated that “courts,
according to our legal organization, are not bound to precedents as they are to the [enacted]
law. It is not the precedent, for being a precedent, that binds, but the norm that it contains, if
this norm is considered a correct interpretation or concretization [of the law].”718 The same
practice exists in Italy719 and in Brazil, save for the binding precedent exception in the case
of the latter. Larenz’s observation makes clear that precedents do not hold the same status of
enacted law and that is the typical view of a system that does not acknowledge judicial
rulemaking.
Indeed, this approach seems to be the typical of countries that adopt a top-down
model of norms creation and interpretation.720 This model, as Hart noted, employs a maximal
use of general classifying words to offer guidance. In theory, as I have pointed out in
subchapter II.3 and II.4., this model assumes that the enacted law fulfills general
requirements of generality, equality of application and certainty, and respects the separation
of powers.721 The fact that jurists do not deny that enacted law need to be interpreted does
not shake this conviction, because they generally think that the legal methods will make
716
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possible for them, through logical operations of technical characters, finding out what the
law means.722
In this sense, Brazilian judges traditionally do not picture themselves writing a novel,
as Dworkin argues in his famous metaphor. 723 In fact, for the conventional notion, the
romance is already written and judges are merely readers that interpret the story, and whose
views will be authoritative in the cases they are adjudicating. They shall not modify the
original novel, because it is copyrighted to the legislature.
Brazilian judges will try to understand the novel as a whole; they will assume that it
has unity, consistency, coherence and it is a complete source of the story. If they admit some
gaps, they will fill them because the author oriented them to do so. 724 But even if their
interpretation does not adequaly fit the original story when confronted with the plain meaning
of the words, they consider it to be a mere reading of the story, not an addition of a new
chapter. It can be a literal, historical, contextual or even teleological reading. This reading
may change during times. But it is the same story that is being read over and over and
interpreted each time by each judge.
Traditional judges are also not bound to other judges’ readings. In fact, they claim
that, under the law, they owe respect solely to the original novel. Of course, their peers’
views may be persuasive, they may consider them appropriate and follow them, especially
because starting a new interpretation all over again may be demanding and time consuming.
Nonetheless, they may also consider the previous interpretations wrong and choose to
disregard them, except in cases in which the author of the novel tells them to be bound by a
prior interpretation.
Dworkin may be correct that the chain novel metaphor captures the American legal
system. But the example Dworkin has in mind is the system interprets the U.S. Constitution,
an Eighteenth Century legal text, whose words are sometimes broad, but whose principles
are strong and must be continually updated to fit the current stage of the American Society—
this is undisputable whether one is an originalist or a living constitutionalist or adopts any
other constitutional interpretive view,725 because contenders of all schools of thought must
interpret the text to present facts, although in a different manner and range. Stare decisis is
also a rule of American law widely accepted by judges.
The literary novel example, nonetheless, may not be the best one to explain Brazilian
practices, because the novel is, in general, written broadly—as stated in subchapter II.4.1.,
in which the civil legislation style was covered.
A post-impressionist painting,726 with is focus on abstract qualities and avoidance of
specific details, may provide a better idea of the civil law generality and certainty. Consider,
for example, Van Gogh’s Starry Night,727 which is part of The Museum of Modern Art MOMA’s permanent collection in New York City. If one examines this work of art, the
person will note that Van Gogh painted a starry night. She may observe that there is a city,
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an arbor, a church and some mountains. But, she may not be sure as to whether there is a
comet in the sky; if the sun has already risen; or if the moon is very bright in the night; if it
is a windy night; or if she can see the northern lights: the aurora borealis. 728 She will have to
interpret it to determine what the painting displays.
Nevertheless, this work has shown changes on the Brazilian social facts regarding
legal practices, especially after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. Since the Constitution is not
seen as mere political document anymore and judges confer normative force to the text and
consider that it tells them to take part on the process of guaranteeing a fair and just society
for Brazilians, judges may well now be writing some new chapters. Insofar as they play an
active role in improving Brazilian society, assuring that fundamental and social rights are
respected by the three levels of Government, a new vision of the metaphor may be pertinent
today, at least for some areas of law.
The Judiciary acts in this new role by applying the law, after being provoked through
the filing of actions. In these lawsuits, the causes of action invoked by the parties are
commonly the broad constitutional principles, which they think need to be concretized in the
situation at hand. The use of the word concretization, instead of interpretation, shows that
judges are doing a different kind of work nowadays. As an excerpt from Barroso
demonstrates that constitutional principles “do not put in detail the conduct to be followed
for its concretization.” 729 In this sense, as he notes, “the activity of the interpreter will be
more complex, because [most of the times] it will be up to him to define the direction to
take.”730
Taking this new scenario into account, Dworkin’s chain novel metaphor starts to
make sense to describe the reality of what Brazilian judges are doing, at least regarding
constitutional law. And since, as noted in subchapter II.5.2, there is ongoing practice of
constitutionalizing the law, this metaphor may even be pertinent to also describe other areas
of Brazilian legal practice.
Indeed, due to changes in social practices, some of Brazil’s current norms—both
constitutional and statutory—do not fit the top-down model anymore—at least those that
need to be concretized by the Judiciary in a case by case fashion. By writing these broad
principles into the law and affirming that they are self-enforceable and do not depend on the
enactment of a statute to have force, Brazil also adopted a bottom-up model of lawmaking to
deal with constitutional issues. As Gustavo Zagrebelsky observes, “[t]he concretization of
the principles take place in the course of the work either of the legislator, through a rule that
looks to future events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to past events.” 731
According to Professor Denise Reaume:
“[t]his model holds that although we may agree on and be
deeply committed to certain abstract values or principles, we
cannot anticipate all the fact situations in which they may be
implicated, nor can we fully map out a comprehensive view of
the concrete consequences implicated by those values. We
want our legal system to be informed by principles of justice,
liberty and equality, but these are multifaceted concepts whose
728
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meaning is contested. In such situations, it is wise not to
attempt a comprehensive theory issuing a precise network of
rules at the outset, but rather to let the implications of the
abstract principles be revealed incrementally through
confronting fact situations on a case-by-case basis.”732
The bottom-up method is based on the common law approach, although it has
differences because in Brazil it is based on pedigreed sources, which originated from a clear
social fact, the inclusion of principles in written norms, specially the 1988 C.F.. The method
is addressed by Hart in The Concept of Law, when he gives the “hat in the church
example.” 733 Waluchow, following Reaume’s teachings, also argues that the Canadian
Charter of rights should be concretized in a bottom-up method of lawmaking.734 I will return
to this subject in the following chapters.735
III.5.3. Are Brazilian Rights Trumps?
Dworkin famously argues that “rights are best understood as trumps over some
background justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a
whole.”736 He claims that, for example, “if someone has a right to publish pornography, this
732
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means that it is for some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that right, even if
they (correctly) believe that the community as a whole would be better off if they did.”737
Dworkin’s struggle is against utilitarianism; his view is that rights protect individuals “in
spite […] of the wider good.”738 The question to be answered in this subchapter is whether
this is the Brazilian view of rights, as exposed in law adjudication.
In subchapter III.2.2.3.2., it was mentioned that the S.T.F has an understanding that
“there are no absolute rights, even the fundamental rights set forth in art. 5 of the C.F., or in
treaties or in human rights international conventions. The criteria and methods of
reasonableness and proportionality are essential in this context because they reject the
prevalence of one determined right or interest over the other of same or higher juridicalevaluative stature.”739 Is this view incompatible with Dworkin’s?
This question is relevant for this work because Dworkin’s trump thesis displays his
view that political morality arguments should prevail over other considerations. On the other
hand, inclusive legal positivism asserts that those arguments will prevail if this criterion is
set forth in the rule of recognition.
To answer the question proposed for this subchapter, it is necessary to take a step
back and analyze some issues regarding the context of Dworkin’s work. Although the HartDworkin debate is possibly Dworkin’s most famous struggle and Dworkin argued that he,
as Hart, was providing a theory of law not tied to any particular system or legal culture,
foreign critics seem to think that Dworkin’s theory is limited to the American reality, at least
with respect to his rights thesis and his distinction among arguments of policy and of
principle. 740
David Kennedy explains that, in the years after 1968, the liberal thought in the U.S.
was under enormous pressure and that had several impacts in the legal field, especially after
the Warren Court years.741 The methods of reasoning and the centrality of adjudication that
prevailed during this period were attacked and became more evident. The rise of textualism
gave strength to critics that called the liberal decisions judicial activism and that they usurped
legislative powers. “Defending the liberal tradition seemed to require a defense of
adjudication as an intellectual activity distinct from legislation—and utilitarian
policymaking—while remaining open to the broad readings of legal texts and tradition
favored by liberal judges.”742
Kennedy affirms that “Dworkin […] took up the challenge of offering a theory of
adjudication between textual fealty and legislative policymaking.”743
Dworkin’s endeavor, nevertheless, was to offer a theory of adjudication in a country
where there has not been any political rupture since its independence and where the core of
the constitutional background for rights remained almost untouched after the Civil War
737
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Amendments. This initiative was especially difficult because the U.S. was already a
developed nation and could not be called a society in transition,744 in which the judicial
branch was required to be a player in improving society, especially in discovering new rights.
Arguing that rights were not always visible in pre-existing legal norms but could be
discovered through principled-based reasoning and without resorting to policy
considerations was certainly a very powerful move by Dworkin.
But in Dworkin’s late works, he seems to have felt that this American institutional
reality left his theory too narrow in comparison to what was happening in the world. The
new constitutions, equally in Europe, Africa and Latin America, included not only individual
rights, but also many positive rights. In the continental legal theory, scholars call these
“social rights”—which demand positive actions from the state to warrant substantive
equality—second-generation rights. They differ from the first-generation rights, which are
considered to be the traditional liberal rights that citizens have against the state, such as life,
liberty and property. There are even a third and a fourth categories: the third-generation
rights—that encompasses the rights to humanity self-preservation, such as environmental
protection; and the fourth-generation, linked to the idea of biological research rights, like
the ability to manipulate human genetics.745
In subchapter II.5.4., I went over this issue and cited a quote from Dworkin in which
he comments upon the South African former Supreme Court member Arthur Chaskalson.
Dworkin’s remarks show that the tasks of adjudication and of recognition of rights in these
countries are more complex and due to that fact it is very hard to sustain that positive (social)
rights trump all other collective interests.
One of Chaskalson’s examples of the dominance of collective over individual rights
was the Soobramoney case,746 in which the South African Supreme Court rejected the claim
from a patient suffering from chronic renal failure to be provided with renal dialysis without
charge. Chaskalson noted that the plaintiff did not fall into the preferable cases established
by the state guidelines, which were the patients that could be cured—he was a diabetic in the
final stage of chronic renal failure, suffering from ischemic heart disease and cerebrovascular
disease. Since resources were limited and the Government should establish some criterion,
the Court ruled that awarding preference to patients that had more chances of surviving was
more important than simply spending funds to prolong Mr. Soobramoney’s life.
Dworkin, in commenting upon this ruling, asserted that the Court acted properly and
that “Mr. Soobramoney was treated with equal concern [because] if the government cannot
provide, out of its health care budget, dialysis for everyone in renal failure, then it does not
deny equal concern to give priority to those who can benefit most from that technology.”747
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Dworkin claims that this approach is egalitarian—the court’s reading is “consistent with
equal concern for all”748—, as opposed to substantive:
“Judges must choose between two strategies [when judging
positive rights cases]. The first strategy is substantive. It
requires judges to review at least the major decisions that
government made in allocating resources to satisfy the basic
needs specified in the Constitution, and to reject any such
decisions they find unreasonable. This substantive strategy
might require judges to declare that government policy is
unreasonable because it spends too much on health care and,
therefore, not enough on housing. The second strategy is
egalitarian: it insists not that government must make any
particular allocation of resources but that it must show equal
concern for all in the allocations it does make. It cannot, for
example, distribute what it does assign for health care in a way
that ignores greater or more basic health needs in order to serve
lesser or less basic ones, when there is no need for that
allocation.”749
This ruling shows how hard is to say that Mr. Soobramoney’s right to health
protection trumps rival collective considerations. Dworkin argues that the rival
considerations in Mr. Soobramoney’s case are egalitarian, not utilitarian; the wishes of a
member of the community are not being discriminated because of the wishes of another
member. But there is no doubt that, at the end of the day, his constitutional right to full health
care assistance was compromised, because this egalitarian treatment neglected him the
possibility of living the remaining period of life in the best possible way. This was probably
an argument that would make a private health insurance company to lose a lawsuit if it had
denied Mr. Soobramoney’s claim.
If one examines precedents regarding health claims against the state in Brazil, he will
note that the Judiciary approach is more concerned with safeguarding human dignity, even
of terminal patients. Indeed, there are several judicial decisions that grant injunctions to
obligate the government to financially support individual treatments. 750 These decisions are
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generally upheld by the S.T.F..751 No doubt the subject is very controversial. In fact, there is
an ongoing case in which the S.T.F. is trying to fix objective criteria for cases in which the
public administration is compelled to supply medication to individuals. 752 But it is likely that
the South Africa Supreme Court approach, endorsed by Dworkin, would be regarded
contrary the prevailing political morality in Brazilian law. The general understanding of the
C.F. right to health protection—at least in accordance with the prevailing judicial
decisions—seems to be more linked to the idea of no one left behind, at least concerning
health and educational issues. It may sound romantic, but courts have been trying to enforce
full health assistance coverage to those who file suits requiring it.753 If Mr. Soobramoney’s
was Brazilian, the government would probably have been forced to provide him with the
treatment, either directly in a public hospital or by paying his bills in a private hospital.
The following syllabus of a S.T.F. opinion regarding the right to day care for up to
5-year-old children is an evidence of the prevailing principle:
“- Youth education represents an inalienable constitutional
prerogative granted to children, which, for allowing their
development, as a first step of the process of basic education,
warrants them attending day care and pre-school (C.F., art.
208, IV).
This high social significant legal prerogative requires the state
to create objective conditions that allow, in a concrete manner,
up to 5-year-old children (C.F., art. 208, IV), the effective
access to day care and pre-school. An unacceptable
governmental omission may unfairly frustrate the positive
right that the text of the Federal Constitution granted to them.
Youth education, being a fundamental right of every child, is
not submitted, during the process of concretization, to mere
discretionary evaluations of Public Administration, neither it
is subordinated to pure pragmatical governmental reasons.”754
This, in any sense, means that Brazilian law adopts a view that individual social rights
always trumps community goals. In fact, these proceedings are analyzed by judges, in a caseby-case manner, in which they balance the individual interest and the state’s considerations
for not fulfilling the social right obligation. Principles of reasonableness and proportionality
are generally applied—as noted in subchapters II.5.5. and III.2.2.2.
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Dworkin, in Hard Cases, drew a distinction between absolute and less then absolute
rights, as well as between abstract and concrete rights. These distinctions show that his
trumps theory may not be so strong as it sounds and he admits balancing, although he would
probably only admit as rival considerations compelling circumstances that do not depart
from his egalitarian framework.755 Nevertheless, there is a difference when one says that
there are no absolute rights, and when one uses the vocabulary that rights are either absolute
or less absolute. The latter, although not so strong, cannot be simply understood as relative
and will not be outweighed for any type of social goal.756
Waluchow makes a similar statement about the issue in Canada:
“[…] section 1 specifies that the [Canadian] Charter
‘guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the subject to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ The
subsequent history of the Canadian courts in developing
section 1 attests to their belief not only that Charter rights can
be qualified by greater good. This is anything but the
suggestion that rights are trumps. It is a message that rights are
not absolute, but they are not blunt instruments with which to
demand selfish advancement of one’s own individual interests.
It is also a message of which Canadians are well aware.”757
Finally, in The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?, of 2003,
Dworkin once again stated the foreign constitutionalism phenomenon and the enlargement
of the judicial role in many countries:
“In the decades after World War II, more and more of these
democracies gave judges new and – except in the United States
– unprecedented powers to review the acts of administrative
agencies and officials under broad doctrines of reasonableness,
natural justice and proportionality, and then even more
surprising powers to review the enactments of legislatures to
determine whether the legislatures had violated the rights of
individual citizens laid down in international treaties and
domestic constitutions. The impact of moral pronouncement
on judicial argument thus became much more evident and
pronounced. In recent years international courts, like the
European Court of Human Rights, have become progressively
more important, and the role and powers of judges have
therefore acquired yet a further dimension.”758
Dworkin noted that the new role was different from the traditional one in three ways.
He asserted that judges had to confront moral issues in a more pervasive fashion in general
administrative regulation and in a much more pervasive in constitutional and international
subjects. He then acknowledged the need judges have to make choices and balance interests:
755

See Dworkin, supra note 296, at 653.
Dworkin, supra note 428, at 571.
757
WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 177.
758
Ronald Dworkin, The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?, 1 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 4,
5 (2003).
756

134

“The role of moral judgments is pervasive and undeniable in
administrative regulation […] because the standards of that
task are themselves set out in moral language—the language
of convenience and necessity, or reasonableness, or
proportionality, for example—and because it requires judges
to choose among contested conceptions of economic and
administrative efficiency, and to fix an interaction and balance
between efficiency and other moral values.”759
Taking into account these new institutional choices and the moral language employed
to translate them into the new constitutions, Dworkin then starts talking about choices—
instead of one right answer—and balancing—instead of trumping. Also, Dworkin mentions
the need that these choices be made taking into account typical arguments of policy—
economic and administrative efficiency.
Dworkin calls this new role of the Judiciary in foreign countries government by
adjudication. He says that this enterprise shall to be carried based on principled decisions,
but he seems to understand how hard it is to create a theory that could describe this more
complex interpretative task—such as his law as integrity for first generation rights—and
acknowledges that the judge’s personal convictions will matter much more in these policy
cases:
“Government by adjudication is newly appealing for a
different reason as well: it seems better suited than the
alternatives to the cultural and ethical pluralism that is so
marked in modern political communities and associations.
Adjudication is constructivist rather than oracular: though
judges rely, as I have been insisting, on their own personal
moral convictions, they accept an institutional responsibility
for integrity with what other judges have done and will do,
which means that the body of principle they together construct,
by way of constitutional interpretation, is more likely to be
abstract and less tied to any particular cultural tradition. The
political rather than ethical character of these principles
contributes markedly to that result.”760
Dworkin’s approach regarding government by adjudication, which differs from his
arguments used to describe the appropriate role of judges in American Law, is centered on
specific social facts—the use of moral language in the constitutions and the prevalent official
behavior that award powers to judges to apply these standards. There is no doubt that
institutional history has always been very important to his rights theory, 761 but his view that
judges should play an active role in reviewing the acts of administrative agencies and
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officials under broad doctrines of reasonableness, natural justice and proportionality—
matters more linked to arguments of policy—and through them build the body of principles
in this government by adjudication enterprise, sounds different from what he argued in prior
works. Since the matters are more complex, Dworkin even asserts that “judges shall rely
[…] on their own personal moral convictions.”762
In making these remarks, it is unquestionable that Dworkin comes closer to describe
the current active role of judges in these societies in transition in a very similar way as
chapter II describes the role of Brazilian judges in interpreting the 1988 C.F.. And Dworkin’s
remarks start to sound like Hart’s remarks on interpretation. This quotation of The Concept
of Law demonstrates my point. Hart, as Dworkin, also mentions choice, balancing and
principled reasoning:
“Neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges
confined to the alternatives of blind, arbitrary choice, or
‘mechanical’ deduction from rules with predetermined
meaning. Very often their choice is guided by an assumption
that the purpose of the rules which they are interpreting is a
reasonable one, so that the rules which are not intended to
work injustice or offend settled moral principles. Judicial
decision, especially on matters of high constitutional import,
often involves a choice between moral values, and not merely
the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for
it is folly to believe that where the meaning of the law is in
doubt, morality always has a clear answer to offer. At this point
judges may again make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor
mechanical; and here often display characteristic judicial
virtues, the special appropriateness of which to legal decision
explains why some feel reluctant to call such judicial activity
‘legislative’. These virtues are: impartiality and neutrality in
surveying the alternatives: consideration for the interest of all
who will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision. No doubt
because a plurality of such principles is always possible it
cannot be demonstrated that a decision is uniquely correct: but
it may be made acceptable as a reasoned product of informed
partial choice. In all this we have the ‘weighing’ and
‘balancing’ characteristic of the effort to do justice between
competing interests.”763
III.5.4. Dworkin’s Principles and the Brazilian View
This final session will examine if Dworkin’s view of principles matches the views of
Brazilian judges and scholars regarding the same issue.
In subchapters II.5.1, II.5.2. and II.5.3, I stated that Brazilian judges usually adopt
Dworkin’s logical distinction among rules and principles, that Brazilian legal texts have
posited standards and called them principles and that, beside these written principles, judges
also refer to implied principles and to general principles of law.
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According to article 1 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, the law enters
into force after 45 days of its publication in the official gazette. This mark is important to
establish the compliance of the requirements of article 5, II, C.F., which sets forth that “no
one shall be obliged to do or refrain from doing except by virtue of [enacted] law”764, and
also article 5, XXXIX, of the C.F., which sets forth that “there are no crimes unless defined
in prior law, nor are there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”765 Therefore,
regarding the requirements of legality and especially of criminal legality, the publication of
an abstract norm satisfies the constitutional moral requirement of nullum crimen sine lege
(“no crime without law”).
Since principles are also included in the body of the C.F. and of statutes, once these
texts are published, the principles already exist in the legal system, are presumptively valid
and, after the 45-day vacatio legis, may produce effects.
When in The Model of Rules I, Dworkin mentions that principles cannot have
pedigree, it is because he considers that “we could not devise any formula for testing how
much and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a principle a legal principle,
still less to fix its weight at a particular order of magnitude.”766 So, the legal norms that are
called principles in Brazil would not be called principles for Dworkin.
Dworkin admits that “a rule and a principle can play much the same role [sometimes],
and the difference between them is almost a matter of form alone.”767 He mentions that the
use of words like “reasonable,” “negligent,” “unjust,” and “significant” often make rules
perform the function of principles and says that “[e]ach of these terms makes the application
of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon principles or policies lying beyond
the rule, and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle.”768 Nevertheless, these
standards will not be principles in his opinion, but the norms that contain them would be
rules.
So, are these views irreconcilable?
To answer this question is necessary to stress that, in Hard Cases, Dworkin says that
an adequate theory will make use of “a distinction between abstract and concrete rights and,
therefore, abstract and concrete principles.”769 He states that an “abstract right is a general
political aim the statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighed
or compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims,”770 and claims that
the grand rights of political rhetoric are in this way abstract.”771 As examples, Dworkin cites
the right of free speech, dignity and equality.772
Concrete rights, and, therefore, principles, “are political aims that are more precisely
defined so as to express more definitely the weight they have against other political aims on
particular occasions.”773 He gives the following example:
“Suppose I say, not simply that citizens have a right to free
speech, but that a newspaper has a right to publish defense
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plans classified as secret provided this publication will not
create an immediate physical danger to troops. My principle
declares for a particular resolution of the conflict it
acknowledges between the abstract right of free speech, on the
one hand, and competing rights of soldiers to security or the
urgent needs of defense on the other. Abstract rights in this
way provide arguments for concrete rights, but the claim of a
concrete right is more definitive than any claim of abstract
right that support it.”774
These abstract principles and rules would probably be the “rules and standards” of
the “preinterpretative” stage of Dworkin’s process of constructive interpretation, mentioned
in Law’s Empire.775
Dworkin’s distinction among abstract and concrete rights and principles in Hard
Cases helps us to understand what he means in The Model of Rules I when he says that
principles cannot have pedigree. He has in mind concrete principles and concrete rules. To
be concrete, it means that these principles have survived the adjudication process and are
taken to be the best solution to comply with the community’s political morality. 776 The all or
nothing fashion of the rule follows the same line of thinking. After all political morality is
evaluated in the interpretative stage, the concrete solution proposed by the abstract rule
provides the best outcome for the case.
His Riggs v. Palmer777 example shows this very well. The New York court famous
case, decided in 1889, concerned whether an heir named in his grandfather’s will could
inherit his part after killing his ascendant. Although the NY law did not have any provision
that denied grandson to inherit in this situation, the court ruled against him by applying the
principle that no one can benefit from his own wrong.778
Dworkin says that the rule that “one who murders is not eligible to take under the will
of his victim […] [did not] exist before this case was decided.”779 Nevertheless, the court
cited the principle above to create this rule. This principle was a part of the law for him, so
judges did not have to reach outside the legal system to find a solution. Dworkin says that
“[i]n Riggs, the court cited the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a
background standard against which to read the statute of will and in this way justified a new
interpretation of the statute.”780
But the pedigreed principles that are included in Brazilian legal texts are obviously
abstract rules, not concrete ones. In fact, the concrete rule of the case, as the current
vocabulary of principles in Brazil suggests, will only exist once the principle is
concretized. 781 Concretization, as the word signalizes, makes specifically what Dworkin
says: turns a pedigreed abstract principle into a pedigreed concrete principle.
Therefore, if Dworkin admits that abstract principles may exist and they turn into
concrete principles during adjudication, when they are interpreted, his denial of the
possibility that principles enacted in the legislation be considered principles does not make
sense. Abstract rights and principles also do not hold in their faces when they will be applied
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or how. The principles inserted in legal texts operate exactly in the same way. They will be
applied based on the criteria judges apply—in the Brazilian case, the most pervasive method
is balancing.
This is an additional evidence that it is possible to make a distinction among law
identification and adjudication. Abstract principles may be identified, but their concretization
will be left to adjudication.
Alexy’s qualification of principles as optimization requirements, in this sense, makes
more sense to describe the practice of principle application in Brazil. Generally, in Brazilian
cases, judges will resort to written principles as initial grounds for adjudication, as prima
facie norms, as Alexy states, or as non-conclusive norms, as Hart asserts. After balancing
them with other principles and norms, they will solve the case. Brazilian judges and lawyers
do not consider that only with the case solution in hand they may identify whether they have
a principle or a rule. When they talk about principles and rules, they will mostly be talking
about abstract principles or abstract rules in Dworkin’s vocabulary.
The following quote, from Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, makes clear that when
Brazilian judges and scholars refer to the normative structure of principles and rules, they are
referring to abstract rules and principles, which will involve judicial interpretation or
concretization for the application in specific cases. Barroso notes that they give instructions,
point out directions, provides details of the covered conduct:
“In relation to their normative structure, a rule specifies the
acts to be performed for its adequate compliance. Although the
interpreter activity cannot be qualified as mechanical—
because he shall give the human touch that links the text to real
life—the application of a rule does not normally demand a
more sophisticated rational process. If the abstract fact occurs,
the established effect shall be produced. Principles, on the
other hand, point to aims, ideal states to be reached. As the
norm does not get into detail the conduct to be followed for its
compliance, the activity of the interpreter will be more
complex, because he will have to decide which action to take.”
782

Dworkin’s conception of the moment when one identifies if he is reasoning with a
concrete principle—at the end of the argumentative chain—in fact, seems to be similar to
when Brazilian official applies the closure rule, which states that “when the [written] law has
a gap, the judge will decide the case by means of analogy, customs and the general principles
of law.”783 The general principle of the law is also employed to close the argumentative
chain.
A divorce lawsuit decided by the State of Rio Grande do Sul Court of Appeals in
2003 illustrates this assertion. The fact pattern is very similar to Riggs v. Palmer: a man killed
his father-in-law and the debate was whether he should lose his share of the couple’s assets—
a consequence not set forth under the law in force—because the father-in-law estate had been
inherited by the daughter-wife and, under their marital regime—which universally
communicated all assets—those assets should be divided.
In a majority opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the wife and denied the
husband’s part of the share. In the reasoning, the court invoked the rational legislator and
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extracted from the posited rules a coherent principle, identifying the purpose of the norm
[which is to provide a deterrence effect for assassinations in order to get inheritance rights].
Since this specific situation was not directly covered by the Civil Code then in force,
the Court asserted the existence of an axiological gap and, by applying the closure rule,
decided the case grounded on the principle that ‘no one can benefit from his own wrong’,
acknowledging both that it is a general principle of the law and an implied principle. The
implied principles, as Nino and Raz asserted in the quotes cited in subchapter II.5.3.2., are
sometimes proposed to summarily describe the content of norms of the system. Their field
of reference, nevertheless, can reach “longer than the whole body of substituted rules and
allowing new principles not included in the original system derive and fulfilling system
gaps.” 784
The concurring opinion of Judge Maria Berenice Dias ratified these conclusions. She
first acknowledged the lack of statutory provision:
“I agree with the judge rapporteur that the 1916 Civil Code did
not state, among the hypothesis set forth in art. 1.595, the
situation now handled, because it only excluded heirs from
inheriting [in case they murder the testator or the intestate
decedent, and the son-in-law murderer is not an heir of the
decedent under the law].” 785
She then affirmed the need to apply the principle that orients art. 1.595 of the Civil
Code. She also invoked the rational legislator dogma:
“However, I cannot see how someone may not apply the
principle that oriented the issuance of this high moral legal rule
[art. 1.595 of the 1916 Civil Code] to this case. When the
legislator demonstrated his repulse in contemplating any
inheritance right to someone that attempts against the life of
the decedent, unequivocally, he rejected the possibility that,
who behaves in this way, be benefited with his wrongful act.
There was a clear omission of the legislator in not
contemplating this act, performed by another, but that directly
or indirectly may benefit from the decedent’s patrimonial
assets, should bore the same legal penalty. […] The legislator
intended to punish the performer of the criminal act removing
the assets that he would have been entitled to.”786
After, she made reference to the closure rule to justify deciding the case using
analogy:
“We cannot forget that the legal order is not complete and an
evidence of this is that art. 4 of the Introductory Act to the
Brazilian Norms and art. 126 of the Civil Procedure Code [of
1973] determine that the Judiciary shall decide all lawsuits. In
case of omission, evidently, the solution is not to deny the
784
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plaintiff’s request because the law gives the path: analogy,
customary law or general principles of law.
The law does not allow that the person who killed the decedent
inherit, excluding him from the succession. So, the fact that the
appellant is not an heir, but the heir’s husband, and the fact that
this is a divorce lawsuit, not an inheritance lawsuit, does not
authorize the departure from the legislator’s orientation and
does not permit the killer to receive the decedent’s assets that
became part of the matrimonial assets after his death.
This legislator gap does not exist in the new Civil Code, which,
in article 1.814, expands the hypothesis of inheritance
exclusion, when it says that heirs convicted by murder or
attempted murder against the decedent, the decedent’s spouse
or the decedent’s parents or siblings, cannot inherit.
Although we cannot apply the new Code to the present case,
the fact that it contains such provision shows the acceptance of
this orientation that was argued by scholars. […]”787
So, in this case, using Benjamin Zipursky’s terminology, the penumbra-extending
which is a secondary rule, permits the Brazilian judge to employ moral argumentation
and to still reason inside the legal system, although, in fact, this rule did not provide the
outcome, but merely oriented the judge to decide—since the system obligates him to make a
decision—and the type of arguments he shall resort to—analogy, customary law, general
principles of law.
Brazil could have opted for a Kelsenian rule of closure, which says that the system
always has an answer—in this case the forfeiting of the assets would not have been permitted.
But Brazilian law chose a different closure rule, one that still closes the system but allows
for moral judgments. Judges that resort to it consider that they are still applying the law or at
least they are applying moral reasons because authorized by the law. This is the heart of
inclusive legal positivism.
Although Kelsen disagrees with legal systems that set a rule of closure such as the
Brazilian—because he says that the law exists but the judges do not like the desired result—
he correctly mentions that the rule of the case in civil law systems, in general, will only be
valid for that specific case:
rule,788

“This rule [the Swiss closure rule 789 ] presupposes the
possibility that Swiss law is inapplicable and is actually not
possible, since a legal order is always applicable and actually
applied even when the court must dismiss the action on the
grounds that the legal order does not contain a general rule
imposing upon the defendant the obligation asserted by the
plaintiff, so therefore the supposition, on which the cited rule
is based, is a fiction. The fiction consist is this: a lack, based
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on a subjective, moral-political value judgment, of a certain
legal norm within a legal order is presented as the impossibility
of its application.
The legislator may be induced to use this fiction through the
consideration that the application of a statute created by him
may lead to an unsatisfactory result under certain unforeseen
and unforeseeable circumstances; and that is desirable
therefore to authorize the court, not to apply in such cases the
statute that predetermines the content of its judgment, but to
create an individual norm, whose content is not determined by
a statute but adapted to the circumstances not foreseen by the
legislator. If he were to formulate this authorization in a
theoretically correct fashion, that is, without fiction, he would
save to say: ‘If the application of the valid legal order is
unsatisfactory according to the moral-political opinion of the
court in the present case then the court may decide the case
according to its own discretion.’”790
Finally, it is relevant pointing out that in Britain, a case with a similar fact pattern
present in Riggs was decided very similarly, by extracting the principle behind the rule and
applying it to an uncovered case. Britain had a rule that prevents a sane murderer from
benefiting under the will of his victim. The debate was whether this forfeiture rule also
applies to a case in which the victim died intestate and the murderer, under the law, would
inherit. The principle “[a] person cannot bring an action based on his own wrong” was
applied.791
III.5.5. Chapter Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to show why the inclusive legal positivism is the best
Anglo-American jurisprudential theory to capture the current Brazilian legal practices.
Brazilian judges consider that the laws of the country are a product of institutions.
Laws usually have pedigrees, are generally a product of social facts. The 1988 C.F. is the
most important one, because it defines the criteria of what is law and what is not law. Evil
laws, although incompatible with the current legal order inaugurated in 1988, were seen as
legal in the past and are still seen, today, as valid laws in that time, although they would not
be valid in the current legal order.
Since the legislator enacted a constitution with many provision that resort to moral
principles, Brazilian judges feel authorized to employ moral reasoning when adjudicating
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cases. But there is not an official practice that moral reasoning should always be employed.
On the contrary, social policy goals, economic, even political arguments may be used in
adjudication because the C.F. also have provisions that determine these interests to be taking
into account.
In this sense, Brazilian judges are not bound to a legalist view as some of the
country’s judges could have been before the current C.F.. They consider that their
interpretation can be more creative. They currently decide more controversial questions than
their forerunners. Even before the 1988 C.F., the law already authorized, although more
narrowly, moral reasoning in adjudication. This was essentially done through the closure
rule, but also through social practices such as the rational legislator.
Nevertheless, in solving these moral cases, judges still do not think they are writing
a new chapter of a novel. They consider to be merely applying the posited law. The fact that
their decisions are authoritative, although sometimes the abstract rules and principles which
they invoke are not so clear does not mean that they consider that law does not exist. On the
contrary, the law exists from the moment that it enters into force, and this moment is fixed
by statute. Judges, to define the content of existing law in individual cases, employ
interpretative methods, cannons and balancing techniques, to harmonize conflicting values
and provisions. They do so not because they think this is the best possible answer, but
because official practice tells them that this is the legal way to reason.
Taking that into account, neither exclusive legal positivism, modern natural law
theory or interpretivism correctly explain the Brazilian legal system. Inclusive legal
positivism is more precise, because Brazilians view their legal system as a product of social
facts and they claim to identify the legal materials through this institutional moments, even
though they are aware that these social facts will often only provide the path to solving
controversial cases, not the solution of these cases.
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IV. BRAZILIAN POST-POSITIVISM
IV.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals
As noted in chapter I, legal positivism was, for decades, the most prominent school
of jurisprudence in Brazil.792 In the last 20 years, however, some jurisprudential scholars
have argued that positivism has been defeated and now post-positivism is the prevalent
school in the country.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain post-positivism as it is understood by
Brazilian scholars and to illustrate why I consider it to be inadequate to the task of explaining
and describing Brazilian law.
IV.2. Post-Positivism Roots
First of all, there is an irony in the use of post-positivism as a way of capturing what
is special about Brazilian law, since it did not arise first in law and it is not a product of
Brazilian legal scholars.793 Post-positivism is essentially a method of social scientific inquiry
that rejects empiricism. The post-positivistic message is to deny that all the knowledge
comes from empirical facts.
The first author to use the expression in law was the German Scholar Friedrich Muller
in 1971. Muller developed the structuring legal theory and argued that this “theory
developed a new post-positivistic concept of legal theory according to which the legal norms
[…] have not already been written into legislation.” 794 He claimed that:
“Enactments are but norm-texts […], that is, formulations that
precede legal norms; and they differ significantly from the
eventual, “actual” legal norms generated, constructed, or
completed for each successive concrete case in order to arrive
at judgment.
Furthermore, the normative domain […] belongs to the legal
norm in a constitutive sense. The legal norm is, in other words,
a complex phenomenon of a norm-programme […] as well as
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a normative domain […]. ‘Concretization’ no longer means
that a general legal norm, found in a statute book, is made
‘more concrete’. Realistically seen and reflected on,
concretization is a step-by-step construction of legal norms,
for each individual case, through which working elements
within the text become even ‘more concrete.’”795
Muller argued that he overcame positivism because he distinguished text and norm.
According to Georges Abboud and Rafael Tomaz de Oliveira, a theory must make this
differentiation to develop under the post-positivistic paradigm. 796 Although Muller’s
doctrine opens the path to the post-positivism debate, it does not describe the sense in which
post-positivism is employed in Brazil and it does not reflect the current understanding of
Brazilian legality.
Thomas Vesting also gives insights about Muller’s theory:
“[The structuring theory of law] attacks the idea of lex ante
casum, the supposition that the norm exists before it is
confronted with the case. [Muller] criticizes legal positivism
because it is little involved with objective structures and
because it excludes ‘objective implications of legal norms and
its own regulatory fields’ of the interpretation process. Both
are unacceptable for the structuring theory of law. For this
theory, the ground for legal meanings is in the practical use of
rules, not in being a rule (ought to be) dissociated of reality
(is). The practical work of jurists—some reference to the work
of courts is made—‘creates in a non-soluble manner in
regulatory determination’. The structuring theory of law aims
to clarify this element of determination of law interpretation
through a model of “normativity determined by the factual
ambit’, in which the norms are drawn as ‘an orderer model
oriented by the factual ambit.”797
Muller’s theory, by separating norm and text, essentially rejects syllogism, which he
associates with positivism. He also criticizes Alexy’s theory—explained in subchapter II.5.5.
when referring to the prevailing approach regarding principles and rules in Brazil—because
the latter does not draw a clear distinction between text and norm and considers abstracts
principles and rules to be norms.798 Therefore, now I turn to examine what are the main
claims that Brazilian scholars appeal to justify post-positivism.799
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IV.3. The Brazilian Post-Positivistic Claims
The expression legal positivism “is used in many senses referring to clearly
distinguishable and sometimes mutually incompatible theses.”800 One of them is that “the
law consists only of standards explicitly enacted by centralized organs (i.e. statutes).”801
Nino adds that two other conflicting senses may also be used to explain legal positivism: (a)
“legal systems are self-sufficient in providing solutions for any possible case; the law has no
gaps, contradictions, linguistic vagueness or ambiguities, etc.”;802 and (b) “the legal system
may not contain a determinate solution for some cases.” 803 These versions are linked to
Kelsen’s pure law theory, which is also considered a positivistic theory.
In addition, Nino says that positivism may be associated with the idea that “a legal
system in force in a certain society can be identified only by taking into account empirical
facts, just as the judicial recognition of its standards, disregarding any consideration about
moral value or justice.”804 I consider this final view may be related to Hart’s definition.
Brazilian post-positivists that attack positivism commonly use arguments to knock
down these senses of positivism.
Indeed, these are the main characteristics that Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, Brazil’s
most important post-positivist exponent, points out when referring to positivism: “(a) an
almost fully approximation between the law and the norm; (b) an affirmation of the
institutional character of the law: the law is undivided and emanates from the state; (c) the
legal order completeness, which has sufficient concepts and adequate instruments for solving
any case, without gaps; and (d) formalism: the validity of a norm depends on following the
necessary procedure for its creation, despite its content;”805 and (e) the adjudication is made
by subsumption.806
Barroso notes that these statements about the law disclose the positivist idea of law’s
scientificity. “The legal system was considered to be a perfect system and, as any dogma, it
did not need any further justification despite its own existence.”807 The author’s view of why
positivism was defeated is centered on the fact that the positivistic ideal of objectivity and
neutrality was impossible to be accomplished. Law could not describe the reality. Law must
have the aim to act over the reality, shaping it and transforming it. Therefore, law is not
given, it must be created.808
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Moreover, Barroso argues that positivism gave the philosophical background for
strengthening totalitarian movements such as Nazism and Fascism in Europe.809 Therefore,
after World War II, the idea of a legal order indifferent to ethical values was no longer
tolerated. Post-positivism emerged after the downfall of these regimes and pathed the way
for important legal debates regarding the social functions and the interpretation of the law.
Barroso observes that “post-positivism is a diffuse ideal, in which the relationship
among values, principles and rules is included and defined. These are new facets of the new
hermeneutics and of the new theory of fundamental rights.”810 Post-positivism, in this sense,
does not want to totally strike down positivism, but to improve it. This improvement is made
through the approximation of ethics and law—something that was argued by the classical
natural law. This new proximity is handled through the insertion of principles, especially
human dignity, reasonableness, solidarity and judicial review, in the law. 811
In an article published in the U.S., Barroso summarized this view:
“The philosophical milieu in which the new constitutional law
blossomed can be referred to as post-positivism. The debate
surrounding its characterization lies in the convergence of two
major currents of thought offering opposite views of law:
natural law and positivism—opposite, but sometimes uniquely
complementary. Society's competing demands for legal
certainty and objectivity (on the one hand), and for legitimacy
and justice (on the other) have expanded beyond the confines
of the ‘pure’ and ‘encompassing models.’ Instead, these
demands now give rise to a broad and diffused set of ideas that
are still in their systematization phase.
In a way, post-positivism is a third path between positivism
and the natural law tradition. Post-positivist thinking does not
ignore the importance of the law's demands for clarity,
certainty, and objectivity, but neither does it conceive of the
law as being unconnected to a moral and political philosophy.
Post-positivism grapples with the positivist postulate of
separation between law, morality, and politics. It does not deny
the unique nature of each of these fields, but it does
acknowledge the practical impossibility of treating them as
distinct 'spaces' that do not affect one another. If the
complementary articulation between them is undeniable, the
theory of separation—which is at the core of positivism and
has dominated legal thought for many decades—pays tribute
to hypocrisy.812
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IV.4. Brazilian Post-Positivism Virtues
Brazilian Post-Positivists have certainly raised important criticism against features
that were prevalent in Brazilian positivism and that seemed incompatible with the judicial
practice after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.: (a) the dominance of legalistic decisions; (b)
the fact that subsumption could not explain all types of reasoning in adjudication, and (c)
their criticism on the legal system dogmatics’ attributes, such as unity, completeness,
coherency and consistency; and (d) the fact that morality and law may overlap.
In this sense, by arguing that Brazilian positivism was defeated because of these
attributes, post-positivists did an important job.
Nevertheless, in subchapter III.2, I drew attention to the fact that these characteristics
cannot be associated with Hart’s view of positivism, which I here subscribe. I indicated that
Hart’s positivism targeted Blackstone’s formalistic view of law. He considers mechanical
reasoning an ‘error’, calls mechanistic judges ‘automatic’ or a ‘slot machine’ and says that
it would be better to ‘toss a penny in applying a rule of law.’813 Therefore, in relation to this
specific point, there is no controversy among Hart’s version of positivism, which I take to
be accurate for the Brazilian system, and the post-positivism view.
The same conclusion goes to post-positivism’s criticism of subsumption. Hart, in
criticizing formalism, accused it of failing to recognize penumbral cases, in which linguistic
conventions do not control the outcome. He also censored the formalist judge for deciding
based on logic, and for not confessing that he is not dealing with the standard case and is in
an area of penumbra. 814 In this penumbral zone, the general terms of the rule are susceptible
of different interpretation and the decision is most likely to be determined by the judge’s
discretionary choice. The result is uncontrolled by linguistic conventions. 815
Hart’s criticism on excessive logic reveals a lot of his unromantic view of law and
his unwillingness to accept illusory descriptions of what effectively takes place. He considers
Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin and Karl Llewelyn [and probably Hans Kelsen] noble
dreamers. 816 Therefore, framing dogmatics’ attributes, such as unity, completeness,
coherency and consistency, in my reading of Hart, is not compatible with his “veracity” view
of law,817 a term referred by Zipursky that precisely captures his ideas.
Finally, the view that morality and law must necessarily be kept apart is also
contradictory to Hart’s soft-positivism. Hart clearly took the position that “in some systems
of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly
incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, and these may
form the content of legal constitutional restraints.”818 Therefore, absolute separation of law
and morals was not among one of Hart’s soft-positivistic claims.
IV.5. Brazilian Post-Positivism Defects
Hart’s goal in the book The Concept of Law was to provide an accurate depiction of
what law is. His theory was intended to be both general, in the sense that it was not tied to
813
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any particular legal system, and descriptive, which sought to give an explanatory account of
what being governed by law means.819 Hart stressed that he had the intention of providing a
descriptive account that was morally neutral and had no justificatory aims: “it does not seek
to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in
[his] general account of law.”820
In comparing his enterprise with Dworkin’s, Hart stated that legal theory conceived
in this manner was very different from Dworkin’s conception of legal theory. He said that
Dworkin’s interpretive theory was partly “evaluative, since it consists in the identification of
the principles which both best ‘fit’ and cohere with the settled law and legal practices of a
legal system and also provide the best moral justification for them, thus showing the law ‘in
its best light.’”821
In this thesis, I have tried so far to provide Brazilian law through the descriptive eyes.
I intended to address what is law in Brazil, what is the role of rules and principles in Brazilian
law and whether there is a predominant criterion judges employ when adjudicating cases in
Brazil.
Although the enactment of the 1988 C.F. changed the relevance of the legal materials
that judges enforce and the general understating of what the text means has put the
Constitution at the center of the system, establishing that the moral concepts it brings serve
as causes of actions—therefore, approximating ethics to law, as the post-positivists argue—
not much has really changed in terms of the descriptive account in Brazilian law.
Despite advocating for an approximation of law and morals, post-positivism still does
not deny the institutional view of the Brazilian legal system. For the proponents of this legal
thought, law is essentially a product of the legislatures. They will not diverge that criminal
legality is achieved, for example, once Congress enacts a statute establishing that a conduct
constitutes a crime. The moral principles they employ in judicial review and in enforcing
individual and social rights are the principles set forth in the C.F., a legal text. Some of them
are implied principles, but the recognition of these principles is commonly justified in
provisions of the C.F., as being a result of the concretization of the text. The reason they
justify these principles is a social fact: the existence of written laws.
Also, in spite of the fact that post-positivism argues for a connection of law and moral
philosophy, it is not certain whether this connection is always necessary to have law or if it
is contingent to the areas they consider it most sensible, such as fundamental rights, areas in
which they unequivocally think morality plays a role.
Post-positivists will not deny that Brazilian had legal systems during the Imperial
Period, in which the 1824 Constitution was in force, or even during the last military
dictatorship, in which the 1967 Constitution was in force. They will not say that there was
not law under these regimes. They will only argue that some of the laws in force in those
periods were bad law and that some of them are incompatible to the current legal [some of
which are moral] standards posited in the 1988 C.F. and that the country’s modern views of
human dignity, democracy and liberty would not conceive returning to these moments.
As I stated in subchapter II.2.2.3.1., it is common to draw a line between what
Brazilians called a state of law (estado de direito) and a democratic state of law (estado
democrático de direito). The first concept is commonly associated to the 1964-1985
dictatorship period, while the second concept is used to describe the current constitutional
regime, installed after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. Both, nevertheless, are legal systems.
Some of the laws of the former, such as the amnesty law, are still valid under the conditions
of legal validity determined by the latter.
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The fact that post-positivism is linked to democratic values in Brazil will not also
mean that their proponents will negate the status of system of law to the Chinese system,
even if China is not currently authoritarian. The same will be said of Cuba, Venezuela or
Russia, for example.
Not all judicial decisions that post-positivists would take as valid will provide moral
outcomes. In fact, there are many decisions that can be called formalists or mechanical—
exactly one of the movement’s main target—, but they still would consider acceptable by
them. Post-positivism does not deny that rules are generally applicable by subsumption. In
subchapter III.2.2.3.2., I mentioned, for example, that if a negligent judge denies a claim
related to a legal issue that is unequivocally covered by a statute, and the losing party lawyer
files her appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case. The fact
that the sentence adopted an unconstitutional, illegal, unfair or immoral reasoning, will not
matter. They will apply the literal rule of the Civil Procedure Code that states that appeals
should be filed within 15 days of the sentence’s publication in the official court report.
Indeed, since post-positivism acknowledges society’s demands for legal certainty and
objectivity, as well as legitimacy and justice, as Barroso asserts, at some point, to meet with
the needs of legal certainty, the post-positivism may have to compromise the value of justice,
at least in some individual cases. This is exactly the case of the late filed appeal of the
example above.
Post-positivists would also agree with utilitarian decisions that seek to give higher
weight to collective interests in comparison to individual ones, if they consider that the
individual interests were not disproportionally compromised. If this decision emerged from
reasoning that balanced conflicting rules, principles and social goals, in which all of them
were weighed, it would still be a correct one.
Barroso precisely points out that post-positivism in Brazil is still in their
systematization phase. To be provide an accurate description of what they think law is, postpositivism will still have to provide answers to many questions.
IV.5.1. The Merger of Law Identification and Adjudication
Brazilian post-positivists criticized positivism because it argued for “an almost fully
approximation between the law and the norm [the text].” 822 Muller also reproved this
closeness and drew the distinction among norm-texts and the actual norm. This point is
described in the following excerpt from a S.T.F. opinion, written by former Justice Eros
Grau:
“The current legal thought distinguishes normative text and
legal norm, textual dimension and juridical phenomenon
normative dimension. The interpreter creates the norm as of
the texts and of the reality.”823
Grau closes his argument affirming that:
“If this is right—and it is—, all texts are obscure until its
interpretation, that is, until its transformation into norm. That
is why I stated, in other context, that it is necessary ‘that we
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observe that the clarity of a law is not a premise, but the result
of an interpretation […]’.”824
The S.T.F. Justice Gilmar Mendes, in the same line, asserts:
“The fact is that, sometimes, due to the evolution of a factual
situation to which the norm applies, and also due to a new legal
view that starts to be dominant in society, the Constitution
changes without the modification of its words. The text is the
same, but the sense that is attributed to it is different. Since the
norm and the text are not the same, one may note the
modification of the norm, but the text did not change.”825
These writings expose the post-positivistic problems emphasized all along. Without
acknowledging judicial lawmaking and trying to avoid literal/legalistic decisions, postpositivists started to justify their creative judgments in properties of language, asserting that
the results they reach are inevitable because of interpretative necessity. Therefore, the results
are justified, even though they diverge from the enacted texts, because legal texts and legal
norms are not the same thing.
Hart, on the other hand, states that enacted norms “may exist as legal rules from the
moment of their enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.”826 Also, he
argues that “where the texture is open, individuals can only predict how courts will decide
and adjust their behavior accordingly.”827 In this sense, it is clear that Hart differentiates the
content of rules and the content of decisions. The fact that he makes this separation, however,
does not undermine his hermeneutical approach regarding the content of the rules, as opposed
to a semantical one—see subchapter III.2.1.3..
This is a sensitive part of this work because it draws the line among positivistic and
post-positivistic thought. In fact, this matter is also important to understand why many
Brazilian authors frame Dworkin as a post-positivistic author, since, as noted in subchapter
III.5.4., he takes the position that principles and rules can only be defined at the end of the
argumentative chain—therefore rejects the possibility of pedigreed principles.
Indeed, I consider that this controversy exists due to the post-positivistic merger of
law identification and law adjudication. As Wil Waluchow notes, “the question ‘What is the
present law on this matter?’ is logically distinct from questions concerning how citizens and
judges should both morally and, in the case of judges, legally, respond with respect to the
law.”828 Waluchow draws a distinction among the law and the institutional forces of the
law.829 He adds that “Hart, Raz, Kelsen, Austin, and Aquinas all offer theories of law and
have only a secondary interest in a theory of adjudication, that is, a theory about how judges
do or should decide legal cases. Dworkin has it the other way round, i.e., he is primarily
interested in a theory of adjudication from which he attempts to derive a theory of law.”830
The first clear problem that post-positivists face in trying to distinguish the text from
the law is regarding criminal legality. The prevalent understanding both in Brazil and
elsewhere is that the requirement of legality is met at the moment the statute is enacted. Once
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the statute is published and the vacatio legis period, the norm setting forth a crime is already
in force. Taking Justice Eros Grau’s writings and Muller’s theory into consideration, the
norm only exists once the text is applied. When then citizens have notice of the forbidden
conducts? Marcelo Neves points out the problems of this theory for not being able to answer
this question:
“A way would be to simply affirm that the constitutional
principles are not legal norms, because they only emerge at the
end of the concretization process. In this perspective, the legal
norms would only be complete rules in the moment that they
are reasons to decide in a particular case. This thesis, […]
although attractive, does not take into consideration an
important question: if the legal norm only emerges at the end
of the concretization process, judges and interpreters in general
will not be subordinated to any legal norm in its activity of law
concretization.”831
The reason post-positivists want to distinguish text and norm is because they need to
explain why sometimes it seems that posited law is not applied by judges in some cases.
These are cases in which moral reasons may conflict with plain meaning. Therefore, by
separating the norm from the text, they are able to justify their creative decisions, while
claiming they are simply applying the law, and distinguishing their practice from the practice
of legislating. As I pointed out in chapter II, Brazilian judges in general are unwilling to
recognize that they make law.
Take the party loyalty case cited in subchapter II.2.3. as an example. The Court,
without any alteration of the constitutional text, overruled an old precedent and asserted that
members of the Chamber of Deputies may not leave the party by whom they were elected,
save for specific cases. Post-positivists would, then, claim that from the text of the
constitution—principle of democracy—in conjunction with reality, they found the norm and,
hence, the law.
However, in the same case, the Court ruled that most Chamber of Deputies’ members
that had changed party affiliation before this decision did not lose their seats because the
S.T.F. decided that the new interpretation would apply only to those who had switched
affiliation after the date the T.S.E. asserted for the first time the need for party loyalty in
disagreement with the previous S.T.F. precedent.832
How would post-positivistic judges explain this situation? They would say that,
despite the old S.T.F. ruling, switching parties was never constitutional—they would not
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acknowledge judicial lawmaking in this decision—but by applying the democratic principle
to the facts of this case and considering that there was a S.T.F. precedent, the judges would
have to take every aspect into account and, therefore, rule that party switching did not lead
those specific Chamber of Deputies’ members to losing their seats.
This portrayal of the law, nevertheless, is unrealistic. Any jurist that frankly describes
the social fact related to these rulings would assert that the S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E. decision
that party switching is now unconstitutional but chose not to apply this new ruling to
members of the Congress that had changed party affiliation before the T.S.E. decision
because they relied on an S.T.F. precedent. In this sense, they would say that the S.T.F. has
set a new rule of conduct but decided not to impose this new rule to previous facts, because
Deputies could not have known this rule in advance.
This is a typical case in which a Court inserts a rule in the system—the rule that party
unloyalty is unconstitutional—but, in adjudication, chooses not to apply it to a specific case
due to other relevant considerations.
Another unrealistic justification was the example I mentioned in subchapter II.4.2.2..
Justice Eros Grau, to allow an ill person precedence over the general public to receive her
indemnization, despite the existence of any legal support, asserted that the Court should apply
the rules that did not grant this right “by disapplying, that is, removing it from the exception.”
833 So, starting from the text, analysing the context, it was possible to reach the legal norm.
Grau’s approach is evidently a post-positivistic one. It is not legalistic in the sense it
did not deny the ill person’s claim because of lack of institutional support. Nevertheless, it is
still tied to logical and mechanical explanations of law adjudication, exactly what Hart fought
against. It is clear that the law did not control this case—Grau asserted that it did not—, but
that sometimes judges simply try to accommodate justice in individual cases, under
compelling circumstances, while adjudicating the dispute.834
Easier cases may also be cited. In subchapter III.2.2.3.2., I mentioned, for example,
that if a judge denies a claim that is unequivocally granted by a statute, and the losing party
lawyer files her appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case in
Brazil. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court, in this particular set of facts, has to rule against
the appellant does not mean that, in abstract, she does not have the legal right under law.
Benjamin Cardozo criticized this post-positivistic view of separating text and law:
“Today there is rather danger of another tough an opposite
error. From holding that the law is never made by judges, the
votaries of the Austinian analysis have been led at times to the
conclusion that it is never made by anyone else. Customs, no
matter how firmly established, are not law, they say, until
adopted by courts. Even statutes are not law because the courts
must fix their meaning. That is the view of Gray in his ‘Nature
and Sources of the Law.’ ‘The true view, as I submit’, he says,
it that the Law is what the Judges declare; that statutes,
precedents, the opinions of learned experts, customs and
morality are the sources of Law.’ So, Jethro Brown in a paper
on ‘Law and Evolution’, tell us that a statute, till construed, is
not real law. It is only ‘ostensible’ law. Real law, he says, is
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not found anywhere except in the judgment of a court. The
court may overrule them. For the same reason present
decisions are not law, except for the parties litigant. Men go
about their business from day to day, and govern their conduct
by an ignis fatuus. The rules to which they yield obedience are
in truth not law at all. Law never is, but is always about to be.
It is realized only when embodied in a judgment, and in being
realized, expires. There are no such things as rules or
principles: they are only isolated dooms.”835
Next, Cardozo asserts that “[a] definition of law which in effect denies the possibility
of law since it denies the possibility of rules of general operation, must contain within itself
the seeds of fallacy and errors. Analysis is useless if it destroys what it is intended to explain.
[…] Statutes do not cease to be law because the power to fix their meaning in case of doubt
or ambiguity has been confided to courts.”836
The fact is that, as Waluchow notes, by mixing what is law with what is decided in
cases, “we run the risk of entirely missing these features of legal norms.”837 That is why he
emphasizes the need to distinguish between a theory of law and a theory of adjudication,
what post-positivist undoubtedly wrongly blend altogether:
“The law is instrumental, on their account, in determining what
our adjudicative rights against judges are, if only because the
judicial decision to which we have an adjudicative right is
often the one which accords with existing law. But this is
clearly not always true and so the law cannot be identified with
adjudicative rights. Nor are legal rights necessarily coextensive with adjudicative rights, as we saw earlier in our
discussion of primary and secondary rights. To suppose that
the law is to be identified with our rights to particular judicial
decisions would, once again, be to confuse a theory of law with
a theory of adjudication.
Although it has not been expressed explicitly in these terms,
our positivistic theory can easily be made sensitive to the
varying institutional forces law can have in different courts.
The suggestion that the law be identified with a subset of the
norms which all courts within a legal system are bound to
apply or change does not mean that the institutional force of
law is one and the same for all judges, nor, obviously, that it is
always strictly binding. To be bound by a norm is not
necessarily to be absolutely bound. It makes perfectly good
sense to say that one might be bound by a norm from which
one sometimes is free to depart, or which one has the power to
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change under certain defined conditions and for certain special
reasons.838
The necessity of justifying the separation of text and norm also escorts postpositivists to unrealistic justifications. In the article Constitutional Concretization, Muller
mentions an example regarding the former wording of article 82 of the Brazilian
Constitution.839 The provision stated that “[t]he period of office of the [Republic] President
is four years, beginning on the first of January of the calendar year following the election.
Any re-election for the office of the [Republic] President for a subsequent period is
precluded.” 840 Muller, although stating that the provision is a clearly formulated text,
enticing one to conclude that the synoptic wording suffices, claims that “only the full set of
elements of ‘concretization’, weighed against one another in accordance with their
methodological status, can lend convincing effect to the limits of the norm-programme.”841
He adds that “this applies even to, relatively speaking, the most simple of numerically
determined norm-texts.”842 This explanation, nevertheless, seems unrealistic and artificial to
clarify a provision whose wording and general understanding is not controversial.
IV.6. Post-Positivism or Different Laws and Practices?
The quotation below, written by Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, shows that the main
concern that Brazilians had before the installation of the 1988 constitutional assembly was
the lack of effectiveness of their old constitutions in transforming reality:
“Two days before the summons of the 1988 constitutional
convention, it was possible to identify one of the chronic
factors of the failure in the realization of the State of Law
(estado de direito) in Brazil: the lack of seriousness concerning
the Constitution, the indifference to the distance between the
text and the reality, between what reality was and what it
should had been. Two emblematic examples: the Constitution
of 1824 established that “the law will be equal for everybody,”
provision that coexisted, without perplexity or embarrassment,
with the nobility privileges, the vote based on property and the
slave regime. Other: the Constitution of 1969, imposed by the
Army Force Minister, ensured a broad list of public liberties
that did not exist and promised to the workers an odd list of
social rights not enjoyable, that included ‘summer camps and
retirement homes’. It was sought, in the Constitution, not the
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way, but the detour; not the true, but the disguise. The most
serious disfunction of the Brazilian constitutionalism, in that
final moment of the military regime, was the lack of
effectiveness of constitutional norms. Indifferent to what the
Constitution prescribed, dominant classes built their own
reality of power, insubordinate to a real democratization of the
society and the State.”843
There is no doubt that post-positivists aimed to draw a line between the background
philosophy of the old constitutional regimes and of the new one. They felt that law lacked
efficacy, that the former constitutions were not truly enforced and did not promote the desired
social changes. Post-positivists thought that it was necessary to empower judges and
prosecutors, because they would make the checks and balances system more effective. Postpositivists acknowledged Brazil was a society in transformation and considered that law to
be an important and active tool for achieving the necessary social and political changes.
This empowerment was made through the insertion of principles, basic foundations
and goals in the Constitution and other legal norms and also through granting more powers
to the Judiciary to enforce these pre-commitments. Contemporary scholars qualify the 1988
C.F. as a directive-constitution, as opposed to a warranty-constitution, such as the U.S.
Constitution, which merely organizes the division of powers and stipulates individual
rights.844
But, in terms of descriptive-explanatory jurisprudence, an external observer would
simply affirm that Brazil has simply changed its primary and secondary rules—especially
the rules of adjudication which specify the powers of judges. With the modification of the
rules of adjudication, judges gained the power to be more effective in securing the
achievements of the new social goals the C.F. chose to pursue and of the moral rights it chose
to protect.
Indeed, instead of having a mere political-organizational constitution, Brazil opted to
write a document that grants wide protections of individual and social rights, including
environment, family and health rights and that sets goals for the government. Since the
country also chose to use open-texture language to regulate these areas, to keep the text alive
and updated, and adopted, as an official practice result, a secondary rule that judges have the
power to enforce it, it is not surprising that the role of the Judiciary branch in Brazilian
democracy has grown so much in the past 20 years.
Since the official practices regarding the interpretation of the law changed, judges
have a more active role. These new practices, nonetheless, are a mere new type of secondary
rules of adjudication.
In subchapter III.2.2.2., there is a quote in which Patricia Perrone noted that, although
the C.F. text was very different from the text of former constitutions, it took time for the
S.T.F. to assimilate the new role of principles. This only occurred in the mid-1990s.
According to Perrone, this new phase was distinguished for (a) the recognition that
constitutional principles had the status of enforceable norms; (b) the use of reasonableness
and proportionality principles; (c) the consolidation of the balancing technique as the leading
interpretative approach. 845 All of these characteristics are essentially new rules of
adjudication that were adopted in Brazilian law through official practice, as a product of a
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new understanding. Even political parties with Congress representation file abstract actions
before the S.T.F. to have those rights enforced on behalf of the rights’ holders, requiring the
Court to use these adjudicatory techniques. Congress rarely reacts to these decisions by
passing amendments and laws to overrule them. This demonstrates that it is likely that
Congress agrees with this new model of governmental functioning.846
In this sense, post-positivist philosophers may be right for wanting to depart from the
old positivistic outlook that prevailed in Brazil and in the continental civil law countries
during the first part of the 20th Century. Indeed, mechanical decisions were common, the
legal dogmas were dominant and the efficacy of the legal system was questioned, at least in
terms of social goals achievement.
By implementing this departure, however, post-positivism did not realize that they
target some specific concepts associated with positivism by continental scholars and judges,
not its philosophy, at least in the manner argued and explained by H.L.A. Hart.
Positivism, at least in the sense understood by Hart, contends that law is a product of
human events, social facts, and official behavior. Hart does not argue that to be a positivistic
system, the legal system should be self-sufficient in providing all solutions for any possible
cases. On the contrary, Hart is a strong proponent that law will mostly not cover all situations
and judges will probably have to make discretionary decisions, because there will be no
answer under the posited laws, maybe only a direction. In addition, Hart says that the social
fact criterion to identify what is legal and what is not legal may incorporate moral standards.
In this sense, Hart’s positivism does not claim “the practical impossibility of treating [law
and morality] as distinct spaces that do not affect one another.” 847
In fact, morality and law may overlap in a legal system, but that is a product of a
choice, of human achievement, not of some natural or inherent characteristic that a system
must have to be considered a legal one. If there is one thing that Brazil’s constitutional history
failures reveal is that fictions and dogmas in relation to inherent substantial properties of law
only contribute to mechanicism, to formalism and to judges not taking seriously relevant
questions of law.
The separation of law and morality thesis supported by Hart has an important
message: that systems of law should avoid considering that only because something is legal,
it is automatically moral. This automatic association of two distinct concepts removes clarity
and candor in law identification and in legal interpretation and blunts the need that
politicians, jurists and judges constantly evaluate the moral quality of the law, to either
conclude whether it should be respected, renewed, revised or rejected. 848 Although not
precise, Jeremy Bentham’s famous remark captures the idea of the separation thesis: “[u]nder
a government of Laws, what is the motto of a good citizen? To obey punctually; to censure
freely.”849
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IV.7. If Post-Positivism fails, can Neoconstitutionalism Survive? (The Bottom-Up
Model)
Neoconstitutionalism is global a political-juridical phenomenon that emerged after
the World War II and that oriented the drafting of the new constitutions.850 Barroso notes
that, “[a]s part of the movement toward new constitutionalism, three major transformations
have subverted conventional knowledge about the application of constitutional law in the
Roman-Germanic World.” These transformations were:
“a) recognition of the constitution's legal force and
justiciability;
b) expansion of constitutional jurisdiction, especially of
judicial review; and
c) development of new ideas and new concepts in
constitutional interpretation.”851
Neoconstitutionalism, as noted, is the most popular way of understanding the role of
the Judiciary in interpreting the C.F. in Brazil. The question I want to answer in this
subchapter is: is it possible to frame these transformations under Hart’s positivistic theory
and, if so, how? In other words, can neoconstitutionalism, as depicted in Brazil, survive under
inclusive legal positivism? My opinion is that it only cannot survive but also it can be better
explained by inclusive legal positivism, since the latter solves many of the problems that
scholars attribute to neoconstitutionalism today, such as judicial activism and usurpation of
legislative power.
I believe I have partially answered the questions above in subchapter III.2.2. and
III.5.2., but I will go into the issue in more detail now.
The recognition of the constitutional legal force and its justiciability is achieved
through the definition of primary and secondary rules in a legal system. A legal system may
opt to write a constitution creating not only individual liberties, but also imposing duties on
that the question of resistance had to be faced, and it was then essential that the issues at stake at this point
should neither be oversimplified nor obscured. Yet, this was precisely what the confusion between law and
morals had done and Bentham found that the confusion had spread symmetrically in two different directions.
On the one hand Bentham had in mind the anarchist who argues thus: ‘This ought not to be the law, therefore
it is not and I am free not merely to censure but to disregard it.’ On the other hand, he thought of the reactionary
who argues: ‘This is the law, therefore it is what it ought to be,’ and thus stifles criticism at its birth. Both errors,
Bentham thought, were to be found in Blackstone: there was his incautious statement that human laws were
invalid if contrary to the law of God, and ‘that spirit of obsequious quietism that seems constitutional in our
Author’ which ‘will scarce ever let him recognise a difference’ between what is and what ought to be. This
indeed was for Bentham the occupational disease of lawyers: ‘[I]n the eyes of lawyers - not to speak of their
dupes—that is to say, as yet, the generality of non-lawyers—the is and ought to be . . . were one and indivisible.’
There are therefore two dangers between which insistence on this distinction will help us to steer: the danger
that law and its authority may be dissolved in man's conceptions of what law ought to be and the danger that
the existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and so escape criticism.” Hart, supra note 431,
at 597-598.
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the state through a catalog of fundamental social rights, such as the obligations of treating
people equally, with dignity and providing minimal conditions for subsistence. Legal
provisions and/or the official practices may also establish that these duties are programmatic
norms that shall be implemented by the legislative through the enactment of statutes and by
the executive through the regulation of these statutes. Therefore, under this scheme, these
constitutional rights cannot be enforced directly through the judiciary branch, but only
through statutory review.852
But this is not the only possibility. A country may also choose to write this catalog of
fundamental rights into a constitution, consider that the enactment of statutes is not necessary
to make them enforceable, and confer courts the power to enforce these rights and also to
overview their compliance by the other branches. This granting of judicial power may not be
explicit but may be a matter of official behavior; officials understand that those powers were
granted by the constitution.853 Courts, in this sense, by reading the constitutional abstract
rights can recognize causes of action in a case-by-case fashion, in abstract or concrete review.
This, of course, will be done concomitantly with legislative and executive action. A dialogue
among branches is established.854 The question of who has the final decision on the issue
may depend on whether the constitution entrenches some constitutional norms as
immutable.855 But it is likely that these entrenched clauses will be limited to exceptional
situations—individual rights, democracy conditions and separation of powers—and will be
construed strictly. In cases of amendable clauses, the legislative branch may have the final
word due to democratic legitimacy. As Waluchow notes, “[i]t is possible to have judicial
review without granting judges the final say.”856 Rosalind Dixon would generally call this
weak-form judicial review.857 Nevertheless, the legislative will also have the political burden
of explaining why it is overruling a judicial decision.
Mark Tushnet, in the book Weak Courts, Strong Rights, writes about this topic:
“The political developments I have sketched made judicial
review more attractive. By the mid-1960s or so, most designers
of modern constitutional systems concluded that some form of
judicial review is the best means of ensuring that policies
852
As I noted above, a very influential doctrine in a book written in the sixties, entitled Aplicabilidade das
Normas Constitucionais by José Afonso da Silva, argued for this view. Silva classified constitutional norms
focusing on their efficacy. For Silva, there are three types of constitutional norms: (a) norms that have full
efficacy; (b) norms that have limited efficacy and demand statutory regulation; (c) norms that have full efficacy
but may be limited in part by statutory law. See SILVA, supra note 95.
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inconsistent with the constitution will not be implemented.
Yet, giving judges the power to enforce constitutional
limitations can threaten democratic self-governance. The
reason is that constitutional provisions are often written in
rather general terms. The courts give those terms meaning in
the course of deciding whether individual statutes are
consistent or inconsistent with particular constitutional
provisions. But, as a rule, particular provisions can reasonably
be given alternative interpretations. And sometimes a statute
will be inconsistent with the provision when the provision is
interpreted in one way, yet would be consistent with an
alterative interpretation of the same provision. […]
Courts exercise strong-form judicial review when their
interpretative judgments are final and unrevisable. […]
Weak-form systems of judicial review hold out the promise of
reducing the tension between judicial review and democratic
self-governance, while acknowledging that constitutionalism
requires that there be some limits on self-governance. The
basic idea behind weak-form review is simple: weak-form
judicial review provides mechanisms for the people to respond
to decisions that they reasonably believe mistaken that can be
deployed more rapidly than the constitutional amendment or
judicial appointment process.”858
Although Tushnet mentions that weak-form of judicial review refers to more rapidly
responses than a constitutional amendment, in Brazil, the C.F. amending process is much
simpler than the U.S. Constitution’s process, because it does not require the approval of the
States and is carried out by Congress alone, although in a more burdensome manner than the
required for statutes.859 Therefore, the enactment of constitutional amendments can serve the
task of implementing weak-form review because “judicial interpretations can be revised in
the relatively short term by a legislature using a decision rule not much different from the
one used in the everyday legislative process.”860
Countries that adopt this second constitutional model commonly consider themselves
societies in transition, such as some European nations after World War II, Portugal, Spain
and some countries in Latin America after the end of dictatorships in the last quarter of the
20th Century.
Nevertheless, as Tushnet noted, countries who chose this form of enforcing rights
will not write down rights in detail in their constitutions. They will usually write them very
broadly, through the use of moral language, by means of principles, goals and basic
foundations, as Brazil did. In this sense, if the official practice adopts a view that these rights
are causes of action and that judges may enforce them even in the absence of statutory
858
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regulation, no doubt judges may have discretion as to how to enforce them. Since these are
societies in transition, those countries may entrust their judiciary with great responsibility
and will have confidence that this branch will guarantee that the constitution does not remain
a symbolic document. Nonetheless, this responsibility will be shared with the legislative and
the executive.
Under a soft-positivist scheme, both of these models of separation of powers are
permissible, because they result of choices made by authorities that, according to secondary
norms (rule of recognition), may draft the rights and duties (primary norms) and shall
implement and enforce them (secondary norms, rules of adjudication).
Dworkin, as noted in subchapter III.5.3., calls this second approach government by
adjudication861 and acknowledges that some countries have adopted this model, which he
believes is more suitable for these nations. 862
Georges Abboud and Rafael Tomaz note that, by choosing this model, a country will
depart from Montesquieu’s classical tripartite idea of government to better seek the ideal of
effective limitation of political power. 863 These authors also point out that through a
prescriptive viewpoint of the separation of powers the country will ask if the adopted model
effectively carries out its desideratum:
“In this sense, the concept of division of powers may be
presented in different forms and it is possible the coexistence
of organisms and functions that do not perfectly frame the
classical tripartite, but, even so, pursue the ideal of a limited
government concretization.”864
It is interesting to note that this model of division of powers is also dynamic.865 As
noted in subchapter III.5.2, by observing this dynamic relationship of the branches of the
government, focusing on the role of judges in constitutional and statutory interpretation,
based on the neoconstitutionalist approach, Brazil does not fit the pure top-down frame
anymore, even though some judges may think it still does.
By writing these broad principles into the C.F. and by affirming that they are selfenforceable and do not depend on the enactment of a statute to have force, Brazil also adopted
a bottom-up model of lawmaking to deal with the concretization of principles—which works
concomitantly with the classical top-down model.
Since Brazil chose its legal system to be informed by the constitutional principles of
justice, liberty and equality and decided that these principles are enforceable by courts and
do not need to wait for government regulation to make them effective, courts gained an
important role in implementing rights that are grounded in these principles and also in
reviewing them when the implementation is made by the legislature and the executive. These
rights are recognized by courts in a case-by-case fashion and also in abstract proceedings that
are decided directly by the S.T.F..866
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The bottom-up method is based on the common law approach, although in Brazil it
is grounded on pedigreed sources, originated by a distinct social fact, the enactment of the
1988 C.F.. As I have previously observed, the method is addressed by Hart it in The Concept
of Law:867
“In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between
two social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over
great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals
to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up
of social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement
by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be
properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case.”868
In the U.S., for example, at least regarding administrative law, it has been possible to
note the flexibility in the selection of methods for policy determination in the administrative
process:
“One of the most distinctive aspects of administrative process
is the flexibility it affords in the selection of methods for policy
formulation. While a legislature must normally confine itself
to the declaration of generally applicable standards of conduct,
and a court must deal with a problem as defined by the
particular controversy before it, an administrative agency may
often choose between these approaches or may even reject
them in favor of more informal means of regulation.”869
Waluchow also argues that the Canadian Charter of rights should be concretized in a
bottom-up method of lawmaking. 870 He attributes a moral sense in defining what is the
philosophy behind the implementation of charters of rights 871 and argues that these rights
should be considered pre-commitments for that community:
867

Hart’s remarks continue as follows: “In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too much is
sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes or of precedent is too formal and so fails to
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“I am going to suggest that we instead view Charters as
representing a mixture of only very modest pre-commitment
combined with a considerable measure of humility about the
limits of our moral knowledge. The latter stems from
recognition that we do not in fact have all the answers when it
comes to moral rights, and that we should do all we can to
ensure that our moral short-sightedness do not, in the
circumstances of politics, lead to morally questionable
government action. Far from being based on the (unwarranted)
assumption that we have the right answers to the controversial
issues of political morality arising under Charter challenges,
the alternative stems from the exact opposite: from a
recognition that we do not have all answers, and that we are
best off designing our political and legal institutions in ways
that are sensitive to this feature of predicament.”872
The fact that these constitutional rights are pre-commitments and that they will be
concretized as the situations occur—either in concrete or abstract review lawsuits—reveals
the importance of courts, as well as the legislative and the executive, in the enterprise. Since
countries that adopt this constitution model using moral principles to define rights do not
anticipate all the situations they covered—they may anticipate some situations; some cases
that judges decide only grounded on principles may be easy cases, as I observed in subchapter
III.3.1873—, all branches may play a concomitant role. “Judicial decisions of this kind—
normally referred to as ‘decisions of principle’—do not eliminate the legislative problem,
but rather recast it, setting limits on acceptable solutions.”874
In Canada, as Waluchow notes, “the idea of a shared partnership, involving a dialogue
between Parliament and the courts, has begun to take hold in both public debate and judicial
decisions.” 875 This shared partnership, nonetheless, to succeed, shall be based on an
important set of virtues pointed by David Strauss: “[i]ntellectual humility, a sense of
complexity of the problems faced by our society, a respect for accumulated wisdom of the
past, and a willingness to rethink when necessary and when consistent with those virtues.”876
Waluchow gives an interesting example of a Canadian Supreme Court precedent in
which this shared partnership may be noticed. In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
N.A.P.E.,877 the Court sustained a provincial parliamentary decision and held constitutional
a statute that postponed the start of equal rights payments to women in the health care sector
to due to fiscal constraints. The pay equity obligation was established in an agreement entered
into three years before the legislation was enacted. The Provincial Government argued that
the procedural conceptions of democracy with its emphasis on self-determination or the much stronger
constitutional concepts and its more substantive ideals, such as the ideal of equal concern and respect. This, we
recognize, can occur even when our majoritarian procedures are functioning as designed—that is, when no one
is denied his right to participate on an equal protection footing with everyone else and decisions are not
motivated by discreditable forces like fear and prejudice. In recognition of these limitations in ourselves and
our procedures, we structure our constitution so as to overcome them. We opt for constitutional arrangement
involving judicial review.” WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 152.
872
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the deferral was necessary because it was facing a severe fiscal deficit. The Court had to
analyze whether “this kind of consideration [the deferral of payment] was enough to justify
an infringement of equality rights under the Section 1 “reasonable limits” clause of the
Charter.”878 Zagrebelsky also gives an example of the dialog in the Italian Constitutional
Court decisions:
“In some cases, when it is a question of safeguarding ‘rights
that have a price,’ ‘the minimum content’ of the relevant
principles must be taken into consideration, thus limiting the
discretionary power of the legislator concerning expenses and
budget. For example, in a 1988 decision, the Italian
Constitutional Court compared the involuntary unemployed
person’s right to social assistance to the legislator’s autonomy
over the budget and declared that a law that provided for an
unemployment benefit of a few thousand lire per month was
unconstitutional. The Court deemed that such an amount was
below a minimum acceptable under law but left further future
decisions to the legislature.”879
In the U.S., Abner Greene points out that much of the SCOTUS “work indicates […]
a willingness to engage in dialogue with government officials and at times to defer to them,
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either completely or partially.” 880 This intellectual humility attitude is a quality that,
according to Strauss, common law judges, familiarized with the bottom-up model, have:
“The first attitude at the foundation of the common law is
humility about the power of individual reason. It is a bad idea
to try to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to
the collective wisdom of other people who have tried and
solved the problem.”881
The mix between natural and posited law and the alleged likelihood of law assuring
clarity, certainty and objectivity882 argued by post-positivists do not provide the necessary
candor to acknowledge that not all situations were anticipated by the C.F., neither the catalog
of rights is universal.
Therefore, explaining neoconstitutionalism through the inclusive legal positivist
eyes, as a legal system’s chosen—not inherent—method, elucidates the different role of
courts in implementing individual social rights and reviewing the legislative’s choices on the
matter, being also much more honest and accurate to what actually takes place in comparison
with how post-positivism explains it.
Inclusive legal positivism allows, then, an empirical or descriptive model of
neoconstitutionalism.883 The phenomenon exists because of the way positive law is figured
out in a system.884 Neoconstitutionalism is simply an “evidence of the existence of a social
practice among judges of resolving [constitutional] disputes in a particular way” 885 in Brazil.
The Italian scholar Tecla Mazzarese shares the same opinion regarding the compatibility of
positivism and neoconstitutionalism:
“Now, simple and plain as it may sound, to conceive of neoconstitutionalism as a form of natural law is nevertheless
unsatisfactory and misleading.
It is unsatisfactory since it actually misses the very point which
grounds the demand for a neo-constitutionalist understanding
of law, namely: the radical change positive law has been going
through since the implementation and protection of
fundamental rights have been taken to be purported as the main
distinguishing feature of a legal system.
Further, to conceive of neo-constitutionalism as a form of
natural law is misleading since, to use Hans Kelsen's words, it
actually ignores that similarly to King Midas transforming in
gold whatever he was touching, law provides with an ultimate
legal character whatever may happen to be its specific concern.
That is to say, it ignores both that what is taken to be a matter
of legal implementation and protection depends upon the
catalogue of fundamental rights which may happen to be
880
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selected in a given legal system, and that the greater or lesser
extent to which such a catalogue of fundamental rights is
secured legal implementation and protection depends, once
again, upon what any given legal system may happen to adopt
as their guarantees. In other words, it is misleading since, far
from making it clear, actually conceals that both the values to
be legally protected and the extent to which secure them
depend, either of them, upon the contingent choices adopted
by different legal systems.”886
Waluchow also mentioned the compatibility of inclusive legal positivism with more
liberal and active approaches of constitutional interpretation. He says that there are various
approaches, but he summarizes three categories: “(a) those who think that judges should be
faithful to the text of the constitution; (b) those who believe that the proper object of
deference is the intent of the original framers; and (c) those who claim that judges should
view the constitution as a ‘living tree’ and interpret it in ways which express an everchanging and developing political morality.”887 He claims that “the judge will be more likely
to follow adjudicative approach (c), which is similar to neoconstitucionalism, if he accepts
inclusive legal positivism:
“If, by way of contrast, a judge is thought to be discovering the
existence or content of pre-existing valid law in a charter case
involving appeal to considerations of political morality
(because there is nothing in the nature of law which precludes
this possibility, as inclusive positivism suggests), then such a
retreat seems far less likely. The judge and others will view his
decision, not as one which encroaches upon forbidden territory
reserved for legislators, but as which is required by his normal
legal-adjudicative obligation to discover and apply the law that
exists and has institutional force over his decisions. There will
be little danger that the archetypal image of the judge will be
confused with the very different image of judge as legislator,
politician, or moral reformer. So the judge will be more likely
to follow adjudicative approach (c), as opposed to the more
‘conservative’ approaches represented by (a) and (b), if he
accepts inclusive positivism.”888
IV.8. Nepotism, Cruelty Against Animals and Party Loyalty Again
Returning to the three cases we first examined in subchapter II.2., the role of the
S.T.F. is much better explained once we understand the Brazilian system of concretization
of constitutional principles as a bottom-up system.
Regarding the nepotism cases, the fact that S.T.F. banned nepotism in all three
branches of government shows that the Court, in a bottom-up fashion, acknowledged a fact—
not anticipated by the 1988 Framers as so serious or maybe anticipated but not confronted in
the C.F. due to corporativism—as causing damaging consequences to the country. The Court
also noticed that the unfairness of allowing appointment of relatives privileged politicians,
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judges and other public officials in detriment to the whole population, who can only have
access to public positions by public competitive examinations. Problems of unequal
treatment, public inefficiency and excess of privileges were addressed. Therefore, the Court,
grounding the prohibition in the principles of morality and impersonality (neutrality), ruled
it unconstitutional.
As Justice Barroso—who was then the lead attorney of the case—commented, the
“conventional knowledge” of respected scholars was that the only constitutional permissible
manner to ban nepotism was through the enactment of a statute. However, to circumvent this
conventional knowledge argument to say that no statute was necessary, the Court framed
nepotism within the core of the concept of administrative morality and impersonality, in a
top-down fashion. Therefore, the argument about the need of a statute prohibiting nepotism
did not prevail, since the court claimed that nepotism offended the nucleus of principles of
morality and impersonality.
By using the “core argument” the Court wanted to avoid any allegation of activism,
lawmaking or undue interference with the separation of powers. The use of the “core
argument” is certainly an attempt to justify the outcome as a process of logical deduction
from a pre-established unequivocal conception of morality, which, based on the huge
disagreement that existed even among judges, reveals not to be true.
It would have been more honest and sincere if the S.T.F. had asserted that, under the
choices made by the 1988 C.F. Framers, the Court has an active role in construing the
Constitution and in helping develop their principles such as equal treatment and assert that
nepotism was a recurrent problem, not resolved by Congress, which had incentives not to
deal with it.889 In this analysis, concrete experience plays a role and the concretization of the
content of principles that inform S.T.F’s conclusion is less abstract and more down-to-earth.
In addition, a clear message is also sent: that legislative inertia in handling important
issues is not an excuse for the absence of immediate C.F. enforcement.890 I will talk more
about this case in the next chapter.
The dialogue approach was even clearer when the S.T.F. reviewed the
constitutionality of the State of Ceara statute that allowed the vaquejada. The C.F. had a
provision that declared that practices that submitted the animals to cruelty were not
allowed.891 But the constitutional text also assures that popular cultural manifestations shall
be protected. Therefore, under the neoconstitutionalism approach, the Court acted correctly
to decide the controversy initiated by Brazil’s Chief Federal Prosecutor. In doing so, the
Court reviewed the concretization of the principles that had been done by the State of Ceara
Assembly and, after gathering evidence in the case file, granting the opportunity for amicus
curiae to join in the case, disagreed with the State’s choice, because, in its opinion, it did not
give proper weight to the animal cruelty prohibition.
Nonetheless, I pointed out in subchapter II.2.2. that an Amendment to the C.F. has
been passed by the Federal Congress and, in the new text of article 225, § 7º, provided a new
definition for cruelty, excluding from the concept the cultural sports practices that use
animals, such as the vaquejada. Brazil’s Chief Federal Prosecutor challenged this new
provision through abstract review, but the S.T.F. has not yet decided the case.
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The debate is certainly of a different kind now because the constitutional challenge
is framed on the violation of constitutional immutable clauses, 892 what is certainly highly
questionable in the case, considering that the issue is about animal rights, not individual
rights.
But even if the Court defers to Congress’ divergent choice, there is no doubt that the
dialog among the branches is likely to have been relevant. Congress is likely to have carefully
scrutinized the S.T.F. reasons and to have stated clearly why it disagreed with them. If
Congress has not done this attentive examination, the political pressure on the issue will
probably not settle.
Finally, regarding the party loyalty case, it is clear that a bottom-up model of judicial
lawmaking also took place. The T.S.E., taking into account the dreadful consequences that
party-switching caused for democracy, ruled the practice unconstitutional. Party unloyalty
basically corroded the opposition parties’ strength, since the parties in the governmental
coalition, using the government structure, had a lot of power, both political and financial, to
attract Congressmembers to them. The problem was worsened because party public funds
and campaign television time is proportionally divided according to the number of members
in the Federal Chamber of Deputies. The facts revealed by the Mensalão trials proved these
concerns were right.893
Both the S.T.F. and the T.S.E. did not wait for Congress to solve the problem,
especially because the governing parties had no incentive to fix it and the functioning of
Congress, as the result of popular vote balance, was under threat due to the arbitrary
disequilibrium of forces and the fraud to the popular will.894
Other bottom-up decisions that are worth mentioning are the recognition of same sex
895
unions, the right of abortion in cases of anencephaly,896 the coexistence of biological and
socio-affective paternity897 and the rights of transgenders to change their names.898
IV.9. Chapter Conclusions
Post-positivism is inadequate to the task of explaining and describing Brazilian law.
Although post-positivists succeeded in attacking specific characteristics of that were
prevalent in Brazilian positivism, which seemed incompatible with the judicial practice after
the enactment of the 1988 C.F, they went too far in acknowledging an inherent relation
among legality and morality and by trying to frame in law identification specific questions
of adjudication.
Inclusive legal positivism, by asserting that morality can be a condition of validity if
the rule of recognition says so, is much more accurate with Brazilian legal practices. And by
892
Article 60, §4°, of the C.F. says that “[n]o proposed constitutional amendment shall be considered that
is aimed at abolishing the following: I. the federalist form of the National Government; II. direct, secret,
universal and periodic suffrage; III. separation of powers; IV. individual rights and guarantees. CONSTITUIÇÃO
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, § 4º, I-IV (Braz.). Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf.
893
S.T.F., A.P. No. 470, Relator: Min. Joaquim Barbosa, 17.12.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO
[D.J.e.], 19.4.2013 (Braz.).
894
See supra note 86.
895
See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, 5.5.2011, D IÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO
[D.J.e.],14.10.2011, 691 (Braz.).
896
S.T.F., ADPF No. 54, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 20.4.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO
[D.J.e.], 30.4.2013 (Braz.).
897
S.T.F., R.E. No. 898.060, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, 21.9.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO
[D.J.e], 28.4.2017.
898
S.T.F. A.D.I. No. 4275, Rel. Min. Marco Aurélio, 1.3.2018, (unpublished).

168

explaining that law identification and adjudication are separated tasks, inclusive legal
positivism offers clarity on why judges sometimes do not apply the laws in particular cases,
without trying to affirm that a norm is being applied by being disapplied. 899
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V. PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES FOR INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM
V.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals
In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that showing that inclusive legal positivism
well captures the Brazilian legal norms and practices would throw light on the country’s
legal system upsides but would also clarify most relevant downsides. I also stated that
highlighting these positive and negative features will be important because they are not
evident and, therefore, are not usually noticed.
There is a famous quote, attributed to the former Ministry of Finance Pedro Malan,
that “in Brazil, even the past is uncertain.”900 This phrase is used in at least two contexts: (a)
sometimes it is related to the lack of clarity in the government financial records and (b)
sometimes it is related to the unforeseeability of legal decisions and to legal uncertainty.
This chapter intends to (a) analyze problems of guidance that may occur with the
inclusion of moral principles as condition of validity of laws and acts and to (b) suggest some
remedies that can minimize this effect in Brazil.
V.2. Uncertainty, Unintended Deterrence and Efficacy
According to Fernando Guimarães, Brazilian public administrators have been, bit by
bit, “giving up deciding.” 901 He remarks that due to excessive control of administrative
actions and to general legal uncertainty, administrators simply do not want to “run risks:” 902
“Since the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, which inspired
a model of control that strongly inhibited the liberty and the
autonomy of the public administrator, we have been watching
an amplification and a sophistication of the control over the
administrator’s actions. Making every day administrative
decisions started to attract legal risks of every order, that can
even lead to the criminalization of the conduct. Under the paws
of all this control, the administrator gave up deciding. He saw
his risks being amplified and, under a self-protecting instinct,
has circumscribed his actions to a ‘comfort zone’. In this sense,
an inefficiency crisis due to control has been put in place:
cornered, the administrators do not only perform acts trying to
achieve the best administrative solution, but also to protect
themselves. The adoption of heterodox or controversial
administrative actions means exposing oneself to
unimaginable risks. And this administrator inhibition towards
this scenario of amplification of his legal risks is
comprehensible. At the end of the day, sensitive decisions may
purport the risk of being criminally prosecuted. As an
inevitable consequence there is administrative inefficiency,
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which clearly harms
administration.”903

the

functioning

of

public

Guimarães is not alone in this criticism. Professors Joel and Pedro Niebuhr, in an
article entitled “Public Administration of Fear,”904 make similar comments. They mention
that public servants should only be punished if they acted with gross negligence or malice.
But that is not what in fact happens:
“Administrative agents should only be penalized when they
had acted with malice or grave negligence, what would only
take place in glaring and exceptional cases. They should not
be penalized when law enforcement offices merely disagree on
the merits with their decisions or with their legal interpretation
on technical or juridical controversial issues. The
interpretation of law enforcement offices should not be taken
as absolute truth, what would lead to application of sanctions
to administrative agents due to mere interpretive disagreement.
This all seems obvious, very obvious. But it is not what
happens in practice. Administrative agents are penalized, with
harsh sanctions, even when they act in good faith, even in cases
in which no one questions their honesty. They are penalized by
pretense mistakes, which, in truth, reverts to interpretive
disagreement or because of neglect of formalities prescribed
by law. Some call this a hermeneutical crime.
The law enforcement offices’ excesses gain relevance because
administrators work with a fuzzy legislation, which gets lost in
bureaucratic formalist regulations, whose most representative
example is the unfortunate Lei No. 8.666/1993, that regulates
the making public biddings and the execution of administrative
contracts.905
Regarding this specific law, Joel and Pedro Niebuhr add that the prevalence of open
textured principles has the effect of providing justifications for subjective and lose decisions:
“This defective legislation is filled of various principles,
which, by nature, are more open and, due to this reason, end
up serving as pretense justification for any type of decisions,
that goes to all sides, all subjective and loose. Furthermore, in
a general manner, law enforcement offices do not worry about
articulating arguments to justify that a given principle leads to
one or another conclusion. They simply decide and use
principles for allegedly furnish grounds to a decision, without
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explaining the reasons and circumstances the stated principle
applies to that situation.906
In this sense, they conclude that “public administrators do not want to create, do
something different, or think about other solutions. The new can go wrong and the mistake
is severally punished.”907
Carlos Ari Sundfeld also observes:
“It is true that, in abstract, nobody in the legal world discusses
that the administrative action has to be efficient and effective.
Even the Constitution demands ‘efficiency’ from the public
administration (art. 37). But let’s speak the truth: the good
public management is not a priority of the Brazilian
legislation, nor of its interpreters. The priority has been
another: limiting and controlling—even threatening—as much
as possible the administrators, which are, in principle,
suspected of having done something.
[…]
Our problems in the public government do not come from
simple technical imperfections of laws and persons. They
come from a deeper issue: the legal preference for the
maximum of rigidity and control, even if this means
compromising the public administration efficiency. Good
management can and shall live together with limits and
controls, but not with this maximalism. If we do not invert the
priorities, there is not administrative reform capable of
unlocking the public administration.”908
In resorting to the economic analysis of law, one may understand the practical
consequences of a legal system that chooses to write laws with the prevalence of moral
principles as criterion of legal validity and as tool to construe the meaning of rules and to
create of causes of action. The option for an analytical constitutional text that employs, in its
provisions, undetermined legal concepts, fundamental rights and principles—all understood,
in most of contexts, as non-conclusive or prima facie norms—was important to allow better
protection of some individual and social rights, but certainly has raised ambiguities and left
difficult issues for future resolution by public administrators and by courts. 909 Since
administrators do not have immunity—only judges and prosecutors do for negligence
cases910—they, in fact, may run high risks in their day-to-day activities.
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Principles, as non-conclusive or prima facie norms, are similar to standards. They
may be “vague; costly to administer because open-ended; and difficult to monitor
compliance with by the court or other body that enforces the standard.”911 As Richard Posner
also notes, “law’s vagueness […] create[s] a risk that legitimate conduct will be found to
violate it.”912 So, vagueness can create an unintended deterrent effect “when the legitimate
activity that is deterred is more valuable socially than privately.” 913 This unintended
deterrent effect is exactly the consequence described by Fernando Guimarães above and is
also pointed out by Carlos Sundfeld:
“The consequences of failure and the consequences of legal
uncertainty cannot fall into the administrator’s back. The
administrator must be protected from the enforcement
extremes. On the contrary, due to the fear of becoming a
defendant in a proceeding, he crosses his arms and keeps
waiting for retirement. Our public administration becomes
even less effective. What law has to do is to multiply the
incentives for the public action, and not create new risks for
those who act, because these new risks generates
accommodation and paralysis.”914
Zagrebelsky agrees with Posner’s remarks regarding rulemaking. He affirms that
principle-based bottom-up jurisprudence is plastic and adaptable:
“In relation to rules, the legally relevant elements in a case are
established in a more or less determined way. In contrast,
principles, as already suggested, yield no such determined
path, with the result that the relevant elements of the law are
determined on a case-by-case basis. This characteristic renders
principle-based jurisprudence particularly plastic and
adaptable, whereas jurisprudence by rules aims at a greater
rigidity and fixity.”915
Empirical research would be necessary to understand the full extension of these
problems. That is far more than the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I am certain that some
of these criticisms and theoretical considerations of the concurrent problems in legal systems
like the Brazilian are problems that may be associated with the possibility of moral criteria
as condition of law validity. In fact, Posner’s comment, read in conjunction with
observations made in (a) subchapter II.4.1., regarding the civil law legislation style and the
status of vague norms in German law, in (b) subchapter II.5.5., with respect to the
concretization of principles, especially under the neoconstitutionalism paradigm, may
provide traces that Pedro Malan’s well-known phrase and that the administrative scholars’
observations are somewhat true.
Another example is Brazil’s approach towards disciplinary punishments, referred in
subsection III.3.. Maria Di Pietro asserted that “in administrative law, vagueness prevails.
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There are few infractions clearly described by the law, as it happens with ‘public employment
abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing with
a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as a serious fault,
irregular proceeding, service inefficiency, public disobedience, or other infractions set forth
in an undetermined manner by the statutory legislation.” 916 Therefore, this is another
example of punitive norms that use standards for justifying decisions. Of course, the use of
standards does not imply that all situations to which they should apply will be controversial.
But it raises the possibility that controversy will exist, because the intent of writing standards
is exactly to leave some situations open to be settled in a case by case manner.
The general use of standards, thus, may not only lead to inefficiency in governmental
action, but also may raise fairness problems, because it runs counter to the values of certainty
and predictability, values that are within Brazil’s political morality. In summary, it may catch
the party by surprise. 917 Mauro Cappelletti takes this position:
“Creative judges should never lose sight of this first
‘weakness’ of law-making through the courts. Of course, it
would not be easy for them to object that statutory law,
whether codified or not, is itself never complete, never
unambiguous, and never easily accessible to all. Difficulty of
information is, in particular, a permanent obstacle to full
access to the law in every legal system, especially for
underprivileged persons and groups. Yet this problem must be
seen—once again—as a matter of degree. Case law is arguably
subject to that difficulty to a somewhat higher degree than
statutory law.”918
Therefore, there is a risk that Brazilian law, in some cases, may treat the citizens in
the same way described in Jeremy Bentham’s notorious metaphor: “It is the Judges [as we
have seen] that make the common law: — Do you know how they make it? Just as a man
makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him off, you wait
till he does it, and then beat him for it.”919
Problems of vagueness of the law have an additional complicating aspect in systems
like Brazil: the fact that concretization of rules and principles by judges look back to past
events.920 Retroactive application of new creative court’s understandings of principles and
rules are the rule of the system. That is why Zagrebelsky points out that in some areas of law
this should be avoided:
“In certain determined fields, [regulation by principles] is
expressly excluded. That is predominantly the case in criminal
law, where it is preferable that the legislator establish crimes
and punishment through prospective and predictable rules.” 921
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As a matter of fact, even the word concretization—that is used to describe the
interpretative work done by the judge regarding principles—discloses this possibility, since,
according to scholars, the results are adopted “in conformity with, but not determinable by,
the Constitution.”922
V.3. The Interactionist View of Law
The American legal theorist Lon F. Fuller is mostly known in Brazil for the book The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers,923 but his most important jurisprudential work is certainly
The Morality of Law. Because the latter book was never translated into portuguese, it has not
made its way into Brazilian jurisprudential thinking. Yet The Morality of Law provides an
important analytical framework for thinking about how to traverse the difficulties that
accompany open-textured and inclusive legal positivist systems. Fuller remarked that he
wrote this book because of his “dissatisfaction with the existing literature concerning the
relation between law and morality.” 924
Fuller starts The Morality of Law by drawing a distinction between the two types of
moralities: the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty. The morality of duty lays
down “the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an
ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark.”925 The morality
of aspiration is the “morality of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers. [...]
A failure to realize one or more of these powers would not be wrongdoing, it would be
shortcoming or a failure to actualize potential.”926
After developing these concepts, Fuller presents his imaginary Kingdom, which is
ruled by a fictitious King Rex, who, by making eight basic mistakes, ends up failing to make
law:
“Rex’s bungling career as legislator and judge illustrates that
the attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may
miscarry in at least eight ways; there are in this enterprise, if
you will, eight distinct routes to disaster. The first and most
obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every
issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes
are: (2) a to publicize, or at least to make available to the
affected party, the rules is expected to observe; (3) the abuse
of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide
action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in
922
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effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective
change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the
enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require
conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7)
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject
cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration.”927
Fuller, then, introduces the eight characteristics that a system of law should have to
deserve being called law. The law should be “(1) general; (2) public; (3) prospective; (4)
clear; (5) compatible with one another; (6) possible to obey; (7) stable; and (8) consistently
applied.”928 These principles constitute “the inner morality of law” and are inherent and
necessary to make a legal system possible. Without them, a certain legal system should not
even deserve to be called a legal one for the author. Fuller does not think that non-compliance
with few of these moral principles would automatically make a system non-legal. But he
thinks that this may lead the system to fail and not endure. As Denise Meyerson notes:
“Because it is not possible for citizens to obey rules suffering
from procedural defects like these, these defects would be
‘routes to failure’ in the enterprise of creating law […]. And
a total failure in all of these ways would result in something
that is not simply bad law but not law at all. Just as we would
not describe something that is totally incapable of cutting as
a ‘knife’, so we would not describe a system of rules which
is totally incapable of guiding conduct as a ‘legal system’.”929
If the departures of the eight inner principles of law are so strong, at some point, the
system will cease being law. That is what Fuller thinks happened with the Nazi legal
system.930
Fuller’s theory was severely attacked by Hart931 because Fuller takes a natural law
jurisprudence position—the author argues that these properties are not contingent, but are
inherent to law, whereas Hart thinks that these principles only contribute to maximize law’s
efficiency.932 Even if Fuller’s theory is philosophically wrong in describing what law is, his
theory conveys an important message: it is likely that a legal system that has these procedural
guarantees will have better chances to succeed in comparison to systems that disregard some
or all of these requirements. In fact, systems in which rules (a) are enacted employing vague
norms; (b) are issued with the purpose of affecting specific citizens of a community; (c) are
927
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drafted to retroactively punish citizens or to demand more than they can comply; and (d) are
applied in an inconsistent manner and (e) are constantly changed; are not likely to succeed
in the long run. As an example of the relevance of Fuller’s remarks, his defenders argue that
both of the legal systems invoked by his critics to attack his theory—Nazi German and
Apartheid in South Africa—did not endure for long. 933
These principles that, for Fuller, are inherent to the concept of legality, confer an idea
of what law represents for the author. Fuller asserts that law should be understood as “the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.” 934 He insists that law
should be viewed “as a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy,
insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of
this dependence, to fall always somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals.” 935
According to Kristen Rundle, “[w]hen Fuller speaks of law and its existence, he has
in view a particular quality of relationship between the lawgiver and the legal subject, one
that is reflected in the observance of his eight principles but which is not exhausted by them.”
936
She adds that to gain a deeper appreciation for Fuller’s theory, it is crucial that we focus
deeply on his “repeated references to the relationship of ‘reciprocity’ that a legal system
constitutes and which signals the equal presence and responsibilities of lawgiver and legal
subject alike, as well as his gestures to how the enterprise of lawgiving implicates a ‘sense
of trusteeship’ and a ‘relationship with persons’.”937
Therefore, for Fuller, the legal system obedience to the eight principles of morality
reflects a relationship of reciprocity and respect among the state (the lawgiver) and the
citizen (the law’s subject).938 That is why his theory is called interactionist, as opposed to
directional.939
V.4. The Importance of Fuller’s theory
This work has shown that inclusive legal positivism is the theory that best captures
the Brazilian legal system. Since inclusive legal positivism argues that the relationship of
law and morals is merely contingent, but not inherent, I cannot side with Lon Fuller’s
assertion that a system that does not observe his eight inner morality principles of law (or at
least most of them) should not be considered law. As mentioned in subchapter III.2.1., I
agree with Hart and believe that what matters for defining the existence of a legal system is
the introduction of Hart’s secondary rules, with the purpose of solving problems of
uncertainty, staticity and inefficiency. 940 The combination of primary rules—rules that
impose obligations and duties—and secondary rules is the real “key to the science of
jurisprudence,” as Hart observes.941
However, the fact that Fuller’s theory might be inappropriate to describe what the
law is does not mean that it is not important to identify the goals that a system that aims to
endure and to be fair—such as the Brazilian constitutional regime inaugurated after 1988—
should seek.
933
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Additionally, it is important to stress that Hart is criticized by some scholars that
claim that he did not ascertain the relevance of Fuller’s legal theory. Jeremy Waldron, in a
powerful article entitled Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller,942
after carefully analysing various of Hart’s works, concludes that the British scholar
demonstrated an apparent inconsistency when dealing with the concept of legality, which,
in some degree, Waldron considers that might be a prerequisite of law. And, for Waldron,
legality inevitably links morality and law, although not in the sense of observing “the
demands of morality.”943 Hart, in Waldron’s opinion, did not elucidate if legality is a topic
worthy of jurisprudential analysis.944
In the mentioned article, Waldron observes that Hart, in the quote below,
acknowledges the importance of ‘principles of legality’, which are roughly what Fuller
referred to as the ‘inner morality of law’:945
“Law, however impeccable their content, may be of little
service to human beings and may cause both injustice and
misery unless they generally conform to certain requirements
which may be broadly termed procedural (in contrast with the
substantive requirements discussed above). These procedural
requirements relate to such matters as the generality of rules
of law, the clarity with which they are phrased, the publicity
given to them, the time of their enactment, and the manner in
which they are judicially applied to particular cases. The
requirements that the law, except in special circumstances,
should be general (should refer to classes of persons, things
and circumstances, not to individuals or to particular
actions); should be free from contradictions, ambiguities, and
obscurities; should be publicly promulgated and easily
accessible; and should not be retroactive in operation are
usually referred as to the principles of legality. The principles
which require courts, in applying general rules to particular
cases, to be without personal interest in the outcome or other
bias and to hear arguments on matters of law and proofs of
matters of fact from both sides of a dispute are often referred
as natural justice. These two sets of principles together define
the concept of the rule of law to which must modern states
pay at least lip service.”946
Waldron notes that these formal principles referred by Hart and by Fuller, combined
with “the principles about the broad character of the procedures that should be used in their
application,” 947 which Hart terms “principles of natural justice”, and Americans call
“procedural due process,” are what is sometimes called “the rule of law.” 948 The New
Zealander author adds that Hart was not so modest about the term ‘principle of legality’,
942
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when he criticized the English decision Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,949 in which
the House of Lords decided that the common law crime conspiracy to corrupt public morals,
although not set forth in any statute, was still a crime in the U.K.. In the case, the defendant
was convicted for publishing a catalog which listed the names, addresses and phone numbers
of prostitutes with accompanying photographs:
“[The House of Lords] seemed willing to pay a high price in
terms of the sacrifice of other values for the establishment …
of the Courts as custos morum. The particular value which
they sacrificed is the principle of legality which requires
criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so
that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand
what acts are criminal and what are not.”950
I do not have the intention of evaluating whether Waldron’s claim against Hart
regarding his response to Fuller is correct or not. My intention in citing Hart’s remarks was
mainly to show that he also acknowledged the importance of the principles articulated by
Fuller, if not to define the concept of law, at least to assure how to reach a better and efficient
legal order. Fuller, as noted, identifies law as a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its
success on the energy, insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it.
The most impressive aspect of Hart’s acknowledgement is that it comes close to be
a unanimous point among all authors referred in this work—the unequivocal importance of
the principles of legality for law’s effectiveness. In making a claim of the existence of some
logical connection between principles of legality and the concept of law, Waldron points out
that the term is also relevant for John Finnis and Joseph Raz, although for different reasons
than Fuller’s:
“Laws are what principles of legality are designed to
evaluate; perhaps principles of legality are (as John Finnis
argues) principles for keeping legal systems in good shape;
or principles of legality may be designed (as Joseph Raz
seems to think) to remedy or mitigate evils that only law
makes possible.”951
Ronald Dworkin also recognizes the importance of principles of legality and
exemplify why some of them are part of his integrity concept. In the passage below, he refers
to the need of fair notice in criminal law:
“[…] But if reasons that argue against prosecution in one case
are reasons of principle—that the criminal statute did not
give adequate notice, for example—then integrity demands
that these reasons be respected for everyone else.”952
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In the article Political Judges and the Rule of Law, also commenting the English case
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,953 Dworkin invokes that individuals have a moral
right of “not to be punished except for committing a crime clearly published in advance”: 954
“[…] It would then have been strenuously argued that
individuals have a moral right, at least in principle, not to be
punished except for committing a crime clearly published in
advance, and that in virtue of that right it would be unjust to
punish Shaw. […]”955
Therefore, although agreeing with Hart that the principles of legality are not
conditions for law to exist, there is no doubt that a legal system that wants to be fair, just and
more effective, like the Brazilian legal system after the 1988 C.F., must take these consensual
moral remarks into account. These remarks are part of the country’s political morality.
The previous subchapter emphasized the problems that a system in which
principles—and not unequivocal clear rules—play a good part in defining behavior. There is
no doubt that this system may grant the Judicial branch a prominent role in the discovery and
effective enforcement of individual and social rights but may also lead to unfair
punishments—due to lack of fair notice—and unintended deterrence.
V.5. Solutions for Legal Uncertainty
Throughout this work I have stated that the option for a system of top-down rules,
instead of bottom-up principles, does not prevent uncertainty regarding the content of law.
Even if one were to draft a rule to cover all possible situations, it is likely that new situations
would arise and there would be doubts as to whether the rule should apply or not to the new
case. Of course, the choice for rules in areas such as criminal or administrative punishment
laws, for example, help to better orient conducts. But we need to remind ourselves that
uncertainty is unavoidable due to our inability to anticipate the future. Hart makes this
remark:
“In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between
two social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over
great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals
to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up
of social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement
by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be
properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case. In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too
much is sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation
of statutes or of precedent is too formal and so fails to respond
to the similarities and differences between cases which are
visible only when they are considered in the light of social
aims. In other systems or at other periods it may seem that too
953
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much is treated by courts as perennially open or revisable in
precedents, and too little respect paid to such limits as
legislative language, despite its open texture, does after all
provide. Legal theory has in this matter a curious history; for
it is apt either to ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of
legal rules.” 956
Since Brazil, following the civil law tradition, adopts a declaratory theory of judging
in which judges do not to create but merely declare the law, to avoid situations of unfairness
that are caused by law’s unescapable uncertainty, it is essential to turn to important AngloAmerican law doctrines that deal with similar problems. These doctrines are not currently
part of Brazil’s law, but certainly could help the country’s system escaping problems of
sometimes not complying with some of Fuller’s inner morality principles.
These concepts are important because, as Hart puts, they help to circumvent “the
oscillation between extremes and remind ourselves of our human inability to [at least
sometimes] anticipate the future, which is at the root of this indeterminacy.” 957 These
doctrines are, then, relevant due to the fact that they help to cure the problems pointed out
by the Brazilian scholars in subchapter V.2. and they provide more respect for the Brazilian
citizens in their reciprocal relations with the state. In Brazil’s current stage of law, none are
well developed—save for the prospective overruling technique. 958 In this sense, if Fuller
was right, by curing them, Brazil’s system has more chances of succeeding as least in a moral
sense.
V.5.1. Fair Notice, Vagueness and Overbreadth
The need of informing the citizen about the official rules of conduct is a concern
present in Brazilian posited laws. Article 1 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms
declares that, except otherwise provided, the law enters into force in the whole country after
forty-five days of its official publication.959 Article 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95/98 sets
forth that legal provisions shall be written with clarity, precision and logical order. For
achieving precision, the law must “articulate technical or common language in a manner that
permits the perfect comprehension of the law’s goal and allows that its text points with clarity
the content and the reach the legislator wants to give to the norm.”960 The problem is that
these attributes are not always obtained, and this is particularly troublesome when dealing
with criminal and punishment norms, which affects the citizens’ liberties. As observed in
subchapter III.5.4., regarding the requirements of legality and also of criminal legality, the
publication of an abstract norm is generally considered by Courts to satisfy the constitutional
moral requirement of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”).
Due to the recognition of the consequences that vague criminal statutes may have
in interfering with the citizens’ liberties in the U.S., the SCOTUS has held that the Due
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Process Clause demands that citizens have fair notice of the content of criminal laws. 961 In
this sense, the Court requires that the citizens shall be unequivocally informed of what is
prohibited:
“No one may be required, at peril of life, liberty or property,
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”962
This precedent shows that the Court understands that law should have a guiding
function, at least when life, liberty or property are at peril:
“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties is a well-recognized requirement consonant alike
with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.
And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."963
The SCOTUS has also ruled that “judicial enlargement of a criminal act by
interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be
defined with appropriate definiteness.”964
It is, then, established that “a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct
it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards,
what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” 965 As the Court notes, “the
objection of vagueness is two-fold: inadequate guidance to the individual whose conduct is
regulated, and inadequate guidance to the triers of fact.”966 In these cases, the application of
the void for vagueness967 may hold the law unconstitutional or at least rule it inapplicable to
961
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the case in which the meaning is clearly defined.968 “[T]he touchstone is whether the statute,
either standing alone or as construed by the courts, made it reasonably clear at the time of
the charged conduct that the conduct was criminal.”969
Overbreadth, on the other hand, “is a term used to describe a situation where a
statute proscribes not only what may constitutionally be proscribed, but also forbids conduct
which is protected.” 970 Overbreadthness problems raise concerns because it may create
chilling effects, making individuals “fearful of the possible or threatened application of laws
or sanctions and subsequent prosecutions, whether or not successful, indirectly resulting from
the exercise of those legitimate rights.” 971
Fair notice concerns resemble Fuller’s ideas that laws should be clear, possible to
obey and prospective. By curing vagueness and overbreadthness problems in law application
and still applying the statute retrospectively, punishing the citizen, there is no doubt that there
is a violation of what legality demands. To avoid these fairness problems, Brazilian law
should develop doctrines of fair notice, void for vagueness and overbreadth.
It is important to stress that the notion of fair notice has appeared in Brazilian law
in some decisions. Although Article 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95/98 demands clarity of
legal provisions, the official practice does not set aside rules that do not comply with it.
An administrative proceeding that adopted a similar approach to fair notice notion
was decided by the Tribunal Regional Federal da 4ª Região [T.R.F.-4]. The respondent was
Judge Sergio Moro.972 In a criminal investigation, Moro had issued an order authorizing the
police to monitor former President Lula’s telephone conversations. One of the captured
audios was a conversation between Lula and the then President Dilma Rousseff. It could be
concluded from that conversation that Dilma was appointing Lula to be her chief of staff,
because she wanted him to evade Moro’s jurisdiction— the S.T.F has original jurisdiction to
trial the president and the chief of staff.973 By removing the secrecy to this investigation,
Moro disclosed the audios and the press published them.
President Dilma’s attorneys filed a claim before the S.T.F. arguing that the Court’s
original jurisdiction to trial had been offended by Moro, because only the S.T.F. could have
made the conversation public, since the Court had original jurisdiction over her. The S.T.F.
ruled that Moro’s decision was unconstitutional and declared it void.974 Several attorneys,
then, filed a disciplinary complaint against Moro before the Inspector’s Office of T.R.F.-4.
There was no debate as to whether Moro’s act had violated the C.F., because the S.T.F. had
already asserted that he had. But the court decided not to punish Moro and upheld the
Inspector’s decision that had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the law did not
provide fair notice and clear guidance to judges on that issue. The T.R.F.-4 observed that
the S.T.F. had precedents that had held that the secrecy of personal communications was not
should be able to know with certainty when he or she is committing a crime.” Void for vagueness, BARRON’S
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an absolute right and that, in extraordinary cases, it could not be invoked as safeguard to
illicit actions975 and concluded that:
“[i]n this context, a judge may not be censored in adopting
preventive measures to avoid obstruction of the Operation Car
Wash Investigations. Only after the S.T.F. ruling (Claim No.
23.457) Brazilian judges, including the respondent judge, have
had clear and safe guidance with respect to the limits of the
telephone
communications
secrecy
in
criminal
investigations.”976
Therefore, the T.R.F.-4, by dismissing the claim against Judge Moro, examined the
ability as to whether the state of the law before the S.T.F. ruling allowed the judge to clearly
assert whether his act of removing the secrecy of then President Dilma and former President
Lula’s communication was unlawful or not, and concluded that the judge had not had fair
notice. This type of reasoning, although desirable, is, nevertheless, rare in the country and
should be developed.
V.5.2. Rule of lenity
The rule of lenity is an old common law rule of statutory interpretation. Eskridge
defines it as: “[i]f the punitive statute does not clearly outlaw private conduct, the private
actor cannot be penalized.”977 He adds that “while criminal statutes are the most obvious and
common type of penal law, many civil statutes have been so classified by at least some
jurisdictions.”978
In England, courts have long used the rule of lenity “vigorously for humanitarian
reasons ‘when the number of capital offences was still very large, when it was still punishable
with death to cut down a cherry-tree.’”979 In the U.S., the justification of the rule of lenity is
commonly associated to fair notice and also to proving the intent requirement for committing
a crime. “Although ignorance of the law is no defense to a crime, the inability of the
reasonable defendant to know that his actions are criminal undermines the justice of inferring
a criminal intent in some cases.”980
Eskridge points out that a third justification is separation of powers and cites the
conclusion of an opinion written by the former Chief Justice John Marshall, in 1820:
“After much debate, the Marshall Court adopted the
proposition that Congress cannot delegate to judges and
975

The T.R.F.-4 referred to the S.T.F. precedent H.C. No. 70.814, Relator Min: Celso de Mello, 1.3.1994,
DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 24.6.1994 (asserting that communications between prisoners
serving sentence may be accessed by jail guards).
976
T.R.F-4, P.A. Corte Especial No. 0003021-32.2016.4.04.8000/RS, Relator: Des. Rômulo Pizzolatti,
23.9.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 29.9.2016.
977
ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 693.
978
Id.
979
Id. The authors mention that “among the statutes to which this canon has been applied are (i) statutes
whose penalties include forfeiture; (ii) statutes providing for ‘extra’ damages beyond those needed to make the
complaint whole, including punitive damages, treble damages, attorney’s fees, penalty interest (often part of
the remedy under usury laws); (iii) statutes permitting revocation of a professional license or disbarment of
lawyers; (iv) statutes against extortion or discrimination; (v) statutes declaring certain acts to be per se
negligence; and (vi) others.” Id.
980
ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 693.

184

prosecutors power to make common law crimes, because the
moral condemnation inherent in crimes ought only to be
delivered by the popularly elected legislature. If the legislature
alone has the authority to define crimes, it is inappropriate for
judges to elaborate on criminal statutes so as to expand them
beyond the clear import of their directive words adopted by the
legislature. There is also a separation of powers concern that
judicial expansion of criminal statutes, common law style,
risks expanding prosecutorial discretion beyond that
contemplated by the legislature.”981
The rule of lenity is an antique common law rule and has lost its relevance over the
last years, since it has been revoked in many states, such as New York and California.982
Nonetheless, according to Zachary Price, the rule has been revitalized in SCOTUS’
precedents over the last thirty years.983
It is far from the reaching of this work to propose a precise solution as to how the rule
of lenity should be adopted by Brazilian law. Nonetheless, for reasons of fairness and due
process, it is important that Brazilian judges and scholars begin considering to incorporate a
similar approach when dealing with vague punishment norms.
The rule of lenity does not seem to be present in other civil law countries, such as
Germany—as shown in the works of Giacomolli and Aflen984—and as it may be perceived
from the precedent below, in which former East German spies that performed activities on
West Germany were punished based on a West German statute that became the unified
country’s law:
“The BVefG had to decide whether after reunification East
German spies could be punished for their activities directed
against the former West German state under previously West
German criminal law which was now applicable to the unified
state. Their activities (for example, eavesdropping and
instructing agents in West Germany) had been conducted from
the territory of former East Germany. They argued that the
extension of former West German criminal law to former East
Germany was for them a case of retroactivity because under
former East German Law their activities had—naturally—
been lawful. The court rejected this argument. Under West
German law their activities had been defined as criminal
offences before they had been merely committed. Thus no
981
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legitimate expectations were violated. The spies had merely
relied on the expectation that they would never be prosecuted
for their activities as long as they were sheltered by their state
which—unfortunately for them—had disappeared after
reunification. Article 103 II GG was thus not applicable. This
was not a case for retroactivity of criminal laws. However, the
court acquitted some of the accused on the basis that a penalty
would no longer be proportionate.”985
The fact that criminal and administrative punishment laws can be interpreted as to
determine their scope—sometimes taking into consideration broad principles—must be
accompanied by a humble reflection on the part of judges as to whether this interpretation
could have been reasonably made by the affected parties in the case. An example of a
criminal case where this approach was not even cogitated was the Ellwanger case, mentioned
in subchapter II.5.6., in which the S.T.F., applying various principles including
proportionality, ruled that the publication of a Holocaust denial book configured racism, a
non-bailable and imprescriptible crime in Brazil. 986 The S.T.F. did well in settling the issue
but did not acted properly at least in analyzing whether, after the great disagreement among
the Justices, the defendant did or did not have fair notice due to the status of Brazilian law
regarding the crime at that moment.
It is important to mention that, sometimes, this approach is adopted in cases in which
public employees have received unlawful payments, but not due to their fault. The S.T.F., in
the cases in which the scope of the law is controversial, the Court settles the issue, develops
the law, rules whether the payment is unlawful or not, fixing a prospective criterion to be
followed, but does not determine reimbursement because of good faith. 987 So the
development of a rule of lenity doctrine would not be totally original and without any
analogical precedential support.
As Hart asserted in Punishment and Responsibility: “[a]t present the law which makes
liability to punishment depend on a voluntary act calls for the exercise of powers of selfcontrol but not for complete success in conforming to law. 988 He added that “[i]t is
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illuminating to look at the various excuses which the law admits, like accident or mistake, as
ways of rewarding self-restraint. In effect the law says that even if things go wrong, as they
do when mistakes are made or accidents occur, a man whose choices are right and who has
done his best to keep the law will not suffer.”989
V.5.3. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a doctrine construed by the SCOTUS that holds that “[p]ublic
officials are immune from [civil actions for deprivation of rights] suits […] unless they have
‘violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”990 For
establishing the clearly established criterion, the SCOTUS holds that “an officer ‘cannot be
said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently
definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that he was
violating it,.’” […] meaning that ‘existing precedent … placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” 991
The SCOTUS notes that “[t]his exacting standard ‘gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judges’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.992” It is also interesting that the Court
adopts a humble criterion for examining whether an official broke the law. In case of police
officers, the Court notes that it analyzes the “question from the perspective “of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, […] allow[ing] for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.”993
The adoption of qualified immunity does not prevent courts to impose forwardlooking relief such as injunctions and declaratory judgements and, therefore, to develop the
law.994 But it is certainly an honest and humble approach that avoids unfair application of
laws that are only made clear during the case adjudication.
In this sense, it resembles the interactionist view of law articulated by Fuller, because
it respects the law subject by examining if the law giver effectively has complied with its
burden to enact rules that are possible to obey, in a prospective manner. As the SCOTUS has
held “[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitucional question, it is unfair to subject police to
money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”995
Qualified immunity is also adopted for policy reasons: by providing legal certainty
in regard to law compliance, the doctrine gives incentives to citizens to choose public careers.
Also, by not making them worry so much about lawsuits in which they could lose their
property, the doctrine aims that public servants develop their service more efficiently,
avoiding the deterrence effects mentioned in subchapter V.2..996
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A U.S. case similar to Judge Moro’s proceeding referred above, in which the doctrine
was applied, was Wilson v. Layne,997 decided by the SCOTUS in 1989. Police officers were
sued under their personal capacity because while executing a warrant to arrest, they invited
a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention
of such a media “ride-along.” The Court held that “[i]t was not unreasonable for a police
officer at the time at issue to have believed that bringing media observers along during the
execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful.” It asserted that “the
constitutional question presented by this case is by no means open and shut,”998 and that
“[t]he state of the law was at best undeveloped at the relevant time, and the officers cannot
have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law.”999
Nonetheless, the SCOTUS concluded that “[i]t violates the Fourth Amendment rights
of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into their
home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home
was not in aid of the warrant’s execution.”1000 Therefore, it developed and settled the law on
the case, giving notice to law subjects, as Justice David Souter pointed out:
“Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers
and the general public.”1001
It is important to clarify that I am not taking the position that there may not be
problems with the adoption of a qualified immunity doctrine because that exceeds the scope
of this work. I am just making the case that the doctrine has important arguments for fairness
and, for this reason, is worth of analysis and, maybe, development in Brazil.1002
V.5.4. Stare Decisis
In subchapter II.6. I mentioned that stare decisis is not a cultural tradition in Brazil
and that only certain precedents have binding effect. I stated that the absence of a
consolidated stare decisis doctrine makes the evolution of the law more complicated in the
country.
Richard Posner writes that “[t]he body of precedents in an area of law can be thought
of a stock of capital goods—specially a stock of knowledge that yields services over many
years to potential disputants in the form of information about legal obligations.”1003 He adds
that:
“Deciding a case by applying a precedent economizes on the
judge’s time and effort; he doesn’t have to rethink the issue in
997
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the case from the ground up. In addition, a precedent project a
judge’s influence more effectively than a decision that will
have no effect in guiding future behavior. This is a reason
judges follow as well as make precedent and therefore why
lawyers argue cases on the basis of precedent. If the current
generation of judges doesn’t follow precedent, the next
generation is less likely to follow the precedents of the current
generation because the next generation’s judges are less likely
to be criticized for not following their predecessors’
precedents.”1004
In addition to these concerns, two moral arguments have to be made. Stare decisis
treats people equally and judges who have a practice of following precedents show
humbleness about the power of individual reason. As Strauss observes “i[t] is a bad idea to
try to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to the collective wisdom of other
people who have tried and solved the problem.”1005
The consolidation of a stare decisis doctrine in Brazil—which has been advanced
with the enactment of the new Civil Procedure Code, as mentioned in subchapter II.6.—is
essential to allow citizens to understand what the law demands of them. If every judge is
authorized to make its own interpretation of the broad C.F. text and statutes, guidance may
always be compromised in Brazil, even if we adopt theories such as the rule of lenity and
qualified immunity. As the SCOTUS, citing Benjamin Cardozo, observed “no judicial
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.”1006
V.5.5. Prospective Overruling
Among the solutions mentioned in this subchapter, the only one that is well developed
in Brazil is the prospective overruling technique. This is “the judicial technique by which a
court—eager to overrule an outmoded precedent but reluctant to disappoint the expectations
of the parties—applies that precedent in deciding the particular case before it but
simultaneously announces that it shall consider the precedent as overruled in all future
cases.”1007
An example of the application of this doctrine took place in the party loyalty case
referred in item II.2.3.. As stated, most Chamber of Deputies’ members that had changed
party affiliation before the S.T.F. decision did not lose their seats.1008 The Court held that the
new interpretation would only apply to those who had switched after the date that the T.S.E.
decided the first case which asserted the need for party loyalty in disagreement with the
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previous S.T.F. precedent. 1009 This basically means that only representatives that changed
their party after the first T.S.E. ruling could lose their seats.1010
V.6. Nepotism Once Again
To provide a clear example of application of sanctions in a case decided under vague
norms, I will once again resort to the nepotism cases, mentioned in subsection II.2.3. In those
cases, the S.T.F. ruled that nepotism was unconstitutional within all three branches of
government because it offended the principles of morality and impersonality (neutrality). In
the concrete review case that was adjudicated by the Court, the Chief Prosecutor of the State
of Rio Grande do Norte sought to annul the administrative appointment of a vice-mayor’s
relative and did not request the application of any sanctions.1011 Therefore, the mayor was
not punished, only the office’s appointment was declared void.
Nonetheless, due to these decisions, several lawsuits were filed to impose
administrative improbity sanctions against politicians and public administrators who had
appointed relatives to public offices before the S.T.F. decisions. Since, according to
Brazilian social practices, judges do not make law, but only apply the law, technically there
was no law creation in the case and the S.T.F. was merely concretizing the C.F. text enacted
in 1988 when ruled nepotism unconstitutional.
The two S.T.J. panels that adjudicate public law cases split regarding the issue. The
First Panel ruled that appointments made before the S.T.F. decisions did not configure
administrative improbity because there was no intent to violate the C.F., but only negligence:
“[...] 5. In casu, the lower courts acquitted the defendants
because they understood that nepotism does not characterize
administrative improbity.
6. The defendant’s conduct is grave negligent, but it does not
show the specific intention of harming the public treasury or
gaining undue advantage, indispensable requirements for
breaching the Lei de Improbidade Administrativa, especially
considering that at the time the contracts were entered into
(in the years 2005 and 2006), there was no law forbidding
nepotism in such city, and the contracts were executed before
the S.T.F. approved the Binding Precedent No. 13 (DJe Aug.
29, 2008).”1012
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The S.T.J. Second Panel, on the other hand, ruled contrariwise and stated that the
practice had always been forbidden by the principles of morality and impersonality, which
are also reproduced in art. 11 of Law No. 8.429/1992 and asserted the existence of
knowledge to break the law:
“[...] 2. In the present case, the practice of nepotism is
effectively configured and, as so, offends gravely the
principles of the Public Administration, in special, the
principles of morality and equality, being framed, in this
sense, in art. 11 of Law No. 8.429/1992.
3. The appointment of relatives to positions of confidence,
even if has taken place before the publication of the Binding
Precedent No. 13 of the [S.T.F.], configures an act of
administrative improbity, which offends the principles of the
Public Administration, as set forth in article 11 of Lei No.
8.429/1992, being dispensable the existence of an explicit
rule of any nature regarding the prohibition.”1013
An appeal filed in this second case, to a higher panel, is now pending.1014 Taking this
split into account, I intend to answer in this chapter the question I wrote in the last phrase in
subchapter II.2.1: should public administrators be punished for having committed an
administrative improbity act because they made unconstitutional (immoral) appointments?
Should the public administrator’s readings of the administrative morality clause be
considered a plausible or a truthful reading of the C.F. text, independently of their beliefs or
personal desires?
It is interesting to point out that the S.T.F, by affirming that it was grounding the
banning of nepotism in the core of the morality principle, made in fact a positivistic reading
of the principle, stating that it is apprehended as a morally incorrect practice within positive
morality. 1015 The Court did not justify its decision based on what it thought to be the best
reading of the C.F., but on the current status of the community’s apprehension of morality.
The fact that, under the new constitutional regime, public positions are generally awarded
through public competitive contests is seen as one of the main conquests of the C.F. in terms
of behavioral change and democratization of the public jobs access and shows that the
unconstitutionality could be understood as a matter of social fact. Therefore, the Court’s
decision was justified.
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However, it is clear that there was huge disagreement as to whether nepotism was or
not forbidden. This disagreement existed both regarding (a) the compliance with the criterion
of legality—if a statute was necessary to outlaw the practice or whether the C.F. principles
were enough—and also (b) if the practice ran against positive morality. Although the S.T.F.
held that nepotism violated administrative morality, even the Court of Appeals of the State
of Rio de Janeiro had filed an amicus curiae brief sustaining the contrary argument. 1016 So,
with all this disagreement, it is questionable whether citizens had fair notice as to whether
the practice was allowed or forbidden. The authoritative example provided by many
members of the Judicial branch that incurred in nepotism communicated to the ordinary
citizen that there was nothing wrong with the practice. Courts are generally regarded as “an
authority on proper behaviour, and [citizens turn to them] […] in order to learn the way to
behave.”1017
The S.T.F. ruling correctly developed the law by holding the practice unlawful.
However, punishing officials, such as the Second Panel of the S.T.J. did, neglects the fact
that the state—the lawgiver—did not comply with its obligation to enact clear rules and to
provide proper guidance.
Justice Barroso was the lawyer that argued the case before the S.T.F.. In his book, he
tells a very interesting story about social situations that happened after the case was decided.
The frankness of the comments shows that, as a matter of social fact, the state of the law was
not settled until the S.T.F. ruling:
“Cases that have an impact on the popular belief and on
particular interests generate different feelings and reactions.
After the nepotism trials, I lived two opposing situations. In
the first one, I attended a conference with a respected Court
of Appeals Judge to talk about a case in which I was the
leader counsel. After discussing the professional issues, the
Judge walked me to the door and said: ‘I cannot thank you
enough. Until days ago, my wife worked in my chamber and
‘guarded’ my office. Well, now I am free of that external
control.’ One week later, I made a speech in an event
organized by a state court. During lunch, I notice that a young
lady, who was very nice to everyone, stared madly at me. To
resolve this situation, I went to her and asked: ‘What do you
do?’. The answer came in a very mad tone: “until last week I
worked for the Court of Appeals Judge ‘Jane Doe’, my
mother. Now, thanks to you, I am unemployed.’ Life is full
of ups and downs.”1018
V.7. Chapter Conclusions
According to Hart, “all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social
needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by
private individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues
which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case.” 1019
1016
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Brazilian jurists must understand that their system has opted to insert broad
constitutional principles in the C.F. and has asserted that these principles must interact with
rules in adjudication, due to the belief that judges may issue better decisions. The advantages
of a system disposed in this way for the development of individual and social rights are
unequivocal. Nevertheless, poor guidance may also be offered in some moments and this
may be a problem in some areas, especially in criminal and in administrative law when
punishments may be applied.
That does not mean that guidance problems and judge law-making will always exist
when deciding based on principles. As Hart observed, it is important to distinguish The
scholar notes that it is important to distinguish: [(a)] when applying rules to instances
different that legislators considered or could have considered represents a deliberate choice
or fiat of the interpreters from [(b)] when the inclusion of the new case under the rule is a
natural elaboration of the rule, as something implementing a purpose which seems natural to
attribute (in some sense) to the rule, rather to an intention of the law drafter.1020 There is no
technical formula to give a precise general answer to this distinction and this will have to be
done by judges in each case. Judges must have candor, humbleness, to understand this
problem. This interactionist view, worrying about the relationship among lawgiver and law
subject, although not essential to the existence of law, certainly makes it fairer and better.
As Mario Cappelletti points out “the creative adjudication is supposed to be
retrospective, for a new doctrine applies also to situations which had occurred previously.
Since it has retroactive effect, creative adjudication runs counter to the values of certainty
and predictability, indeed, it is ‘unfair’, for it catches the party by surprise.” 1021 But, as he
adds, citing Lord Diplock, “[t]he rule that a new precedent applies to acts done before it was
laid down is not an essential feature of the judicial process. It is a consequence of a legal
fiction that the Courts merely expound the law as it has always been. The time has come, I
suggest, to reflect whether we should discard this fiction.”1022
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VI. CONCLUSION
H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudential approach to law is unromantic and it does not provide
us with all the answers we may desire about legal disputes. Hart’s positivistic conception
admits that evil systems can still be considered legal systems. It acknowledges that, in some
cases, judges will have nowhere to resort to and will have to come up with a discretionary
decision that will innovate, bringing a new rule to the legal system. In being honest and
realistic about what truthfully happens, about law’s limitations and about the fact that law
does not necessarily have moral value—it may or may not have—, no wonder Hart’s theory
is not the most attractive one for many scholars.
Nonetheless, as this work intended to do, demonstrating that Brazilians identify law
in a similar manner as the inclusive legal positivists do is important for diverse reasons. It
helps to answer criticisms as to whether moral argumentation should take part of legal
reasoning and, if so, whether this is always the case. It helps to comprehend if judges are
being activists or if they are simply doing what the legal system in the past decided they
should now do. It permits showing that problems of guidance happen in any legal system,
but that they can be greater in some systems, due to choices that are specifically made on
law drafting and on law adjudication. Moral criteria in the rule of recognition can be
controversial, can raise disagreement and may be only settled when legislators enact a statute
or, in most times, when courts rule on the issue. In a civil law country, settling a controversial
legal question can be even harder.
Lon Fuller was right when he argued that some basic moral qualities are necessary
for a system to endure. His King Rex example showed that the system will probably not get
very far without them. His only problem was to tie these efficiency qualities to the concept
of law. Many systems of law will never solve these problems and persons will still be living
under the rules of these systems. Not to call this law is unrealistic. Some of these problems
may seem apparently solved at some point, but they may come back at a different time. His
longed-for enterprise of morally subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,
therefore, can always be in danger.
In proposing an unromantic view of law, Hart keeps our eyes open for the legal
system’s great achievements, but also for its worse defects. He shows that participants in the
practice may accept and obey the legal norms as reasons for action, without endorsing
them;1023 that bad laws may be part of the system and that good laws may not, and that, in
many cases, you cannot blame the citizen for obeying the former and not the latter.
If there is candor and humbleness to acknowledge these issues and will to start
thinking about law in this way, the Brazilian legal system may improve in a fair and just
manner. Permanent evaluation of the law, as to whether it should be “respected, or reviled,
renewed, revised or rejected,”1024 must be a constant goal. As Aristotle once said, “knowing
yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.”1025
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